Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 21.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

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[135] between the order published in the Official Records as No. 191, copied from General Lee's book of general orders, and that which McClellan declared in his report to be a copy of the order sent by him to Washington, suggests to a legal mind a solution of the dispute which corroborates in the strongest possible manner the sworn testimony of Major James W. Ratchford, Adjutant-General of Hills's division, that the custody of such papers was a part of his exclusive duty at that time, and that no such order was delivered to him with the solemn statement of General Hill that he never saw or read a copy of the order in question, except one purporting to have been sent through General Jackson, to whose corps he was attached when it was issued, and which he still preserved among his private papers in 1886. It will be observed that the first of the two paragraphs, omitted in what purports to be the copy of the order that fell into the possession of the enemy, forbade the troops stationed around Frederick City from entering that town without permission, and the second directed that the sick and disabled of the army should be removed to Winchester. Halleck's correspondence with McClellan on the same day, September 13, 1862 (Official Records, Series 1, Volume XIX, Part 1, page 41), evinces the greatest apprehension that the movement of the army was aimed at Washington city, and the demonstrations higher up the Potomac were intended to distract attention from the real design. Was it not more important that the chief officer of all the armies should know that Lee's sick and disabled soldiers were to be moved to Winchester as the ‘general depot of the army,’ and that all recruits returning, or coming for the first time to the army were to rendezvous at Winchester, than to learn from the last paragraph of the copy sent him that Lee's troops were to habitually carry in their regimental wagons axes to cut wood, &c.? The second paragraph seemed plainly to indicate that Lee's purpose was what he afterwards declared in his report to have been his plan—to establish his base of operations by way of the valley of Virginia and invade or threaten Pennsylvania, not Washington, after taking Harper's Ferry. （Official Records, Series 1, Volume XIX, Part 1, page 145.) This was McClellan's own idea of Lee's design, and if he could have convinced Halleck of the correctness of his views, there would have been no reason for further hesitation about weakening the garrison of the Capital City to swell the effective force in the field. McClellan did not get the whole order and omit a portion of