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[131] few feet, overflows large areas of these bottoms, and even when not overflowed they are spongy and impracticable for cavalry and artillery.1

In this state of facts, McClellan's disposition of his army must be considered a grave fault, and inaction in such a situation was in the highest degree dangerous. ‘A general,’ says the Archduke Charles, ‘must suppose that his opponent will do against him whatever he ought to do.’ Now, for Johnston to omit to strike one or the other of these exposed wings, was to neglect that principle which forms the whole secret of war—to be superior to your enemy at the point of collision: it was, in fact, to overpass a unique opportunity of delivering a decisive blow.

The Confederate commander was not the man to let slip such an opportunity; and, so soon as reconnoissances had fully developed the position of that portion of the Union army which lay on the Richmond side of the Chickahomy, he determined to act. It was a situation in which, by bringing two-thirds of his own force to bear against one-third of the Union force, he might hope not merely to defeat but to destroy the exposed wing. By the 30th of May he had formed his resolution, and he immediately made preparations for carrying it into effect on the following day.2 During the

1 Barnard: Report of Engineer Operations, pp. 18, 19.

2 It is commonly supposed that it was the freshet in the Chickahominy, caused by the storm of the night of the 30th, that prompted General Johnston to attack; but he had fully resolved to strike before the storm came on, on the mere chances of the situation of the Union army. The storm did not come on till the night of the 30th, and the following extract from the official report of Major-General D. H. Hill will show that General Johnston had made dispositions for the attack as early as noon of that day: ‘These reconnoissances (of Hill's brigade commanders) satisfied me that the enemy was not in force on the Charles City road, but was on the Williamsburg road, and that he had fortified himself about the Seven Pines. The fact was further established, that the whole of Keyes' corps had crossed the Chickahominy. These facts I communicated to General Johnston about noon on Friday, 30th of May. I received a prompt answer from him, that, being satisfied by my report of the presence of the enemy in force in my immediate front, he had resolved to attack them.’ Official Reports of Battles. Richmond, 1864.

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