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Their third argument is this: just as we maintain1
that some things seem expedient but are not, so they
maintain, some things seem morally right but,
are not. “For example,” they contend, “in this
very case it seems morally right for Regulus to have
returned to torture for the sake of being true to his
oath. But it proves not to be morally right, because
what an enemy extorted by force ought not to have
been binding.”
As their concluding argument, they add: whatever 2 is highly expedient may prove to be morally
right, even if it did not seem so in advance.
These are in substance the arguments raised
against the conduct of Regulus. Let us consider
them each in turn.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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