Another way whereby those passages which are suspicious in poets may be transferred to a better sense may
[p. 60]
be taken from the common use of words, which a young
man ought indeed to be more exercised in than in the use
of strange and obscure terms. For it will be a point of
philology which it will not be unpleasant to him to understand, that when he meets with
ῥιγεδανή in a poet, that word
signifies an
evil death; for the Macedonians use the word
δάνος to signify
death. So the Aeolians call victory gotten
by patient endurance of hardships
καμμονίη; and the Dryopians call daemons
πόποι.
But of all things it is most necessary, and no less profitable if we design to receive profit and not hurt from the
poets, that we understand how they make use of the names
of Gods, as also of the terms of Evil and Good; and what
they mean by Fortune and Fate; and whether these words
be always taken by them in one and the same sense or
rather in various senses, as also many other words are.
For so the word
οἶκος sometimes signifies a
material house,
as, Into the high-roofed house; and sometimes
estate, as,
My house is devoured. So the word
βόοτος sometimes signifies
life, and sometimes
wealth. And
ἀλύειν is sometimes
taken for being
uneasy and
disquieted in mind, as in
ὡς ἔφαθ᾽ ἡ δ᾽ ἀλύουσ᾽ ἀπεβήσατο, τείρετο δ᾽ αἰνῶς,1
and elsewhere for boasting and rejoicing, as in
῍η ἀλύεις, δτι ῏ιρον ἐνέκησας τὸν ἀλήτην.2
In like manner
θοάζειν signifies either
to move, as in Euripides when he saith,
κῆτος θοάζον ἐκ ᾿ατλαντικῆς ἁλός,—
or
to sit, as in Sophocles when he writes thus,
Ti/nas po/q' e(/dras ta/sde moi qoa/zete,
(Ikthri/ois kla/doisin e)cestemme/noi.
3
It is elegant also when they adapt to the present matter, as grammarians teach, the use of words which are commonly of another signification. As here:—
[p. 61]
νῆ᾽ ὀλίγην αίνεῖν, μεγάλῃ δ᾽νὶ φορτία θέσθαι.
For here
αἰνεῖν signifies
to praise (instead of
ἐπαινεῖν), and
to
praise is used for
to refuse. So in conversation it is common with us to say,
καλῶς ἔχει,
it is well (i.e.,
No, I thank
you), and to bid any thing
fare well (
χαίρειν); by which forms
of speech we refuse a thing which we do not want, or receive it not, but still with a civil compliment. So also
some say that Proserpina is called
ἐπαινή in the notion of
παραιτητή, to be
deprecated, because death is by all men
shunned.
And the like distinction of words we ought to observe
also in things more weighty and serious. To begin with
the Gods, we should teach our youth that poets, when they
use the names of Gods, sometimes mean properly the
Divine Beings so called, but otherwhiles understand by
those names certain powers of which the Gods are the
donors and authors, they having first led us into the use of
them by their own practice. As when Archilochus prays,
King Vulcan, hear thy suppliant, and grant
That which thou'rt wont to give and I to want,
it is plain that he means the God himself whom he invokes. But when elsewhere he bewails the drowning of
his sister's husband, who had not obtained lawful burial,
and says,
Had Vulcan his fair limbs to ashes turned,
I for his loss had with less passion mourned,
he gives the name of Vulcan to the fire and not to the
Deity. Again, Euripides, when he says,
No; by great Jove I swear, enthroned on high,
And bloody Mars,
4
means the Gods themselves who bare those names. But
when Sophocles saith,
Blind Mars doth mortal men's affairs confound,
As the swine's snout doth quite deface the ground,
[p. 62]
we are to understand the word Mars to denote not the God
so called, but war. And by the same word we are to understand also weapons made of hardened brass, in those verses
of Homer,
These are the gallant men whose noble blood
Keen Mars did shed near swift Scamander's flood.
5
Wherefore, in conformity to the instances given, we must
conceive and bear in mind that by the names of Jupiter
also sometimes they mean the God himself, sometimes Fortune, and oftentimes also Fate. For when they say,—
Great Jupiter, who from the lofty hill
Of Ida govern'st all the world at will;
6
That wrath which hurled to Pluto's gloomy realm
The souls of mighty chiefs :—
Such was the sovereign doom, and such the will of Jove;
7
For who (but who himself too fondly loves)
Dares lay his wisdom in the scale with Jove's?—
they understand Jupiter himself. But when they ascribe
the event of all things done to Jupiter as the cause, saying
of him,—
Many brave souls to hell Achilles sent,
And Jove's design accomplished in th' event,—
they mean by Jove no more but Fate. For the poet doth
not conceive that God contrives mischief against mankind,
but he soundly declares the mere necessity of the things
themselves, to wit, that prosperity and victory are destined
by Fate to cities and armies and commanders who govern
themselves with sobriety, but if they give way to passions
and commit errors, thereby dividing and crumbling themselves into factions, as those of whom the poet speaks did,
they do unhandsome actions, and thereby create great disturbances, such as are attended with sad consequences.
