Plutarch, Timoleon
Bernadotte Perrin, Ed.

6. So true is it that the purposes of men, unless they acquire firmness and strength from reason and philosophy for the activities of life, are unsettled and easily carried away by casual praise and blame, being forced out of their native reckonings. For it would seem that not only our action must be noble and just, but the conviction also from which our action springs must be abiding and unchangeable, [2] in order that we may be satisfied with what we are about to do, and that mere weakness may not make us dejected over actions which have once been accomplished, when the fair vision of the Good fades away; just as gluttons who devour cloying viands with the keenest appetite are very soon sated and then disgusted with them. For repentance makes even the noble action base; whereas the choice which springs from a wise and understanding calculation does not change, even though its results are unsuccessful. [3] For this reason Phocion the Athenian,¹ after having opposed the activities of Leosthenes, when Leosthenes was thought to be successful and the Athenians were seen sacrificing and exulting over the victory,² said he could have wished that the achievement were his own, but was glad that he counselled as he did. And with more force Aristides the Locrian, one of Plato's companions, when Dionysius the Elder asked him for one of his daughters in marriage, said he would be more pleased to see the maid dead than living with a tyrant; [4] and when, after a little while, Dionysius put his children to death and then asked him insultingly whether he was still of the same mind about giving his daughters in marriage, answered that he was afflicted by what had been done, but did not repent him of what had been said. Such utterances as these, then, betoken perhaps a larger and more consummate virtue.