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 right, in an open field, with General Longstreet, dismounted, and with glasses inspecting the position to the south of Cemetery hill. When I delivered my message, General Lee gave me his glasses and said that the elevated position in front was he supposed the commanding position of which Early and Rodes spoke, that some of ‘those people’ were there (a few mounted men, apparently reconnoitering), that he had no force on the field with which to take that position; and turning to Longstreet asked where his troops were, and expressed the wish that they might be brought immediately to the front. General Longstreet replied that his front division, McLaws, was about six miles away, and then was indefinite and noncommittal. General Lee directed me to say to General Ewell that ‘he regretted that his people were not up to support him on the right, but he wished him to take the Cemetery hill if it were possible; and that he would ride over and see him very soon.’ Whatever the opportunity was, it was lost. Early and Rodes were ready for the assault; A. P. Hill felt the losses in his command and waited for third division, Anderson's, and General Ewell, waiting for his third division, Johnson's, and diverted by the false alarm on his left, lacked initiative and looked for instructions from his commander. General Hancock, of date, January 17th, 1878, writes: ‘In my opinion, if the Confederates had continued the pursuit of General Howard on the afternoon of the first day of July, at Gettysburg, they would have driven him over and beyond Cemetery Hill. After I had arrived upon the field, assumed the command, and made my disposition for defending that point, I do not think the Confederate force then present could have carried it.’ Colonel John B. Bachelder, the historian of Gettysburg, said ‘there is no question but what a combined attack on Cemetery hill made within an hour, would have been successful. At the end of an hour the troops had been rallied, occupied strong positions, were covered by stone walls, and under the command and magnetic influence of General Hancock, who in the meantime had reached the field, they would, in my opinion, have held the position against any attack from the troops then up.’ Col. Batchelder states in support of his opinion that there was but one brigade that had not been engaged, Smith's, of Steinwher's division, with not a battery in reserve on Cemetery hill. “The best chance for a successful attack was within the first hour and unquestionably the
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