and the Bulletin was defined.
That of the Republican
was not. Nominally it was Southern in feeling and policy, but really it changed its course with every change in the situation, and while talking of the rights of the people and the honor of the State
, was playing into the hands of the enemies of both.
It was an enemy in the camp of the Southern Rights
men, and did their cause all the harm it could.
During this period of doubt and delay, Missourians had an object lesson at home that might have taught them a world of wisdom, if they had chosen to learn the lesson.
The State had found it necessary during the preceding fall to keep a considerable military force on its southwestern frontier to protect the lives and property of the people of the border counties from the predatory and murderous incursions of armed bands of Kansans.
So bitter was the feeling of the Free State
men of Kansas
that they never allowed an opportunity to harass, plunder and murder the people of Missouri
to pass unimproved.
A certain Captain Montgomery
, with an indefinite force under him, was particularly active in this congenial work.
The only organized and armed force which the State
had was Gen. D. M. Frost
's skeleton brigade, of St. Louis
It was a fine body of men—a little army in itself, composed of infantry, artillery and cavalry—and General Frost
, who was a native of New York, was a graduate of West Point
Though the brigade did not fight any battles, Frost
was an intelligent officer and a strict disciplinarian, and his campaign served a good purpose in instructing in the rudiments of soldiership a number of young men who afterward made brilliant reputations in the Confederate army.
In point of fact, General Harney
of the regular army was eventually sent to the scene of disturbance to hold the lawless Kansans
The incident did not amount to much, but it showed the feeling by which the Northern
people were animated, and their hostility to Missouri