Strategical policy of the Southern Confederacy.
--The New York Journal of Commerce has an editorial upon this subject, in which occurs the following:
Without stopping to inquire further into the nature of the extraordinary rumors in circulation for some time past, in reference to a threatened invasion of the District of Columbia, it is at least safe to suggest as a possible truth, that it has been the persistent policy of the
Confederate States, since the first alarm of war, to tempt the
North into an enormous scale of expenditure for military purposes, and thus to produce a more speedy exhaustion.
It would appear as though no means had been neglected — no artifice unemployed — which might tend to this result.
The announced intention of the
Confederacy to grant letters of marque, for aught that appears to the contrary, is not likely to be carried into execution; embargoes laid upon commerce at Southern ports have been raised; and Northern vessels seized have been released, in many instances, by direction of the authorities at
Montgomery.
Nevertheless, these varied acts of hostility may have answered a purpose, by precipitating events in the
North, and hastening the final issue.
Meanwhile, the
Southern States seem to be husbanding their resources in every possible way. Individuals serve in the ranks as common soldiers, gratuitously.
Not unfrequently, as the newspapers state, whole companies are put on a war footing, with no other expense to the
General Government than the providing of muskets; and railways do the necessary transportation without indemnity.
Reviewing the events of the last few weeks, it may well be doubted whether there has ever been any settled purpose to invade the
National Capital.
Jefferson Davis evidently prefers to act on the defensive, rather than employ aggressive measures.
But even if we accept this as a solution of certain rumors and proceedings otherwise difficult of explanation, it cannot be said that the extensive preparations for the defence of
Washington are ill-advised.
Without them, the political attitude of two or three of the
Border States might have given much more reason for concern; and besides, the concentration of a large force at some convenient point is absolutely necessary.
