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We know not what may have been the dispositions made to meet the invasion of Sherman, which was certainly among the contingencies that ought to have been, and we suppose were, anticipated as consequent upon the movement of General Hood to his rear. Of this, however, we feel assured: that if the population of Georgia and South Carolina be only half as patriotic as they have credit for being, his situation must be perilous in the extreme. He has entirely cut himself off from all communication with his base of supplies, which lies at Nashville, two hundred and fifty miles off. His army is a flying column, and cannot, therefore, be supposed to encumber itself with many wagons and much provision. The country through which he is passing is thinly settled, and the population bitterly hostile. Here are as many elements of danger to an invader as it is usual to find upon occasions of the sort. If the population be only true to themselves and their country, we see not how he can possibly escape disaster. We are still at a loss to understand the ulterior object of Sherman. The Yankee papers, more than a month ago, gave out that the seat of war was to be the cotton States this winter. If such be the design, and this the execution of it, the certainty that he will move upon Savannah or Charleston, in order to secure a base for future operations, seems pretty well established. Once in Savannah or Charleston, however, he will find himself as effectually besieged there as Howe was in Philadelphia when Dr. Franklin wrote, that instead of Howe taking Philadelphia, Philadelphia had taken Howe. A Confederate army, lying before whichever of these cities he may select, will effectually bar his entrance into the country and render his army — save in the article of employing so large a force to blockade it — as useless as though it did not exist. To take position in Charleston or Savannah is to place himself in precisely the same position with Howe and Clinton in New York. They had the city, with good quarters and a powerful fleet. Washington lay above them, watching them carefully, cutting off their parties whenever they ventured out; or, when they come out in full force, taking up such strong ground and offering battle on such terms that they did not dare, in a single instance, to accept it. If it be the intention of Sherman to take either of these cities, he has first to take it, which he will find no easy job; secondly, to operate in the country, which, with the army that will certainly confront him, he will find no easy undertaking. As for opening any communication with the country he has left behind him, that we take to be out of the question. In the Revolutionary war, the British, besides having possession of Charleston and Georgetown, had posts all through the State. When they were finally compelled to abandon these latter, they all retired into Charleston, and Green held the whole country, while they attempted no farther enterprise. If Sherman go to either Charleston or Savannah, and there be shut up by our armies, it will probably be the best thing that can happen to either of these States, since it will be the means of leaving them free and uninterrupted by the presence of the enemy in the agricultural country. Our own impression, however, is that this expedition has been undertaken with a view to render assistance to Grant. Savannah or Charleston once taken, it would be very easy to transfer Sherman's whole force to the lines before Richmond and Petersburg. Richmond is now the prevailing Yankee idea; and all other enterprises dwindle into insignificance in comparison with that directed immediately against Richmond.
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