his command pounced upon the prey, believed it entitled to the credit of the capture.The truth is, the battle of Shiloh was fought by an army of superbly brave men, very few of whom had had the advantage of instruction, drill, or discipline. The surrender of Prentiss was due to the gallantry of the entire army, which, by desperate fighting between daylight and 4 o'clock on April 6, had dispersed and driven from the field all of Grant's army, except Prentiss and Wallace's Divisions, which, becoming in a measure isolated, were doomed to surrender. Confederate regiments who never fired a shot at the surrendered troops were entitled to a full share of the credit, as they had defeated and driven off the other divisions, which made the capture of Prentiss and Wallace's Division possible. A review of the reports written at the time may be a matter of some interest. War Records (Vol. X, page 104) and General Prentiss' report (pages 277-279) inform us that Prentiss' Division included the 12th Michigan, Colonel Francis Quinn; 18th Wisconsin, Colonel J, S. Albin; 18th Missouri, Colonel Madison Miller; 21st Missouri, Colonel David Moore; 23d Missouri, Colonel Tindall; 25th Missouri, Colonel Everett Peabody; 61st Illinois, Colonel Jacob Fry. General Prentiss also informs us that the following regiments of General W. H. L. Wallace's Divison fought to the end and surrendered with him: The 8th Iowa, Colonel J. L. Geddes; 12th Iowa, Colonel Jos. I. Wood; 14th Iowa, Colonel Wm. T. Shaw; 58th Illinois, Colonel Lynch. I find only eight reports made by these officers, and some of them do not allude to the fighting incident to the surrender of General Prentiss. His report, dated November 17 (Vol. X, page 278), says: ‘I reformed to the right of General Hurlburt and to the left of Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace. This position I did maintain till 4 P. M., when General Hurlburt, being overpowered, was forced to retire. Perceiving that I was about to be surrounded, I determined to assail the enemy which had passed between me and the river, charging upon him with my entire force. I found him advancing en masse, and nothing was left but to harrass him and retard his progress so long as might be possible. This I did until 5:30 P. M., when finding that further resistance must result in the slaughter of every man in the command, I had to yield the fight. The enemy ’
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