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The British press on American Affairs.

The American Revolution.

[From the London Times, 19th.]

It needs no comment of ours to impress the public with the great importance of the news from America. We are anxious to speak with caution on this subject, and not cause alarm which may possibly prove to have been unnecessary. Therefore we would rather let the telegraphic summary from Queenstown speak for itself. The steamer left New York on the 6th, and on the day previous the signs of an approaching conflict, which had been visible for some weeks before became so marked that a panic took place in Wall street. In what may be called the two chief cities of the rival Federations, the belief that war was at hand prevailed equally. In New York there was as we have said, a panic on the Stock Exchange, while from Charleston the telegraph announced that the dreaded moment had arrived, and a rupture would at once take place. It was even feared that military operations had begun on the part of the Southerners. No news had been received from Fort Pickens for several days, and this had led to the belief that the communication had been cut off by the Southern troops. From Charleston it was announced that Major Anderson had been called upon to evacuate Fort Sumter within forty-eight hours, the alternative being that the place would be bombarded. The belief at Washington was that the Government there was as determined as that of the secessionists. Every man had been ordered on duty; frigate, with two first-class merchant steamers, would sail at once with sealed orders, but we learn from a private source that there were still doubts as to whether they were intended to relieve Fort Pickens, or to proceed to St. Domingo.

Such is the momentous intelligence which we publish to-day. We may here, however, repeat the hope so often expressed on this side of the ocean, that if the two sections of the late Union be destined to separation, the change may be accomplished without the spilling of blood. It may, perhaps, be too late to indulge in such wishes, yet we will not give up all hope that even at the last hour moderate counsels may have prevailed, and that this fratricidal war has been checked in the outset. But, supposing that the worst has happened, and, either through the naval operations of the United States or an attack on the Federal forts by their rivals, hostilities have begun, it is plain that a conflict of no common kind must follow. The Confederate States, though without a navy, and consequently forced, for the most part, to remain on the defensive, will be an enemy not easy to deal with. True, they are not so powerful in men or resources as they anticipated some months ago. The fidelity of the border States to the Union has been a great disappointment to the Montgomery politicians and their ambitious President. The Border States, particularly Kentucky and Tennessee, contain a population which, for military purposes, surpasses, perhaps, any in the Union.--The fine race which inhabits these regions would prove formidable enemies to the Government at Washington if they had resolved on seceding. Then there would have been the accession of a large white population without any great admixture of Negroes, and further more considerable wealth, which in the present state of the Southern Exchequer would have been very acceptable. But, though for the present, at least, the Border States stand fast by the Union, yet the South shows a bold front. The seven seceding States, being in earnest and fighting for their independence, have raised an army which the other twenty-seven have not yet succeeded in matching.--According to all accounts, the Southern levies are large, well-disciplined, and in high spirits. For weeks it has been difficult to keep the Charleston regiments from attacking Fort Sumter, and at Pensacola we find that Fort Pickens was hard pressed by a considerable force. The iron foundries in Virginia were turning out guns to be used against the Government which owns the allegiance of Virginia itself. ‘"Troops, provisions and ammunition were flowing in to the Confederate army,"’ was the intelligence received a few days since. It seems clear that, if peace be preserved, it will not be by any yielding on the part of the Secessionists.

It would be a great political error, not to say a crime, if the Republican President should plunge the New World into war in order to show his attachment to his party or his consistency with his former principles. When Mr. Buchanan published his unhappy message — a document to which it is probably owing that South Carolina was followed into secession by six other States--the Republican party, and indeed opinion generally throughout the North, was so much inflamed against the President that Mr. Lincoln found or fancied it necessary to repudiate these sentiments. Incautiously giving utterance to his own opinions wherever he came on his journey from the West, he arrived at Washington pledged not only to keep but to retake the forts belonging to the Union in the seceded States, and to refuse any recognition of Southern independence. The collection of the duties at the Southern ports was also made a part of the new President's programme. How difficult it has been found to carry out all this, is evident from the long delay which has taken place. Before Mr. Buchanan left office Major Anderson was in extreme danger; no time was to be lost in relieving Fort Pickens and the Confederate States themselves were lowering their tariff and letting in the productions of Europe at a rate which would make every idler in the Border States take to smuggling at once. It was though that the moment Mr. Lincoln was installed a resolution would be taken. But this was not to be. For a full month the President and his Cabinet have been debating what is to be done, and only on the 5th of April is it announced that the policy of coercion has triumphed.

The delay seems all the more to be regretted since confidence among men of business had been almost restored. There was up to nearly the last day of March a feeling that the worst was over, and that, however lamentable might be the disruption of the Republic, there would not be added to this misfortune the still greater calamity of civil war. The absorbing interest in military and political matters was passing away, and business was resuming its usual course. What will be the result of a collision between the two Governments is more than any one can predict. The vision of privateers at sea and partisan bands along the frontier must be so terrible to Americans that it is possible the public feeling of the people may restrain the acts of their rulers. But, should this quarrel begin and continue until both sides are roused into animosity, the war, though short, may be as savage as any that has been carried on even by the Spanish race. The Americans are in the highest degree excitable and vindictive; the ferocity which they carry into their domestic conflicts would be increased largely when one side fancied itself to be resisting tyrants and the other punishing traitors. But we had rather not speculate on so great a calamity as such a war would be. We would rather hope that the good sense of the Americans and the peaceful counsels of this country may bring about a reconciliation before the dispute has been too far envenomed. As long as the two sections of the Union refrain from hostilities, it would be the height of arrogance and folly to interfere; but when the soil and seas of the New World are likely to be stained with blood, foreign nations may surely remonstrate in the cause of humanity.

