Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 1

‘ [229] will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance. We started from Bruinsburg with an average of about two days rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. Some corn-meal, bacon, and vegetables were found, and an abundance of beef and mutton. A delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. If Blair was up now, I believe we could be in Vicksburg in seven days. The command here has an average of about three days rations, which could be made to last that time.¹ You are in a country where the troops have already lived off the people for some days, and may find provisions more scarce; but, as we get upon new soil, they are more abundant, particularly in corn and cattle. Bring Blair's two brigades up as soon as possible. . . .’

When the march from Hankinson's ferry began, McPherson's corps had the left, on the Rocky Springs road, nearest Black river; McClernand kept to the right, and moved direct by the road from Willow Springs, while Sherman followed with his corps divided on the two roads, and closely guarding the ferries across the Big Black, against Pemberton. But, at Rocky Springs, Grant heard that the rebels were fortifying and concentrating at Edward's station, about twenty-five miles off, on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad, and he at once determined to change the relative positions of the corps. It was his intention now to hug the Black river as closely as possible, with McClernand and Sherman's corps,