opinion that the army must either fall back or be reinforced by infantry.
gave orders that the position should be maintained and at the same time sent to General Franklin
to hurry forward the infantry.
About 4.30 the enemy, made a general attack in front and right flank, driving infantry and cavalry, back to the line where the battery was stationed.
The guns of the battery were being fired as rapidly as possible with double charges of canister, and although many of the men were recruits, having had no experience under fire, every one of them stood up to his work as bravely as the veterans.
When, however, the infantry support failed (except for the 23d Wisconsin and 19th Kentucky), orders were given to retire in order that the guns might not fall into the hands of the enemy.
Three of the guns had to be left on the field as the horses had been killed.
At the foot of the hill a stand was made, but the rout had become so general that the battery could not maintain its position and was almost surrounded by the enemy.
Orders were therefore given to retreat.
About a mile from the battlefield was the wagon train of the cavalry division, which had become blocked in the ruts and mud and entirely obstructed the narrow road.
The road was so obstructed at this point and the rush of retreating forces so great that it became necessary to abandon the remaining three guns, together with caissons, baggage wagons, battery wagon and forges.
To account for the position of the cavalry train we quote from the 1
report of Col. John G. Chandler
, acting chief quarter-master
‘Both General Franklin
and General Lee
wanted the cavalry train to move in the rear of the infantry force, but they disagreed as to the precedence of position when the trains should be joined.
desired that his train should precede General Franklin
's infantry train, and the ’