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A Scathing Explosions of Lincoln's Absurdities.Besides the startling measures announced by the President of the United States for the prosecution of the war, his Message to Congress on opening this extraordinary session comprises a historical glance at the origin of the civil war, an explanation, an argument in favor of his own policy, and an announcement for the future. The historical retrospect is chiefly remarkable for the broad admission which are involved, though they are not intended. The express object is to show that the States which profess to have seceded have "rebelled" If any a t is used in the composition, it is entirely employed in the endeavor to diminish the show of numbers, power, resolution, and the unanimity amongst the Confederate States Six States are named as having joined the Confederacy; Virginia is spoken of as if she were still balancing between secession and Union, consenting to make herself ‘"a neat for invaders"’ from the seceding States.--Men who have been in the Federal Government or Legislature, or in the Federal army, and have joined the Confederation, are implied described as a knot of conspirators, aiming to carry off muskets belonging to the central Government, and to put a pressure upon their own individual States in order to suborn public opinion. In short, the aim of the Messa is to represent the Confederation as limited to a small territory, a minority of malcontents with that teritory, and a clique assembled around President Jefferson David at Richmond, the said Richmond being mentioned as if it were still within the United States.--This is by far the best part of a message which reminds us, un c ily of the worst compositions that have emanated from the White House at Washington. A recent occupant of the Presidential chair had restored something of the correctness and elevation which at one time marked the Messages sent into Congress Some few Presidents before Mr. Buchanan acceded to office had not been very happy in their style; but we must confess that the least felicitous of them never bordered upon the very unsatisfactory character of the document now before us. The second portion is a volunteered explanation of the reasons why the Federal Government defended Fort Sumter. We do not remember that Mr. Lincoln and his friends have ever been as a lted by the charge against which they are now so anxiously defending themselves, and their pleading is as curious as their thus spontaneously standing in the dock. If they had not defended the fort, they say,‘"the act might have been construed by many as a part of a voluntary policy;" while at home, it would, "discourage the friends of the Union, embolden its adversaries, and go far to insure to the latter a recognition abroad; that, in fact, it would be our national destruction consummated."’ It is difficult to imagine any more exaggerated or impolitic admission than the one we have her.--that if any portion of the Union could be ‘"recognized"’ as an independent State, ‘"our national destruction would be consummated."’ So, on the strength of that fear, President Lincoln did venture to defend Fort Sumter? The third and longest section of the Message is the pleading against the right of secession, conducted in a fashion which would not obtain much credit in any district attorney's of fice there or in the Old Riley here. The secession of the States ‘"commonly called slave States"’ is again mentioned as an off nee, which is begging the whole question at issue, and the same time confessing how incapable the Federal Government has shown itself of retaining any hold upon the Southern members of the late Union. Yet, as our readers are aware, the Southern States have been only too anxious to keep open a path for friendly communications with the North; while it is the Federal Government which has b oxen off communications, and has rendered the secession so thoroughgoing and complete as it is. One argument upon which Mr. Lincoln and his friends appear strongly to rely is, that the States never existed independently, and that, therefore, they cannot lawfully and peacefully withdraw from the Union ‘"without the consent of the Union or of any other States."’ This is an assertion directly in the teeth of the Constitution, which provides for any amendment even of the Constitution itself, on a vote taken by the Legislatures of the States; that is to say, any amendment of the Constitution would become a law if it were affirmed by a specified majority either of the State Legislatures or of a National Convention. Yes, Mr. Lincoln makes the astounding assertion that no State can withdraw from the Union if the withdrawal be vetoed by any one State. Perhaps he does not mean what his words express, for we must always make allowances on the score of his manifest inexperience and inaptitude in wielding the pen The argument, however, against the independence of the States, in any period of their political growth, is carried to the pitch of the sublime and the proverbial trifle beyond. If Mr. Lincoln had read the history of Virginia to himself he would know better than to put on record this indecorous essay for the ridiculous posterity. The personal idiosyncrasy of ‘"the Executive."’ as the President calls himself, comes out fully in the concluding and shortest section of the Message, where he professes to announce what is to be the course of the Government after its victory in the present civil war. If there is to be coercion and conquest or subjugation, he does not ‘"perceive"’ that there is to be any such thing ‘"in any just sense of these terms"’ * * * It is, indeed, impossible to follow the Presidential bungling through all its intricacies for while Mr. Lincoln is uttering for each State this broad and unqualified right of dictation, he allows that ‘"the people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own deliberate decision,"’ which is precisely what the seceding States proclaim. If it is Mr. Lincoln's purpose to mitigate the mistrust and hostility which his Administration has raised in the Southern States by explaining what course he should pursue after the conclusion of a peace, he has most ludicrously failed to carry out his own purpose. On the contrary, he has just alluded to the ur j e sufficiently to show a consciousness that satisfaction ought to be given to the public on both sides of the Potomac, while irritating at least the Southern States by withholding the information which he promises. We can imagine one reason for this reverse. From a latent sense that it is at discord with the majority in the Northern as well as the Southern States, Mr. Lincoln's party has done its best to suppress the friendly overtures of the Confederate Government, and now it is endeavoring to conceal from the leading men in the South the growing disposition in the Northern States to re- open the question of peaceful negotiations. Hence, undoubtedly, he astoundingly vague and prevaricating language which he employs, at the very time that he professed to alleviate the uneasiness in the mind of candid men, by intimating what is to be the course of Government towards the Southern States after the conclusion of the war. But he promises that the war shall be done cheaply; he will contract to get it finished off hand at ‘"only"’ four hundred millions of dollars--‘"only"’ two-thirds of the expense incurred by the whole War of Independence. And he thinks that his cute subjects will duly believe their oracle and autocrat, ‘"the Executive,"’ unquestionably making up their minds that the bill offered to them before the beginning of the war will precisely tally with the bill to be presented at the end. The Yankees may be very obedient people, but we doubt yet if they are quite so much or slaved as Mr. Seward and his President seem to think.
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