The whole cavalry force having been dispatched to press the enemy and cut off detachments, orders were given for the army to move to a point near the railroad and convenient to water, still interposing between the enemy and our large number of wounded, our trophies and our wounded prisoners, whose removal from the field occupied many days. Our supplies of all kinds were greatly reduced, the railroad having been constantly occupied in transporting troops, prisoners and our wounded, and the bridges having been destroyed to a point two miles south of Ringgold. These supplies were replenished, and as soon as it was seen that we could be subsisted, the army was moved forward to seize and hold the only communication the enemy had with his supplies in the rear. His most important road, and the shortest by half to his depot at Bridgeport, lay along the south bank of the Tennessee. The holding of this allimpor-tant route was confided to Lieutenant-General Longstreet's command, and its possession forced the enemy to a road double the length, over two ranges of mountains, by wagon transportation. At the same time our cavalry, in large force, was thrown across the river to operate on this long and difficult route. These dispositions faithfully sustained insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest road to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy and his destruction was only a question of time.
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