Hon. J. L. M. Curry , LL.D., William Robertson Garrett , A. M. , Ph.D., Confederate Military History, a library of Confederate States Military History: Volume 1.1, Legal Justification of the South in secession, The South as a factor in the territorial expansion of the United States
Clement Anselm Evans, Ed.

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[532] to close the war by consenting to secession. The position of the Democrats was, in fact, the precise ground taken by Mr. Lincoln at the beginning of his administration and from which he receded under radical pressure. That position was ‘the Union without slavery, or with slavery —but the Union must not be dissolved.’ The leading proposition which they brought forward at various times during four years was that this single question be submitted in any feasible way to the Southern people—Are you resolved on attempting only one end, to establish an independent government? If the answer should be in the negative, the government would then hear the grievances which had caused secession, would redress every wrong, and disarm the spirit of disunion. If, on the contrary, a separate nation was proposed without regard to any adjustment of grievances, Democracy would oppose against it all the entire resources of the United States.

Confederate leaders were greatly influenced from the beginning of the trouble, by proper consideration for the position of the large majority at the North who like themselves opposed the sectional policy of the party which bore Mr. Lincoln into the presidency. It was the earnest desire of this vast Northern conservative element, as was evinced by hundreds of popular demonstrations, to have all hostilities averted with the hope that by lapse of time and mutual forbearance secession could be arrested and the Union preserved. There was undoubtedly very general sympathy at the South with this view of the situation, notwithstanding the fears of the radical aims of the new party. The same consideration for these Northern patriots caused the Confederate authorities to announce that their policy was defensive. The opposition to invasion of Maryland or attack on Washington immediately following the great Confederate victory at Bull Run, was based partly on this policy. Hesitation to cross the Potomac or the Ohio is attributed to the same desire not