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 It was as easy for the enemy to land an army within a few miles of the city without obstruction, as it was to transport one from Washington to Alexandria. Richmond depended for the support of its inhabitants, and the army that defended Richmond depended for its supplies of all kinds, upon long and exposed lines of railway, the defense of which was necessary, if Richmond was to be held. Now, if you will count the whole number of Federal troops employed for three years in trying to take Richmond, including, of course, those engaged in destroying supplies upon which Richmond and its defenders directly depended, and in breaking lines of rail by which Richmond received its supplies and the army defending Richmond received nearly everything it required, and then count all the troops engaged during that time in defending Richmond and its communications, you will find that the respective numbers were nearly or quite as four to one. Then, if you remember that the defense of these communications, as well as the defense of the city, was imposed upon the smaller force, and that the larger had the aid of a powerful flotilla, and the assailants had a profusion of military supplies of all kinds, and that the defenders were armed mainly with the spoils of battle, and very often were nearly naked and always with little to eat, and that there were ten men to take the place of every Federal soldier lost, and often none to fill a vacancy in the Confederate ranks, I say, if you remember all these things and then reflect that Richmond was held triumphantly for three years, I think you will understand how it is that the consent of military opinion in our day accords a foremost place among the great soldiers of ancient and modern times to our chieftain of the glancing helm and stainless sword.
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