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Murfreesboro' has been a very mysterious affair. Telegraphers to Southern journals have very much aided in shrouding it in log. Gen. Bragg's first and second dispatches impressed all with the belief in a glorious victory, and prepared us for the retreat to Tullahoma. His Aid had informed us that it was to Shelbyville that he had retreated. As General Bragg himself names the former place of course we take it that there he must be. Tullahoma is some thirty miles from Murfreesboro', on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. Gen. Bragg telegraphs that he could not drive the enemy from his entrenchments, and learning that he was reinforced he thought proper to withdraw to the point he had reached. We suppose those entrenchments must have been his second line, as it was understood that he had been driven from his first position, with the loss of 4,000 prisoners, 31 pieces of artillery, and some 200 wagons. That Gen. Bragg retreated with his prisoners, captured arms, &c., together with his own stores, proves that the enemy was not in a proper condition for pursuit. Indeed, one of the ridiculous Southern dispatches says that he, too, was retreating towards Nashville! It has been said that Bragg and the enemy both retreated rapidly at Perryville from each other; but this strange occurrence in military proceedings can hardly have been repeated. There can be no doubt that our army at Murfreesboro' was greatly outnumbered by the enemy, under Rosecrans. That it fought most gloriously and gained a brilliant advantage is cleared. --The enemy confess to an immense loss. It is stated by two writers at 25,000 and 20,000. The latter number, we conjecture, is larger than our entire force under Bragg. The figures may be too large; but they argue, at least, an immense loss by the invaders. The retreat from Murfreesboro' is unfortunate for us and for the Commanding General. Retreats are generally considered defeats, and though our General carried off his prisoners, &c., the moral effect of the move robs him, in a measure, of the meed of his achievements in the two first and glorious days before Murfreesboro'. The new position, it may be supposed, is still favorable for strategic movements, if reinforcements can be in time brought up. General Johnston will no doubt repair to the scene, and do what is possible to put our affairs in proper trim, and arrange for the defence of East Tennessee--a part of the Confederacy that we cannot afford to lose. We have faith in our men and in the Commander of the Southwest, and we look for brilliant advantages for our cause during the winter campaign.
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