[26]
Well, then, if any man should, in addition to the
actual virtues which the great orator Demosthenes
[p. 465]
possessed, show himself to be the possessor of others,
that either owing to his own temperament or the
laws of Athens1 Demosthenes is thought to have
lacked, and should reveal in himself the power of
strongly stirring the emotions, shall I hear one of
these critics protesting that Demosthenes never did
this? And if he produces something rhythmically
superior (an impossible feat, perhaps, but let us
assume it to be so), are we to be told that it is not
Attic? These critics would show finer feeling and
better judgement, if they took the view that Attic
eloquence meant perfect eloquence.
1 See II. xvi. 4. Quintilian alludes to an alleged law forbidding Athenian oratos, to appeal to the emotions in the law courts.
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