from the Confederates
, with few exceptions, were those lost on Sunday by the Federals
, which, for want of horses to draw them from the field, had been left by the Confederates
where they had been taken.
First—The delay of the Confederate Army in making the march from Corinth
is a signal illustration of the truth of Napier
‘That celerity in war depends as much on the experience of the troops as upon the energy of the general.’
Nevertheless, there were grave faults in the handling of several of the corps on the march.
Moreover, several of these did not quit Corinth
as early in the day as they might have done.
We know General Johnston
was profoundly disappointed and chagrined that his just expectations of delivering battle on Saturday morning were thus baffled.
Second—The precise terrene occupied by the Federal Army
was unknown to the Confederate
general, who therefore adopted the parallel order of battle rather than the oblique, which has generally been employed by great captains since Frederick the Great
restored it to the art of war. Had General Johnston
known the actual position occupied by the Federal
front line, he surely would have attacked by the oblique order; massing upon the Federal
), so as to force it back southeastwardly into the cul de sac made above Pittsburg Landing
by the junction of Lick Creek
with the Tennessee River
As the attack was made, the shock of the onset only affected Sherman
's left brigade.
Had it fallen with full force upon his entire division, it is manifest that that which happened to Hilderbrand
's Brigade would have befallen it. The entire division must have been swept away as that brigade was, and been driven rearward so rapidly upon McClernand
's and Wallace
's (W. H. L.), as to give them little or no time to form their division, and make the stand which Sherman
's obstinate resistance with two of his brigades, near Shiloh
, enabled them to do.
Third—Both sides have claimed the advantage.
The Confederates found their pretension upon the fact of the heavy