From Europe.
arrival of the great Eastern
Count Mercler's visit to Richmond — suffering in France — the English press on American affairs, &c, &c. The steamship Great Eastern from Millord Haven, brings London and Liverpool dates to May 6th, two days later than previous advices. The Paris Patris says that the visit of the French Minister to Richmond was entirely political, and that its purport was known to President Lincoln.
Affects of the War on the Trade of France.
Paris, Monday, 5,7 A. M.--The letters from the manufacturing districts are in general unfavorable. The latest accounts from Leyons state that there was scarcely any business transacted in the silk market of that town last week.--There has consequently been but little variation in prices. There were a few sales by auction, but they produced no fresh buyers Business is not better in the South of France than at Lyons, and prices are much the same The hopes entertained for a very short time that the civil war in North America would be quickly brought to a conclusion caused a rise of prices but the effect produced subsided and the previous dullness has returned.Views of the English press.
[from the London morning post, Government Organ]
There is but little to chronicle, according to the mail just arrived, of the movements of the American armies.
The Federal troops continue to advance wherever no opposition is offered, or when it is so alight a nature as scarcely deserves the name.
Except for the sake of gaining time the resistance hitherto shown by the Southern Confederacy on the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Mississippi rivers, was, strategically speaking, a mistake.
With no gunboats at his command, the South never could have hoped to cope successfully with the North under conditions which admitted of the naval resources of the latter being made available.
Fort Donelson fell after a brief struggle.
Island No.10 was also captured, though after a more gallant resistance, and according to the last intelligence, Fort Pulaski had also fallen into the Federal hands.
It is a principle of warfare that the capture of fortified place is a mere question of time, and numerous have been the proofs afforded of its correctness from the sledge of Troy to that of Sebastopol.
The loss of the places taken by the Federal armies should excite neither surprise nor regret in the Southern Confederacy.
The sole question which they have to consider is whether the delay occasioned to the advancing army by the resistance of those places has been dearly or cheaply purchased by the loss of men and arms incurred in their defence.--The conquest of the Southern States--that is to say, the successful invasion of the country, throwing out of consideration the establishment of dominion subsequently — must, if at all, be achieved in a reasonable time.
A nation might possibly be enabled to afford to besiege a fortress for two or three years, but it is evident that the work of ‘"crushing the rebellion"’ must be accomplished in less than that time if it is to be accomplished at all.--It would not be difficult to prove that, at the present rate of advancing, the Federal forces would be obliged to exhaust many years before they had planted their standard in every portion of the Southern States. In comparatively unprotected places they succeed in making their power felt, but against the real strongholds of their opponents they have made no impression whatever.
The Federal and the Confederates.
[from the London times of the 5th instant.]
If we look with solution to the details of the recent engagements, we shall be disposed, to conclude that the Federal is have made greater progress in military efficiency than their antagonists.
Both at Fort Donelson, and still more conspicuously at Pittsburg, the Confederates did as much as would have secured them the victory if the Federal had been no better soldiers than they were at Bull Run.
There cannot be a greater contract than that between the invincible and unflinching endurance of the Unionists, under the fierce onset of Beauregard, and the panic and flight of a whole army before Johnston's division at Manassas.
The Federal--at any rate, those of the Western army--have learnt to stand, and the Confederates can no longer match a sudden victory by a rapid assault.
Whether the army of the East has been raised to the same standard of efficiency is what remains to be seen, and the suspense in which the question is kept provokes natural but unpleasant comparisons, while it furnish as Gen McClellan's enemies with arguments to his prejudice.
For the rest, however, the Confederates still enjoy the one great advantage of having time on their side.
If the check inflicted on the Federal in the West and the resistance offered in the East should have the effect of prolonging the war under its present aspect for a few weeks longer, the season for operations would be at an end, and the campaign will be closed, not indeed, without success on the part of the Northerners, but without any material progress towards their ultimate object.
The hold of the South on the Border States has been roughly shaken, and victory has shed its lustre on the arms of the North, but the proper territories of the seceders will remain untouched except on the cause and they will have the benefit of another year for the organization of their resources, the completion of their defences, and the possible chances of diversion of success.
