Adam Badeau, Military history of Ulysses S. Grant from April 1861 to April 1865. Volume 2

[505] detailed: ‘I believe,’ said Grant, ‘with a bombardment beforehand, the enemy will abandon his works. If not pursued, Sheridan may find everything against him. Humphreys can push everything he has to his left, and if he finds the enemy breaking in his front, then push the single line left, directly to the front. If there is no break made by the enemy, then Miles's division can be pushed directly down the White Oak road. Parke and Wright can open with artillery and feel with skirmishers and sharp. shooters, and if the enemy is giving way, push directly after him.’ Ord also was informed: ‘If it is impracticable for you to get through in your front, I do not want you to try it. But you can, in that case, draw out of your lines more men as a reserve, and hold them to throw in where some one else may penetrate. My opinion is you will have no enemy confronting you in the morning. You may find them leaving now. Understand, I do not wish you to fight your way over difficult barriers against defensive lines. I want you to see through if the enemy is leaving, and if so, follow him up.’

Grant's great anxiety was that Lee should not escape before the assault was made, and precipitate himself on Sheridan. Before the news of the battle arrived, he had directed Meade to hold Miles's division, of the Second corps, in readiness to move to the left;¹ and at 9.30 P. M., he said again: ‘I would fix twelve to-night for starting Miles's division down ’