Crossing over the
Potomac with
Longstreet to
Fredericktown, Md., when our forces moved from that point south,
General Hill was
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ordered to occupy and hold a pass in the
South Mountains, which, if gained by
McClellan, would have enabled him to relieve
Harper's Ferry and possibly to prevent the junction of our scattered army and destroy the divisions in detail, or drive them precipitately south of the
Potomac with great loss of artillery and transportation.
General Lee's object in crossing the
Potomac east of the
Blue Ridge, afterwards avowed (Series 1, Vol.
XIX, part 1, page 145), was to induce the enemy, by threatening
Washington and
Baltimore, to evacuate
Martinsburg and
Harper's Ferry, to establish his own line of communication through the
Valley, and then by advancing towards
Pennsylvania to draw the enemy away from his own base of supplies.
General Lee had not contemplated making a stand at
South Mountain-probably not at
Sharpsburg, or at any point north of the
Potomac.
But the continued occupation of
Martinsburg and
Harper's Ferry made it necessary to move directly upon the former place and to invest the latter, where both garrisons ultimately united.
In consequence of the delay in reducing the garrison it became essential to the safety of
Lee's army that
McClellan's entire force should be held in check for a whole day at the pass in the
South Mountains by
Hill's depleted division, now numbering only 4,000, as a glance at the map with a knowledge of the disposition of
Lee's different divisions will show.
Longstreet with his whole force, estimated at 4,000, was at
Hagerstown, while
Jackson had disposed his own command, including Mc-Laws' and
A. P. Hill's divisions, either with a view to an attack on
Harper's Ferry or to cutting off the retreat of the force occupying it. Three days later
McClellan, according to his own report, advanced to the attack at
Sharpsburg with 87,000 men. Of this vast army probably 33,000 were in the force actually engaged in the assault upon the little Spartan band of
D. H. Hill for five hours without cessation before
Longstreet's advance brigade arrived at 3:30, and was followed by others coming up from that time till dark.
The late
Justice Ruffin, the
Colonel of the Thirteenth North Carolina, standing by the side of the gallant
Garland when he was instantly killed, discovered a moment later that the other regiments of the brigade had retired, leaving his command surrounded by the enemy.
Facing to the rear in an instant, he ordered his regiment to charge, and embarrassed by a painful wound, performed the desperate feat of cutting his way through the serried ranks of the enemy.
A few moments
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later that gallant officer was astonished to hear his intrepid commander express his delight at the discovery that
McClellan's whole army was approaching his front. (2 Battles and Leaders of the
Civil War, page 564.) The explanation afterwards given was one that could have been safely disclosed only to a kindred spirit, such as
Ruffin had shown himself to be.
Hill then said that he had at first feared the movement upon his front was a feint, and that the main body of the enemy had passed through another gap, and might be thrown between
Jackson and
Lee. The situation was still further embarrassed by the fact that
General Stuart had at daylight in the morning withdrawn his command, except the single regiment of
Rosser, which afterwards did its duty so nobly, under the impression that but a small force was in
General Hill's front.
It was ‘with the stern joy’ of an intrepid warrior waiting for the coming contest, that from an elevated pinnacle of the mountain he saw the four advance corps of the grand army of the Potomac, one of which was forming at the foot of the mountain.
The hour and the man had met when
Lee entrusted to
Hill the duty of holding the approach against that army with his little band of 4,000.
From
Seven Pines to
Malvern Hill they had never turned their backs upon the foe. They believed that their leader would require them to endure no sacrifice or face no danger that was not demanded by the inevitable exigencies of the situation.
With God's help,
Hill determined to save the army, as his chief ordered him to do at any sacrifice, and, if the emergency had demanded his own life, he would have met death, not as the degree of fate, but as the
Providence of God, who had brought him face to face with a desperate duty.
Captain Seaton Gales, the gallant
Adjutant-General of
George B. Anderson, on that memorable day, has summarized the important results of this battle so clearly that I prefer to reproduce his language rather than use an extract from report of history, or to make a vain attempt to improve upon it myself.
Of this battle ‘it may be safely said that in its consequences, in the accomplishments of pre-determined objects, and in the skilful disposition of small numbers to oppose overwhelming odds, it is without a parallel in the war. The division, unaided until a late hour in the afternoon, held in check the greater portion of
McClellan's vast army, endeavoring with battering-ram impetus to force its way through the narrow gap, and thereby afforded time for the concentration
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of our various corps dispersed in strategic directions in season for the bloody issue at
Sharpsburg.’