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[101] of ordinary field-guns, especially if the ground affords the least cover. In this case the distance was fully a thousand yards, and a very dense wood entirely concealed each party from the other's view. All the firing was therefore at random, and the damage sustained was trifling on each side, if we except the disabling of one gun in the Federal battery exposed to view at the commencement of the affair. If it was deemed impossible to use the infantry to force a crossing, at least seventy-five guns (that number might have easily been had) should have been crowded in the Confederate line to hope to accomplish anything by such a random fire.

At the same time that this affair was going on, General Huger's division, numbering about eleven thousand muskets, and accompanied by thirty-seven guns, while pressing down the Charles City road was checked about two miles from Frazier's Farm, where Longstreet and Hill were already engaged, by a ‘powerful battery of rifled guns’ posted on high open ground. General Huger says, ‘General Mahone advanced a battery of artillery (Moorman's), and a sharp artillery fire was kept up for some time. The enemy's fire was very severe, and we had many men killed and wounded.’ General Mahone says, ‘Two pieces of Moorman's battery were put in position and opened fire on his position, which was returned by the enemy with energy and effect.’ The contrast between the results accomplished by the artillery forces of the two armies is very striking in these two instances, and is even more so in the battle of Malvern Hill, which, it is well known, was decided by the powerful artillery concentrated by the enemy. General Lee had designed that a very heavy artillery fire should precede the infantry attack, and ample time (from 10 A. M. to 5 P. M.) had been allowed for all dispositions to be made. The execution of this design is best described by General D. H. Hill in his official report: ‘Instead of ordering up one or two hundred pieces of artillery to play on the Yankees, a single battery (Moorman's) was ordered up and knocked to pieces in a few moments. One or two others shared the same fate of being beaten in detail. Not knowing how to act under these circumstances, I wrote to General Jackson that the firing from our batteries was of the most farcical character.’

The serious defects of the artillery organization were, however, not entirely unappreciated, even before the experience of the Seven Days. On the 22nd of June, General Lee had issued an order which would have materially improved its condition, had there been time for its operation to become effective. It did not do away with the institution

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