the attack in front became more furious. The enemy covered every hilltop, swarmed in every ravine, but seemed to be massing his force more particularly against Battery C [Graveyard hill]. I now signaled the gunboat Tyler, the only one at hand, Lieutenant-Commander Pritchett commanding, to open fire in that direction. The enemy (Parsons' and McRae's brigades), nothing daunted by the concentrated fire from Fort Curtis, Batteries B, C and D, the Tyler, and all the infantry I could bring to their support, and led, as I since learn, by Lieutenant-General Holmes and Major-General Price in person, charged upon Battery C. Twice they were repulsed, but the third time, exhibiting a courage and desperation rarely equaled, they succeeded in driving my small force at the point of the bayonet and capturing the battery. Dividing his forces and sending a part, as a feint, to menace Fort Curtis, the enemy then assaulted Battery D [Hindman hill demonstration by Fagan], to reach which they must pass through a deep ravine and encounter a heavy cross-fire. The enemy faltered; seeing which the men in Battery D, and those behind the breastworks and in the rifle-pits supporting it, sallied forth and, surrounding more than three times their number, brought them off prisoners. Not to be outdone by their comrades, the men who had been supporting Battery C . . . gallantly charged upon the enemy in Battery C, retaking it, and capturing as well a large number of prisoners This was about 10 o'clock. I immediately dispatched two aides to carry this information to Cols. S. A. Rice and Powell Clayton, who, with the remnants of two small brigades, were holding the enemy in check on the right flank, where the attack was only the less severe and successful than it had been in front. At 10:30 it became evident that the enemy was withdrawing his forces; but, unaware how severely he had been punished, and learning somewhat of the strength of his forces from prisoners, I could but believe it was for the purpose of massing and attacking my left flank, which I considered the weakest point (the south end of his line). The attack was not resumed, however. . . . My whole force numbered . . . 4,129. [Total loss, 239.]Except by those who suffered from it immediately, through losses and bereavements never to be forgotten,
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