For to all unadvised acts, in fine,
The Fates unhappy issues do assign.
8
But when Hesiod brings in Prometheus thus counselling
his brother Epimetheus,
[p. 63]
Brother, if Jove to thee a present make,
Take heed that from his hands thou nothing take,
9
he useth the name of Jove to express Fortune; for he calls
the good things which come by her (such as riches, and
marriages, and empires, and indeed all external things the
enjoyment whereof is unprofitable to them who know not
how to use them well) the gifts of Jove. And therefore he
adviseth Epimetheus (an ill man, and a fool withal) to stand
in fear of and to guard himself from prosperity, as that
which would be hurtful and destructive to him.
Again, where he saith,
Reproach thou not a man for being poor;
His poverty's God's gift, as is thy store,
10
he calls that which befalls men by Fortune God's gift, and
intimates that it is an unworthy thing to reproach any man
for that poverty which he falls into by Fortune, whereas
poverty is then only a matter of disgrace and reproach
when it is attendant on sloth and idleness, or wantonness
and prodigality. For, before the name of Fortune was
used, they knew there was a powerful cause, which moved
irregularly and unlimitedly and with such a force that no
human reason could avoid it; and this cause they called by
the names of Gods. So we are wont to call divers things
and qualities and discourses, and even men themselves,
divine. And thus may we rectify many such sayings concerning Jupiter as would otherwise seem very absurd. As
these, for instance:—
Before Jove's door two fatal hogsheads, filled
With human fortunes, good and bad luck yield:—
11
Of violated oaths Jove took no care,
But spitefully both parties crushed by war:—
12
To Greeks and Trojans both this was the rise
Of mischief, suitable to Jove's device.
13
[p. 64]
These passages we are to interpret as spoken concerning
Fortune or Fate, of the causality of both which no account
can be given by us, nor do their effects fall under our power.
But where any thing is said of Jupiter that is suitable,
rational, and probable, there we are to conceive that the
names of that God is used properly. As in these instances:—
Through others' ranks he conquering did range,
But shunned with Ajax any blows t' exchange;
But Jove's displeasure on him he had brought,
Had he with one so much his better fought.
14
For though great matters are Jove's special care,
Small things t' inferior daemons trusted are.
And other words there are which the poets remove and
translate from their proper sense by accommodation to
various things, which deserve also our serious notice. Such
a one, for instance, is
ἀρετή,
virtue. For because virtue
does not only render men prudent, just, and good, both in
their words and deeds, but also oftentimes purchaseth to
them honor and power, therefore they call likewise these
by that name. So we are wont to call both the olive-tree
and the fruit
ἐλαία, and the oak-tree and its acorn
φηγός,
communicating the name of the one to the other. Therefore, when our young man reads in the poets such passages
as these,—
This law th' immortal Gods to us have set,
That none arrive at virtue but by sweat;
15
The adverse troops then did the Grecians stout
By their mere virtue profligate and rout;
16
If now the Fates determined have our death,
To virtue we'll consign our parting breath;—
let him presently conceive that these things are spoken of
that most excellent and divine habit in us which we understand to be no other than right reason, or the highest
attainment of the reasonable nature, and most agreeable
[p. 65]
to the constitution thereof. And again, when he reads
this,
Of virtue Jupiter to one gives more,
And lessens, when he lifts, another's store;
and this,
Virtue and honor upon wealth attend;17
let him not sit down in an astonishing admiration of rich
men, as if they were enabled by their wealth to purchase
virtue, nor let him imagine that it is in the power of Fortune to increase or lessen his own wisdom; but let him
conceive that the poet by virtue meant either glory or power
or prosperity or something of like import. For poets use
the same ambiguity also in the word
κακότης,
evil, which
sometimes in them properly signifies a wicked and malicious disposition of mind, as in that of Hesiod,
Evil is soon acquired; for everywhere
There's plenty on't and t'all men's dwellings near;
18
and sometimes some evil accident or misfortune, as when
Homer says,
Sore evils, when they haunt us in our prime,
Hasten old age on us before our time.
19
So also in the word
εὐδαιμονία, he would be sorely deceived
who should imagine that, wheresoever he meets with it in
poets, it means (as it does in philosophy) a perfect habitual
enjoyment of all good things or the leading a life every
way agreeable to Nature, and that they do not withal by
the abuse of such words call rich men happy or blessed,
and power or glory felicity. For, though Homer rightly
useth terms of that nature in this passage,—
Though of such great estates I am possest,
Yet with true inward joy I am not blest;
20
and Menander in this,—
So great's th' estate I am endowed withal:
All say I'm rich, but none me happy call;—
[p. 66]
yet Euripides discourseth more confusedly and perplexedly
when he writes after this manner,—
May I ne'er live that grievous blessed life;—
But tell me, man, why valuest thou so high
Th' unjust beatitude of tyranny ?
21
except, as I said, we allow him the use of these words in a
metaphorical and abusive sense. But enough hath been
spoken of these matters.
