This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
 landing to throw a brigade across, and upon the last ridge; and at that hour the last assaults of the Confederates had not taken place, nor until Nelson was in position to help to repel them? Very well. Would General Grant, knowing that Buell must be up that night, be likely, even at 10 o'clock, to omit communicating such important intelligence to his doughty, right-hand lieutenant—the very ‘sinew and forehand’ of his army—not only to inspire him to still more obstinate fighting, but as a solace, a relief of inestimable value at the instant? Or would he at 5 o'clock have failed to acquaint that lieutenant of Buell's presence at the landing, and Nelson's on the other bank? Finally, at a moment when the Confederates were swarming down to make their crowning assault upon the last foothold of his fighting wreck, with but a few hundred yards between it and a wide river, and when, from what had already happened, he could scarcely hope it would not be a concentrated, terrible onset. Could General Grant, as yet ignorant of that issue, be in condition to give orders looking to the offensive on the next morning? We are sure not, as well as that General Sherman's memory has deceived him. The fect is, the order of which he speaks was really given later; that is, when Generals Grant and Buell visited him together. All who weigh evidence must come to this conclusion. Were further proof necessary, it is found in the fact that neither Sherman's nor Lew Wallace's, nor any of Hurlbut's troops became really engaged on Monday before 10 A. M.; and that after that hour even Hurlbut, turning over to McClernand such men as he had been able to collect, was sent back to the river to glean and assemble the still scattered fragments of the five dismembered divisions.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.