by other and more formidable obstructions and to encounter other powerful batteries with which the whole harbor of Charleston
had been lined.
He says that the slowness of our fire and our inability to occupy any batteries we might silence are disadvantages of the gravest character, and until the outer forts shall have been taken, the army cannot enter the harbor or afford assistance.
A want of success, however, will not prevent him from bringing to the notice of the Department the gallant officers and men who took part in this desperate conflict.
After naming the officers and the vessels they commanded, he says: ‘They did everything that the utmost gallantry and skill could accomplish in the management of their untried vessels.’
These commanding officers
had long been known to him; many of them had served in the squadron before, and were present at the capture of the Port Royal
forts; they were men of the highest professional capacity and courage, and fully sustained their reputations, coming up to his requirements.
He commended them and their reports, which speak of those under them, to the consideration of the Department.
He then names in the highest terms Commander C. R. P. Rodgers
, Lieutenant S. W. Preston
, Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie
, and Ensign M. L. Johnson
, who were on his staff or serving immediately under his personal observation.
The result of the attack was mortifying to all of the officers and men engaged in it. Had any loss of life been regarded as likely to render another attempt successful, there would have been few indeed who would not have desired it. The opinion before the attack was general, and was fully shared in by the writer, that whatever might be the loss in men and vessels, blown up by torpedoes or otherwise destroyed (and such losses were supposed probable), at all