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[103] Their third argument is this: just as we maintain1 that some things seem expedient but are not, so they maintain, some things seem morally right but, are not. “For example,” they contend, “in this very case it seems morally right for Regulus to have returned to torture for the sake of being true to his oath. But it proves not to be morally right, because what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have been binding.”

As their concluding argument, they add: whatever 2 is highly expedient may prove to be morally right, even if it did not seem so in advance.

These are in substance the arguments raised against the conduct of Regulus. Let us consider them each in turn.

1 (3) oaths extorted by constraint not binding,

2 (4) exceptional expediency makes right.

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