The South never to be Subdued by arms.

[From the Liverpool Times, 20th.]

The latest accounts from America are ominous in the extreme, and it is greatly to be feared that the North and South will, after all, come to blows. We had hoped a different result, and we hope so still, but it is useless to disguise the feeling which prevails not less in New York than in Charleston, that a deadly collision is impending — a fratricidal war imminent. For this melancholy state of things people in Europe were not prepared. The tone of the new President's inaugural address pointed to war, but his subsequent conduct has been at variance with this belief, and hopes were entertained that, as the South could not be again seduced into the Union, she would not be coerced. We may receive, at any hour or any day, intelligence that the deadly conflict has begun, and once commenced, there is no telling how long it may continue, or where it may end.

America, in this hour of her fate, can be said to owe little to the judgment of her Presidents — the last or the present. Mr. Buchanan's ill-omened message to Congress, at the end of his term, was a direct incentive to the breaking up of the Federal compact; and now we have the pacific policy which followed Mr. Lincoln's accession to office cast aside, and a policy of force substituted which may end in the destruction of thousands of lives and the flowing of rivers of blood. Matters had proceeded to such a pass that a pacific solution of the difficulty was the only reasonable and proper one. It may be that the accounts which have reached us are exaggerated and unreliable; but when the business men of New York look on civil war as imminent, and when the capital of the South is moved by a similar belief, we, in England, have no alternative but to accept the probability, however much we may deplore it.

As war, then, between the two Republics seems to be regarded as certain, the question that remains to be asked is, What will the principals gain by it? It is evident that President Lincoln has neither an army nor a navy at hand to make the South submit, and it is equally certain that the South is even more anxious than the North to test it by a trial of strength. The old Government has certainly one alternative to which it may resort; but it is so terrible in conception, and would prove so malignant in practice, that we will do Mr. Lincoln the justice of expressing our disbelief in his ever having recourse to it. The South is so strong on its own ground, that no amount of Federal force which can be brought into the field, within any reasonable period, would stand a chance of success. * * *

If civil war has really commenced between the North and the South, we hope that the representatives of England and France at Washington have been instructed by their respective Governments to tender their aid as mediators before the struggle has roused all the fierce passions which, if continued for any length of time, are certain to be called into play. --Both nations wish well to the American people, both are alike interested in the general prosperity of the country in every latitude; and both are impelled towards it by the strongest sympathy that can animate friendly nations. This seems to us the last resource before the sword is drawn and the scabbard thrown away, and probably the suggestion would meet the approval of that large class in both extremes of the country which must look with horror and dismay at the prospect of men and brothers cutting each other's throats under circumstances so fearfully provocative of vengeance.

A Manchester View.

[From the Guardian, 20th.]

With a people less shrewd and practiced than the Americans — and less addicted, we will add to extravagance in their language and demonstrations — it would abundantly support the inference that the next mail might be expected to bring us news of the actual commencement of civil war. We are far, however, from abandoning the hope that conciliatory councils will prevail even at the eleventh hour. There is obviously no reason for a contest now, which did not exist with at least equal force during the whole of last month — nay, the enterprise of attempting to force the seceding States to return to their allegiance is far less justifiable now than it would have been at the beginning of Mr. Lincoln's administration, because it has become by the lapse of time infinitely more difficult. Whether it is believed that some desirable impression may be produced on the popular mind by adopting a menacing attitude at this moment, or whether, as some people have supposed, a design altogether unconnected with domestic politics is masked under the naval and military preparations ostensibly made against the secessionists, we cling to any interpretation of the new turn of affairs rather than that the unnatural conflict which it seems to threaten is really about to take place.

To predict the course and result of the struggle, if it be regarded as inevitable, is impossible. The disparity of force appears at first sight very great; but, besides that the Southerners have little or nothing to do but to maintain themselves on the defensive, it is to be considered that very important changes in the respective positions of the combatants might follow very quickly on the outbreak of war. The most conspicuous failure in the expectations of the founders of the Southern Confederation has been met with in the fact that what are called the Border States have hitherto remained firm to the Union. What effect, however, is likely to be produced on their disposition by hostilities, the first blow being struck by the Government at Washington? That they could remain wholly disengaged in the contest for any length of time, would appear to be forbidden by their geographical position, and by the extent to which their own interests would be involved.

Could they, however, be expected to take part with the North, seeing that the war waged by that power must be in manifest danger of assuming the character of a crusade against the institution of slavery wherever it is to be found? It is much more likely that they would be driven, by a sense of the paramount necessity of protecting their own property, into the arms of the party whose blandishments they have hitherto resisted.--The New York Herald already declares that every demonstration of public feeling in Virginia goes to show that the secession movement is making repid strides in that State, under the prevalence of a belief that no compromise or concession is to be expected from the North. It may be hoped that the undesirableness of doing anything to promote this conclusion will concur with other considerations to make President Lincoln hesitate before he enters on a contest in which he may have to cope with more enemies than are arrayed against him at the outset.

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