William Swinton, Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac

1 ‘A part of the colored division was deflected to the right, and charged and captured a portion of the enemy's line, with a stand of colors and some prisoners.’—Burnside: Report of the Battle of Petersburg.

2 The most destructive fire came from a gun in a work south of the mine, which was covered from the Union batteries by a fringe of trees on their front, that the chief of artillery had required should be felled. ‘This work having been delayed by the Ninth Corps until the night of the 29th, it was then objected to by General Burnside that the noise of chopping would alarm the enemy.’—Hunt: Report of Siege Operations.

3 The report of the Congressional Investigating Committee finds that the failure of the assault was due to the following causes: 1. The fact that the charge was led by white, instead of black troops. This is stated by the committee to be ‘the first and great cause of disaster.’ 2. The fact that General Meade directed that the assaulting column should push at once for the crest of Cemetery Hill, instead of first clearing the enemy's lines to the right and left of the mine. This is a ridiculous charge; for the order to crown the crest involved, in its execution, the clearing of the enemy's lines right and left, as much as an order to General Burnside to pass through a door would presuppose his opening the door.

A very different verdict was, however, pronounced by a military court of in quiry instituted soon after the failure. This court was composed of Generals Hancock, Ayres, and Miles, and its finding is as follows:

The causes of failure are—

1. The injudicious formation of the troops in going forward, the movement being mainly by flank, instead of extended front. General Meade's order indicated that columns of assault should be employed to take Cemetery Hill, and the proper passages should be prepared for those columns. It is the opinion of the court, that there were no proper columns of assault. The troops should have been formed in the open ground in front of the point of attack, parallel to the line of the enemy's works. The evidence shows that one or more columns might have passed over at and to the left of the crater, without any previous preparation of the ground.

2. The halting of the troops in the crater, instead of going forward to the crest, when there was no fire of any consequence from the enemy.

3. No proper employment of engineer officers and working parties, and of materials and tools for their use, in the Ninth Corps.

4. That some parts of the assaulting columns were not properly led.

5. The want of a competent common head at the scene of the assault, to direct affairs as occurrences should demand.

Had not failure ensued from the above causes, and the crest been gained, the success might have been jeoparded by the failure to have prepared in season proper and adequate debouches through the Ninth Corps lines for troops, and especially for field artillery, as ordered by Major-General Meade.

Report on the Conduct of the War, second series, vol. i., p. 215.

Neither of these verdicts, however, reaches the root of the evil. If the reader will study carefully the passage I have quoted from Carnot, in its application to the character of the troops that made the assault, he will have the real cause of the failure. All the rest followed from that primal evil.