England and the blockade.

Frenchmen fight for glory, Englishmen for gain. England will not recognize our independence or raise the blockade until it is her interest so to do. At present, there are several strong reasons why she does not intervene. Her citizens own Northern stocks and securities for debt to the amount of eight hundred millions of dollars. All this would be lost if she interfered in American affairs and deciared the blockade inefficient. Although she does not fear the North, and in full consciousness of strength listens with contemptuous silence to Yankee insults, threats, and braggadocios, yet she knows that Northern privateers would, in the event of war, seriously disturb her trade and that is too great and valuable an interest to be impaired or jecparded if it can be honorably avoided.

She wishes to encourage the production of cotton in India and her other Southern dependencies. The blockade will effect this object far better than any other measure.--There is abundant cotton grown in India and other parts of Southern Asia to supply all our demand. She has only to give more for it than the Asiatics will give at home, and she is sure to procure it. The advancement of price occasioned by the increased demand would not, probably, enhance the cost of her annual supply a hundred millions of dollars. At this rate, by supplying herself from India and avoiding war with the North, she might possibly, in a twelve month, save seven hundred millions of dollars, stimulate, the growth of cotton in her provinces, and become partially (save a modicum of our long staple to blend with the Asiatic) independent of the South for her usual annual supply.

Besides, from the Queen downwards, the Abolition feeling, prejudice and influence in the present ruling party combination in England, is very powerful, and the Government hesitates to take part with slaveholders, however just their cause.

Of course, England is too sagacious not to see that she has a vast interest in the commerce and carrying trade of the South; and she will so shape her policy, doubtless, as to prevent, if possible, any other nation from getting the advantage of her in the participation in that trade and commerce. But just at this time such is the magnitude of the existing alliances with the North that she pauses to coquette for a time with her own interests in order to get the benefit she may derive from delay and the developments that are rapidly taking place. Should she even derive the permanent separation of the old Union, as she, no doubt, does most heartily, she may yet conceive that the situation of affairs favorable to her interests will be much improved by the exhaustion and bankruptcy of the Federal Government. But this view opens an extensive line of reflection for the mind, for which we have not space in this article.

Of late years France and England act in most singular and suspicious concert; and it is to be presumed that France, will not intervene in our behalf until England is ready to follow her lead. Notwithstanding that it is very evident Louis Napoleon is our friend, and desires to inaugurate an active policy affecting our relations and interests very promptly, it is the undoubted policy of France to co-operate with England and not to without her concurrence.

Let us dismiss, then, all expectation of foreign aid, and calmly inquire what injury, if any, we have sustained, or may hereafter sustain, from the blockade.

It is at once obvious that this measure of the North compels her to diffuse her naval force along a coast of several thousand miles, and prevents a concentration of that force in an attack against any of our seaboard cities. But for the blockade, it is quite possible that by combining her whole naval strength, and directing it against, a single point, she might take, one after another, all of our seaboard towns. We think that Norfolk, Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and New Orleans, owe their security thus far to this very blockade. Besides, it enormously increases the war expenses of the North, and it is the rapidly increasing and intolerable burden of those expenses, alone, that can exhaust her strength — and so end the war.

Again, the blockade is fast making us a manufacturing people, so far as the implements of war and necessaries of life are concerned, and to that extent only do we care about becoming a manufacturing people. Independence of foreign nations for the supplies necessary in times of war, should be attained in some way; and nothing will so effectually teach us what is needed for this purpose, and how we shall manufacture and produce it, as this blockade.

Confederate money or notes and Confederate bonds are now., as a currency, as good as gold and silver. Gold and silver have ceased to be a currency, and become a marketable commodity, but Confederate notes pass as freely and purchase as much, agreeable to their denomination, as would a metallic currency. This is evidenced by the price of grain, which is selling at ordinary prices. The higher prices of other things is owing to their scarcity, not to the depreciation of our paper currency. Could a nation be wholly excluded from all trade and intercourse with all other peoples, it might makes on paper issues of its Government money for all purposes, and wholly exclude a metallic currency. So long as the blockade continues, we are in this situation, but when it ends, our pecuniary difficulties will begin; for Confederate paper will not answer for foreign trade. The removal of the blockade, therefore, may produce serious national embarrassments, which nothing but our valuable staples could prevent from reaching the extreme of national bankruptcy. It would be hard for a bankrupt government to carry on a war. The truth of our theory is about to be tested in the North. We predict that their foreign trade, which requires gold and silver, will destroy the currency of their treasury notes, and embarrass the prosecution of the war.

When once we become satisfied that we have nothing to hope from foreign aid, and that the blockade will be continued, we shall redouble our exertions, and if not conquer the North, will keep her at bay, and soon exhaust her. She relies, solely on our cotton and tobacco to sustain her credit, and enable her to continue the war. She is now buying India cotton in the English market, and if we be true to ourselves, she will never get enough of cotton and tobacco from us to supply her home demand. We will burn them if necessary, but think it will be much better to determine resolutely and devotedly to defend them.

It will be far more honorable to achieve our independencies without foreign aid; and independence so achieved will bind our Confederacy together with adamantine chains; for we shall see and feel that our safety and existence as free States depends entirely on our cordial and permanent union. Paper constitutions, of States or Unions, and paper articles of confederations, are not worth the parchment they are written on, except in so far as they ex-

press, school, and enforce the natural relations of men; for all Governments, Unions, and Confederacies are natural outgrowths, God-made, not man-made. Our Confederacy will last so long as it is natural, no longer; and it will be natural so long as it is needed for mutual defence.

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