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 the army of the Potomac. He knew very well that Lee with his powerful army could turn either of his flanks by way of Waterloo Bridge or the lower Rappahannock, and thus cut him off either from Washington or Aquia Creek. But if he had fallen back upon either of these points, he would have uncovered the other; and Halleck, who from the recesses of his office did not weigh the practical difficulties of the movements he ordered, believing that a few hours would suffice to disembark the army of the Potomac, advised Pope not to leave the Rappahannock, promising him speedy and powerful reinforcements.1 On the 21st, the whole of Lee's army—Jackson on the left, Longstreet on the right—presented itself before the Rappahannock. A brisk cannonade was engaged on both sides of the river, which was continued the whole day, but the Federals were everywhere on their guard, and the Confederates did not try to force a passage at any point. Unable to surprise his adversary or to attack him in front, Lee resolved to strike his right flank by crossing the barrier which held him back as near its source as possible. On the morning of the 22d, while Longstreet was extending his lines to cover the positions occupied the day before by the whole army, Jackson marched rapidly up the right bank with his three divisions, preceded by Stuart's cavalry. On the other side of Hazel River, a large stream which lay on his route, he was perceived by the Federals; the brigades of Bohlen and Milroy crossed the river in succession and attacked his rear, not in the hope of arresting him, but of delaying his march. They were easily repulsed, and Jackson reached Freeman's Ford before night. Finding this pass strongly guarded by Siegel, he proceeded higher up, and took possession of Sulphur Bridge or Warrenton Springs, which was only guarded by a small outpost. On the same evening, Early occupied the left bank of the Rappahannock at this point. This movement had not taken Pope unawares. On the 20th he had indicated it to Halleck as very probable, and had explained to his chief how he proposed to parry it. On the morning
1 ‘Do your best to keep possession of the Rappahannock,’ he wrote him on the 21st. ‘To-morrow large reinforcements . . . . Defend every inch of ground, fight like the devil, until we can reinforce you. In forty-eight hours you shall have all the troops you want.’
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