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‘  once.’ General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conversation dropped. By night (it was then about 3:30), that hill—Culp's—the key of the position around Gettysburg was occupied by part of the 12th Corps, Slocums; and reinforced the next day. On the 2nd and 3rd determined efforts were made by us to gain this hill, but without success, and fearful loss. On our extreme right, west of Round-top Hill, General Longstreet had reached a point three or four miles from Gettysburg, with but slight opposition. That night from daylight to late at night, General Lee was anxiously reconnoitering the ground and frequently expressed a wish to attack the enemy that night or early in the morning. Why his wish was not carried out I don't feel at liberty to explain. Nothing however was done, nor a gun fired, until next day late in the afternoon. Thus the 1st and 11th Corps, were signally defeated by 2:30, July 1st. General Hill had lost heavily; General Rodes of Ewell's Corps had not suffered much and his men, as I saw them, were in high spirits. General Early had hardly suffered at all and General Johnson had not been in the fight, only reaching the field by sundown. What were the enemy's condition and movements? July 1st. At 3 P. M. the 1st and 11th Corps had been dispersed, except Steinwehr's Division of 3 or 4000 men, a reserve left on Cemetery Hill. General Hancock reached Cemetery Hill in person about 4:30, and at once advised General Meade to bring his whole army there. Slocum's 12th Corps arrived about 4:30 P. M. and was posted on the right (Federal right). Sickles with only Birney's Division, 3rd Corps, arrived about 5 P. M. and formed on the left of 1st Corps. These troops had all made forced marches, and were not in fighting order. General Wadsworth's Division took possession of Culps Hill about sundown. The other corps—12th, Slocum's; 2nd, Hancock's; 5th, Sykes'; 6th, Sedgewick's—arrived late in the night and early on the morning of the 2nd. It is apparent from this condition of things, at 3:30 P. M. on the 1st, that the failure to follow up vigorously our success, from whatever cause it proceeded, was the first fatal error committed. It seemed to me that General Ewell was in a position to do so. But he evidently did not feel that he should take so responsible a step without orders from General Lee who might reasonably be expected to take the direction of affairs at this juncture. I have since been told
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