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[677] The borrowing system, under all its forms, including the issue of treasury notes bearing no interest, had during the year yielded the sum of $529,692,460.50, while the resources which the country furnished without discounting the future only amounted to $51,935,729.76, nearly all of which, or $49,056,397.62, were the product of the custom-houses. The following year the new tariffs, of which we have just spoken, added about twenty millions to this amount, while the internal revenue yielded more than thirty-seven millions. There was something in this situation well calculated to alarm financiers, who anxiously questioned the future, asking themselves how long the American nation would be able to sustain the war without becoming bankrupt. At that period the annual products of the United States were estimated at about two thousand millions, out of which it was calculated that two hundred million were economized. Nearly one-half of this two hundred million was invested annually in stocks, the aggregate amount of which represented a capital of about twenty-five hundred millions. The new taxes, yielding from one hundred to one hundred and twenty millions, already affected to a great extent the private incomes of the country, which were greatly reduced by the stoppage of industrial pursuits and the unproductive consumption by large armies. It was not, therefore, from this source that the treasury could expect to obtain the funds for which it was calling. This capital could only become disposable by being withdrawn from the stocks (valeurs mobilieres) in which it had been invested. But as the total amount of loans which the government was authorized to negotiate already exceeded seven hundred millions, it would have been necessary, in order to realize the cash immediately, that one-third of the stocks should be sold without depreciation—that is to say, that capitalists could be found in foreign countries disposed to purchase them, and thus bear indirectly the unproductive expenses which the war entailed upon the United States. Such a result was all the more impossible because a new loan seemed to be already impending; the consolidation of debt, therefore, was to be long and troublesome, and in the mean while the creditors of the State could not be paid, except by resorting to forced loans, disguised under the name of treasury certificates or irredeemable treasury notes. In

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