Mr. Russell's first letter after the Fall of Fort Sumter.
[from the London Times of May 15]
Norfolk, Va., April 15.
Sumter has fallen at last.
So much may be accepted.
Before many hours I hope to stand amid the ruins of a spot which will probably become historic, and has already made more noise in the word than its guns, gallant as the defence may have been.
The news will produce an extraordinary impression at New York — it will disconcert stockjobbers and derange the most ingenious speculations.
But, considerable as may be its results in any part of the Union, I venture to say that nowhere will the shock cause such painful convulsions as in the Cabinet of Washington, where there appeared to exist the most perfect conviction that the plan for the relief of Sumter could not fail to be successful, either through the force of the expedition provided for that object, or through the unwillingness of the leaders at Charleston to fire the first shot, and to compel the surrender of the place by actual hostilities.
The confidence of Mr. Seward in the strength of the name and of the resources of the United States Federal Government must have received a rude blow, but his confidences are by no means of weakly constitution, and it will be long ere he can bring himself to think that all his prophesies must be given up, one after another, before the inexorable logic of facts, with which his vaticination have been in ‘"irrepressible conflict."’ It seems to me that Mr. Seward has along undervalued the spirit and resolutions of the Southern Slave States, or that he has disguised from others the sense he entertains of their extent and vigor.
The days assigned for the life of the secession have been numbered over and over again, and secession has not yielded up the ghost.--The ‘"bravado"’ of the South has been sustained by deeds which render retreat from its advanced position impossible.
Mr. Seward will probably find himself hard pushed to maintain his views in the Cabinet in the face of recent events, which will, no doubt, be used with effect and skill by Mr. Chase, who is understood to be in favor of letting the South go as it lists without any more trouble, convinced as be is that it is an element of weakness in the body politic, while he would be prepared to treat as treason any attempts in the remaining States of the Union to act on the doctrine of secession.
But the Union party must now prevail.
As yet I do not know whether the views I expressed relative to the destination of the greater part of the troops and stores sent from the North were correct, for it cannot be learned here how many ships were off Sumter when it surrendered; but notwithstanding what has occurred.
I reiterate the assertion that the Washington Cabinet always said, and say they had no intention to provoke a conflict there, and that had the authorities at Charleston continued their permission to the garrison to procure supplies in their markets, there would have been no immediate action on their part to precipitate the fight, though they were determined to hold it and Fort Pickens, as well as Tortugas and Key West, and to victual and strengthen the garrison of the former as soon as they were able.
Fate was against them.
The decision and power of their opponents was against them.
But their defence will be that they could not do anything until they got troops and ships and munitions of war together, and that they did as much as they could in a month.
Sumter, in fact, was a mouse in the jaws of the cat, and the moment an attempt was made to release the prey by external influence, the jaws were closed and the mouse was disposed of. The act will produce, I believe, in spite of what I see, a very deep impression throughout all the States, and will tend to bring about an immediate collision between the high-handed parties on both sides.
When Mr. Lincoln came into office, it was discovered that a promise had been made by the outgoing members of the preceding Government to surrender the Southern forts.
That promise was ignored by the incoming Ministry.
The Southern Commissioners insisted on it that, apart from the compact of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, a pledge had been given to the South that no attempt would be made to reinforce the forts without notice to the Government at Montgomery, and, so far as can be ascertained, the authorities at Washington did cause to be conveyed to the Southern Confederation the expression of their intention to victual Sumpter; but whether they do so in respect to their pledge, if it existed, or in consequence of the decision at Charleston to prevent the issuing of further supplies to the garrison, is uncertain.
The withdrawal of permission to market was all but an act of war. If the United States Government would act on the hypothesis that the Southern Confederation was an independent power, it would surely have considered the proceeding as a prelude to immediate hostility.
But the course thus adopted arose out of the preparations made by the United States Government in fitting out expeditions, the object of which was scarcely dubious.
The Commissioners of the Southern States at Washington, never acknowledged, at last met with a decisive rebuff just as Virginia saw her representatives from the Convention on their way to ask Mr. Lincoln to explain his intentions.
The Commissioners were given to understand that their presence was useless, and that the forts would be reinforced, and on the intelligence thus furnished to the Government at Montgomery it was resolved to act by summoning Maj. Anderson to surrender before succor could arrive, and in the event of a refusal by compelling him to yield in the sight of the would be relieving squadron. 