Potomac, these facts will often be found confessed on the record. On the other hand, it was, of course, the cue of the Confederate army to make the best possible showing of strength by figures, and if you believed the accounts of Confederate prisoners, you would have come to the conclusion that the South had a population to recruit from as large as that of China. Capt. Battine is a cavalry officer, and thinks that mounted charges —shock-tactics, such as Cromwell made use of with splendid results, when fire-arms were comparatively harmless—should have been practiced on a large scale on many occasions against discomfited infantry, thus effecting a complete rout. The war was fought on both sides, as far as infantry was concerned, with the muzzleloader rifle musket and minie ball, which the author thinks had an accurate range of only one hundred yards, and was not effective at over four hundred yards, but, as a matter of fact, the range was nearly four times as great, the accuracy satisfactory, where the weapon was decently clean, and the killing power infinitely more fearful than that of modern rifles, because of the size and shape of the bullet. Moreover the rough nature of the ground where fighting took place invariably forbade mounted charges in mass, and rifle fire in the open would usually render them impossible, or suicidal. All that could be accomplished by shock-tactics was effected against cavalry and small bodies of infantry, but the magnificent fighting qualities of the cavalry (developed by Hampton, and Forrest, and not by Stuart, as the author supposes), were displayed as dismounted riflemen, where they equalled infantry in deadly work and staying-power and were enabled to excel them in mobility and dash by means of their horses. Gettysburg, the author considers the turning point of the war, and that if Lee had there completely defeated Meade it would have ended the contest victoriously for the South. His account of the battle is good—though he errs in numbers—but the main causes to which is attributed the failure to rout the Federal army are not given sufficient prominence. That the three days fighting was more like three separate battle than one is quite true, as Captain Battine says, and also that there were mistakes made by Confederate corps commanders, and lack of needed support to attack delivered, but Lee was not in fault. He necessarily depended upon the cavalry for keeping him thoroughly informed of the position of the enemy, and this duty he had entrusted to Stuart, who disappeared
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Trees whittled down at Horseshoe.
The lost sword of Gen. Richard B. Garnett , who fell at Gettysburg , (from the Baltimore sun , of November 4 , and December 3 , 1905 .)
The honor roll of the University of Virginia , from the times-dispatch, December 3 , 1905 .
John Yates Beall , gallant soldier
Plan to relieve Confederate prisoners on Johnson's Island .
Fifteenth Virginia Infantry .
Crisis at Sharpsburg .
My personal experiences in taking up arms and in the battle of Malvern Hill .
General Lee at Gettysburg .
The movement begun.
Some of the drug conditions during the war between the States , 1861 - 5 .
A paper read before a meeting of the American pharmaceutical Association held in Baltimore, Maryland , in August , 1898 ,
The last charge at Appomattox .
The Twelfth Alabama Infantry , Confederate States Army.
Twelfth Alabama Infantry .
List of killed and wounded of the Twelfth Alabama regiment , Third brigade , commanded by Brigadier Gen-Eral R. E. Rodes , at battle of Seven Pines .
Battle of Mine Run , Nov. 28th .
Battle of Winchester , September 19th , 1864 .
Roster of the Battalion of the Georgia Military Institute Cadets
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