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The great tactician of the New York Times does not appear to agree with General Sherman with regard to the rate at which it is proper for his column to move. He entertained no doubt that, on the 20th, Sherman was in Augusta, having passed over the intervening distance of one hundred and seventy miles in eight days; that is to say, having marched somewhat more than twenty-one miles per diem. General Sherman, on the contrary, in his general orders, prescribes a march of fifteen miles a day, and he does not appear to have been able to do even that. At least, we do not learn that he is in Augusta, as he ought to have been a week ago if that pace had been preserved. Indeed, we very much doubt whether he has been able to reach as much as ten miles per diem. This is a slow rate for a flying column, as Sherman was supposed to have converted his army into. It would seem to indicate that he had not found the people as complaisant as he expected them to be when he cut himself loose from his base and destroyed all communication with his rear by tearing up the railroads and burning the towns. Even fifteen miles a day is slow traveling for a flying column; and we are led, with a contemporary, to doubt whether Sherman meant to place his army in that category. A flying column, from its very name, would seem to indicate a rapidity of movement entirely inconsistent with Sherman's prescribed daily march. He must have meant something more solid than the Yankee newspapers gave him credit for. His proposal to Governor Brown and Mr. Stephens, last summer, give evidence of a fixed belief on his part that Georgia was ready to fly into the arms of the Union as soon as her people could feel themselves secure under the protection of a Yankee army. The whole tone of the Yankee press has been of the same character, and the probability is, that the idea was derived from Sherman himself, or from persons about him supposed to know his opinions. There is another theory to account for Sherman's expedition, but not for the slow rate which he prescribes to its movements. It is that the operations of Hood upon his rear rendered it utterly impossible for him to retain his position at Atlanta. That he was compelled to move from that locality and to go somewhere. That he had the choice of either Alabama or Georgia, and that he preferred the latter. That there is a great deal of truth in this supposition is evident enough. The care which the Yankee newspapers take to represent the movement of Hood as ineffectual and despicable — the ridicule which they cast upon his present position — their constant declaration that Thomas is more than a match for him, and that he has failed entirely — prove it beyond a doubt. He has not failed. He has suceeeded in placing Sherman in a most embarrassing situation — a situation from which he could only escape by a desperate plunge, which he has taken, and the effect of which we shall very shortly witness. We know nothing of the councils or designs of the authorities; but we cannot help strongly suspecting that this movement of Hood has had the exact effect that it was designed to have, and that this movement of Sherman is a legitimate and calculated consequence.--We express this belief without knowing what, or whether any, provision has been made for resisting the advance of the latter, but from the consideration that, if Sherman reach the ocean, he will leave the whole country behind him, from the ocean to the western boundary of Alabama, clear of an enemy. The entire State of Georgia, and the lower part of the State of Alabama, will, in that event, be without the presence of an enemy. He cannot hold the State of Georgia by means of posts, for he has but fifty-five thousand men; and should he destroy all the railroads, they will soon be restored. Should he reach the Atlantic, and, as we suggested several days ago, sail thence to join Grant or Sheridan, still he will leave the whole country free behind him. His expedition, let it terminate as it may, will but have added another to the already existing proofs that it is impossible for an army to keep down a people scattered over such an immense surface of country as ours.
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