Clark, of Mississippi came into my camp and wanted Falkner and Liddell, commanding two of the best regiments in the service, to unite with him in getting them under his command. They refused. He did not do me the honor to call upon me; nor did I know of his presence or his object. Had I known his purpose, I would have put him in arrest. He was miffed because they preferred to remain as they are. If they persist at Richmond (in their purpose to reorganize the brigades), they will be guilty of inconceivable folly. * * * For one, I am not disposed to submit for one moment to any system which is devised solely for the advancement of log-rolling, humbugging politicians—and I will not do it. If the worst comes, I can go back to North Carolina or Georgia, where I shall be welcome, and where I shall (as Major of engineers) find enough to do in defending the coast.The proposed reorganization of brigades was not carried into effect at that time; and General Whiting retained command of the troops who were used to him, and he to them. When General Johnston's army occupied the defensive line at and near Yorktown, General Whiting commanded a division composed of three brigades—his own and those of Hood and Hampton. That division formed a portion of my command during the operations at Yorktown, and in the withdrawal of our army to the vicinity of Richmond. On the 28th May, 1862, under authority from General Johnston, the following order was issued by my direction:
The division now commanded by Brigadier-General Whiting, and the brigades of Brigadier-General Pettigrew and BrigadierGen-eral Hatton will, until further orders, constitute one division under command of Brigadier-General Whiting.That division bore my name. My command, proper, at that time, was the left wing of General Johnston's army, which was composed of the division under Whiting, and the divisions of A. P. Hill and D. R. Jones. On the next day, May 29th, General Johnston wrote to General Whiting:
For any purpose but that contemplated yesterday the present disposition of our troops is not good—it is too strong on the extreme left. If we get into a fight here, you will have to hurry to help us. I think it will be best for A. P. Hill's troops (his division) to watch the brigades, and for yours to be well in this direction—ready to act anywhere. Tell G. W. (General G. W.) Smith, commander of the left wing of the army.