of influence in elections. Nor is it difficult for
any man of fortune to procure a right of voting. So that the mention of these cases, as parallel with that of the colonies, is wonderfully trifling and impertinent. Our adherence to the English Constitution is on account of its real excellence. * * It is not the mere name of English rights that can satisfy us. It is the reality that we claim as our inheritance, and would defend with our lives. * * Can any man be represented without his own consent* * Where is the advantage of it, if persons are appointed to represent us without our choice?*Would not our greatest enemies be the most likely to endeavor to be chosen for that office? * * Could such a right of representation be ever desired by any reasonable man? Is English liberty such a chimera as this? The great fundamental principles of a government should be common to all its parts and members, else the whole will be endangered. If, then, the interest of the mother country and her colonies cannot be made to coincide, if the same constitution may not take place in both, if the welfare of the mother country necessarily requires a sacrifice of the most valuable natural rights of the colonies,—their right of making their own laws, and disposing of their own property by representatives of their own choosing,— if such is really the case between Great Britain and her colonies, then the connection between them ought to cease; and sooner or later it must inevitably cease. The English government cannot long act towards a part of its dominions upon principles diametrically opposed to its own, without losing itself in the slavery
chap. XIII.} 1765. May.
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