[74a] of Simmias himself?”“Yes,” said he.“All these examples show, then, that recollection is caused by like things and also by unlike things, do they not?”“Yes.”“And when one has a recollection of anything caused by like things, will he not also inevitably consider whether this recollection offers a perfect likeness of the thing recollected, or not?”“Inevitably,” he replied.“Now see,” said he, “if this is true. We say there is such a thing as equality. I do not mean one piece of wood equal to another, or one stone to another, or anything of that sort, but something beyond that—equality in the abstract. Shall we say there is such a thing, or not?”
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