Peace or War.
Under this head, the Baltimore Sun
exhibits the dilemma in which the Black Republican
administration is placed.
If, says the Sun,
it adopts a " peace policy," which is in conformity with the earnest desire of the great mass of the people, it will necessarily confirm the nationality of the Confederate States
and mortally offend the party from whom it has existence.
But this is not all. It will as certainly establish a superior nation in the South
, and cripple and dwarf the enterprise and importance of the North
It is in this singular complication of circumstances: Its policy — almost vital to its existence — is that of war. Yet, if it would — that is, if it should select
that policy --it is at once deprived of the means of carrying it into execution.--On the other hand, if it should select
a a "peace policy," it immediately contributes to the stability, aggrandizement and possible superiority of the Southern Republic
Thus the false, nefarious Black Republicanism of the North
will, in any case, prove to have been the author only of the national ruin, and of its own everlasting infamy.
By way of illustrating the effect of the "peace policy," we copy the following significant paragraph from the Philadelphia Ledger
"The Revenue and Its Collection.--The last act of the United States Congress was to largely increase the rates of duties upon importations; the first act of the secession Confederation was to reduce them.
The natural effect of these two diametrically opposite policies is to drive importations away from Northern ports and to send them to Southern ports, to avoid the duties.
There being no interior custom-houses, no collectors at the railroad stations, which extend from one State to another, or upon the great rivers which sweep through Southern and Northern States, there is nothing to prevent these importations into Southern ports from being sent to every Northern city, and foreign articles may be introduced, and sold under the very noses of those who were to be protected by a high tariff.
to the exclusion of the home production.
The Government can only pre- vent this by collecting duties at the mouth of Southern harbors, or establishing a chain of internal custom-houses all along the line which separates the United States
from the seceding States.
The latter there is no authority for till Congress shall authorize it, and the expense would be enormous.
The former is attended with difficulties which are almost insurmountable.
It might be an easy matter to station national vessels at the mouth of the Mississippi
, or at the entrances to Savannah
, but the collection districts are so numerous that all the unemployed vessels in the American Navy
would be required to guard them.
How the difficulty is to be got over is not so clear, though the consequence to Northern commerce of allowing goods to enter Southern ports under low duties, or none at all, are very evident.
If secession is to be uninterred with, the only way to preserve the commerce of the North
will be to open our ports free of duties.
This is one of the inevitable consequences of successful revolution in the South
, and the fact has got to be faced squarely."
But meet it squarely, or in a round about way, the result is still the same.
The ex- pense of collecting the revenue will cat it up. To make the Morrill
tariff meet this expense of collection, war and the support of the Government
, it will be prohibitory.
And then comes losses, direct taxation and rebellion.
As to opening the Northern
ports free of duties, imagine the howl that will greet such a proposition from the manufacturing districts of Pennsylvania
and New England
," the intelligent Washington
corres- pondent of the Baltimore Sun
, justly says:
"If it had been a stratagem of the secessionists to deprive the Lincoln Government
of all sources of revenue, and to enrich the exchequer of the Southern Confederation
, it would be regarded as a very admirable stroke of policy.
But it obtained no votes from that class of politicians.
The Southern Confederate States
however. availed themselves of the act, and have been enabled by it to establish a higher and more productive tariff than they would otherwise have done; but one that is so much more favorable to importers and consumers of foreign, dutiable goods, that the country will necessarily be in a great measure supplied through Southern ports at the lower rates of duties.
"The question which the Lincoln
government has to meet is not whether it can collect duties in ports of the Confederate States
It is whether it can collect any revenue at the port of New York?
The whole Northwest and the entire South--and why not New York itself?--will be supplied with foreign imports, through railroads and other channels of interior communication, which have paid duty in ports of the C. S. A."
The Southern Confederacy is master of the situation.