The North, in the meantime, will be exhausting its means by a most prodigal expenditure, and trying the patience of the people by an unproductive and unpromising contest. Sooner or later, the taxes so indiscriminately imposed must be actually collected, and then will come the test of public feeling.
So long, in short, as the Federal are not absolutely winners in this unnatural struggle they are losers, and losers at a prodigious cost; whereas, so long as the Confederates are not actually subdued they may regard themselves as winning.
These are conditions which leave heavy odds against the North, and fully counterbalance the superiority of its resources, the magnitude of its armies, and, let us add, the extraordinary energies of its citizens.
European sentiment
[Correspondence of the New York Herald.] London, May 2, 1862.
In assuming so decidedly in the preceding letter the hostility of this country to the people of the North, or at least to their endeavors to restore the dreaded Union, I had, I recollect, some slight twinges of misgivings, for fear I might, from canting protestations on both sides, be thought to have exaggerated its extent or generality.
I therefore determined, on the first opportunity, to give fair reason for the faith that is in me, or, at all events, for such of it as I may send your readers.
This task has been fulfilled for me by subsequent events.
I refer you to the speech of Mr. Gladstone at Manchester, combined with certain articles there anent in the London ‘"Times."’ The man and the place are both preeminently to the purpose.
Manchester you thought to be the centre of your English friends.
But let us not expect the people to be more than men or Englishmen.
Their interests of party maintained silence in Manchester until the late appearance of Mr. Gladstone on that scene.
This gentleman himself, as you know, is of the party, or rather he is somewhere between it and the whigs, as by a like transition he passed to whigs from tories.--On the occasion of a visit to his fatherland, some months ago, he spoke with high approval of your cause and of your course.
But now, before an audience of your best friends in England, he formally abandons them both with loud applause.
Remember also that he not only is a radical, but a minister subordinate, indeed, at present, but supreme in expectancy, and you will perhaps see a deeper import in his language.
Moreover, I would ask your particular attention to the article in the Times of last Saturday, and again of yesterday.
They have manifestly been inspired from the same source as the speech.
They will show you what is brewing in the public mind of England, or rather in its belly this still less execrable customer.
The Manchester party, who keep in the present Ministry, have been from the outset the sole English bar to action.
But they seem now submerged by the swelling distress, for which public contributions are solicited in London, to he followed perhaps in the House by a claim upon the sinking treasury.
And then to grant this claim would be to open starving Ireland, who is reduced, as usual, to knock at the door.
In such a situation you will easily conceive that, in order to seize, the first pretext for intervention, there remains but to obtain the co- operation or consent of France.
And s you could yourself expiates the late demonstration.
I may be told that one or two of the London journal pirated your cases, and must thus imply a certain English public in your favor — But can it be that these things impose upon Americans?
One of the said champions is the Manchester Orgas, and only mark be silence since Mr. Gladstone has spoken.
The other is the London News, a paper of hundred politics, and, above all, a commercial rival of the Times. Whatsoever is espoused by the oligarchical leading journal is decided by the radical competitor, which would be leader.
This is the plain truth about your two sole organs in the English press.
No, if England were tomorrow polled by bellor on the question.
I would stake my existence that the North would not have twelve votes.
Do not, therefore, inquire about the Southern Commissioners, what may be their intrigues, or the dispositions of England.
All that is decided, out and dry. Keep the ears of your Government and people but to two things — that they maintain their present advantages and energy, or, in case of reverse, keep on good terms with France.
Either of these positions, and these alone, can save them from what they would have had months ago to meet but for Napoleon.
[correspondence of the journal of Commerce.]
Paris, Friday, May 2, 1862.
The rumor of intended intervention grow hourly more persistent.
France is said to have declared her intention to Great Britain of not delaying beyond the month of July next to recognize the independence of the South.
This fact is asserted to be tree on very high authority.
No one doubts that proposals of intervention have again been made by the Imperial Government to the Cabinet of London, and so far acceded to that instructions on that basis have been sent to M. Mercier by the Foreign Minister.
Hence the journey of M. Mercier to Richmond The presence of M. de Moray in England is also attributed to the same cause.
No doubt the material pressure on the Government grows every hour more severs.
The aspect of things looks very ominous for the North, so far as Europe is concerned, and causes much anxiety here to the friends of America and the Union.
