[
1059a]
[18]
That wisdom is a science of first
principles is clear from our Introductory remarks,
1 in which we of raised objections to
the statements of other thinkers about the first principles.
[20]
It might be asked, however,
whether we should regard Wisdom as one science or as more than
one.
2 If as one, it may be objected that
the objects of one science are always contraries; but the first
principles are not contraries. And if it is not one, what sort of
sciences are we to suppose them to be?
Again, is it the
province of one science, or of more than one, to study the principles
of demonstration?
3 If of one, why of it rather than of any
other? And if of more than one, of what sort are we to suppose them to
be?
Again, are we to suppose that
Wisdom deals with all substances or not?
4 If not with
all, it is hard to lay down with what kind it does deal; while if
there is one science of them all, it is not clear how the same science
can deal with more than one subject.
Again, is this
science concerned only with substances, or with attributes as
well?
5 For if it is a demonstration of
attributes, it is not concerned with substances; and if there is a
separate science of each, what is each of these sciences, and which of
them is Wisdom? qua demonstrative, the science
of attributes appears to be Wisdom; but qua
concerned with that which is primary, the science of
substances.
Nor must we suppose that the science
which we are seeking is concerned with the causes described in the
Physics.
6 It is not
concerned with the final cause; for this is the Good, and this belongs
to the sphere of action and to things which are in motion; and it is
this which first causes motion (for the
end is of this
nature); but there is no Prime Mover in the sphere of immovable
things.And in
general it is a difficult question whether the science which we are
now seeking is concerned with sensible substances,
[
1059b]
[1]
or not with sensible substances, but with some
other kind.
7 If with another kind, it must
be concerned either with the Forms or with mathematical objects. Now
clearly the Forms do not exist. (But nevertheless, even if we posit
them, it is a difficult question as to why the same rule does not
apply to the other things of which there are Forms as applies to the
objects of mathematics.I
mean that they posit the objects of mathematics as intermediate
between the Forms and sensible things, as a third class besides the
Forms and the things of our world; but there is no "third man"
8
or "horse" besides the Ideal one and the particulars. If on the other
hand it is not as they make out, what sort of objects are we to
suppose to be the concern of the mathematician? Not surely the things
of our world; for none of these is of the kind which the mathematical
sciences investigate.)Nor
indeed is the science which we are now seeking concerned with the
objects of mathematics; for none of them can exist separately. But it
does not deal with sensible substances either; for they are
perishable.
In general the
question might be raised, to what science it pertains to discuss the
problems concerned with the matter
9 of mathematical objects.It is not the province of physics,
because the whole business of the physicist is with things which
contain in themselves a principle of motion and rest; nor yet of the
science which inquires into demonstration and
scientific knowledge,
[20]
for it is simply this sort of thing which forms the
subject of its inquiry. It remains, therefore, that it is the science
which we have set ourselves to find that treats of these
subjects.
One might consider the question
whether we should regard the science which we are now seeking as
dealing with the principles which by some are called elements.
10 But everyone assumes that these are
present in composite things; and it would seem rather that the science
which we are seeking must be concerned with universals, since every
formula and every science is of universals and not of ultimate
species; so that in this case it must deal with the primary
genera.These would
be Being and Unity; for these, if any, might best be supposed to
embrace all existing things, and to be most of the nature of first
principles, because they are by nature primary; for if they are
destroyed, everything else is destroyed with them, since everything
exists and is one.But
inasmuch as, if Being and Unity are to be regarded as genera, they
must be predicable of their differentiae, whereas no genus is
predicable of any of its differentiae, from this point of view it
would seem that they should be regarded neither as genera nor as
principles.Further,
since the more simple is more nearly a principle than the less simple,
and the ultimate subdivisions of the genus are more simple than the
genera (because they are indivisible), and the genera are divided into
a number of different species, it would seem that species are more
nearly a principle than genera.On the other hand, inasmuch as species are
destroyed together with their genera, it seems more likely that the
genera are principles;
[
1060a]
[1]
because that which involves the
destruction of something else is a principle. These and other similar
points are those which cause us perplexity.
Again,
ought we to assume the existence of something else besides particular
things, or are they the objects of the science which we are
seeking?
11 It is true that they are
infinite in number; but then the things which exist besides
particulars are genera or species, and neither of these is the object
of the science which we are now seeking. We have explained
12 why this is impossible.Indeed, in general it is a difficult question
whether we should suppose that there is some substance which exists
separately besides sensible substances (i.e. the substances of our
world), or that the latter constitute reality, and that it is with
them that Wisdom is concerned. It
seems that we are
looking for some other kind of substance, and that this is the object
of our undertaking: I mean, to see whether there is anything which
exists separately and independently, and does not appertain to any
sensible thing.But again,
if there is another kind of substance besides sensible substances, to
what kind of sensible things are we to suppose that it corresponds?
Why should we suppose that it corresponds to men or horses rather than
to other animals, or even to inanimate objects in general? And yet to
manufacture a set of eternal substances equal in number to those which
are sensible and perishable would seem to fall outside the bounds of
plausibility.Yet if
the principle which we are now seeking does not exist in separation
from bodies,
[20]
what can we
suppose it to be if not matter? Yes, but matter does not exist
actually, but only potentially. It might seem rather that a more
appropriate principle would be form or shape; but this is
perishable
13; and so in general there is no eternal substance
which exists separately and independently.But this is absurd, because it seems natural
that there should be a substance and principle of this kind, and it is
sought for as existing by nearly all the most enlightened thinkers.
For how can there be any order in the universe if there is not
something eternal and separate and permanent?
Again,
if there is a substance and principle of such a nature as that which
we are now seeking, and if it is one for all things, i.e. the same for
both eternal and perishable things, it is a difficult question as to
why, when the principle is the same, some of the things which come
under that principle are eternal, and others not; for this is
paradoxical.
14 But if there is one principle of perishable
things, and another of eternal things, if the principle of perishable
things is also eternal, we shall still have the same difficulty;
because if the principle is eternal, why are not the things which come
under that principle eternal? And if it is perishable, it must have
another principle behind it, and that principle must have another
behind it; and the process will go on to infinity.
On the
other hand, if we posit the principles which seem most unchangeable,
Being and Unity,
15(a) unless each of them denotes a
particular thing and a substance,
[
1060b]
[1]
how can they be
separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for
which we are looking are of this nature.(b) If, however, each of them denotes a
particular thing and a substance, then all existing things are
substances; for Being is predicated of everything, and Unity also of
some things.But that all
things are substances is false. (c) As for those who maintain that
Unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number
from Unity and matter as their first product, and assert that it is a
substance, how can their theory be true? How are we to conceive of 2
and each of the other numbers thus composed, as one? On this point
they give no explanation; nor is it easy to give one.
But
if we posit lines or the things derived from them (I mean surfaces in
the primary sense
16) as principles,
17 these at least are not separately
existing substances, but sections and divisions, the former of
surfaces and the latter of bodies (and points are sections and
divisions of lines); and further they are limits of these same things.
All these things are integral parts of something else, and not one of
them exists separately.Further, how are we to suppose that there is a substance of unity or
a point? for in the case of every substance
18 there is a process of
generation, but in the case of the point there is not; for the point
is a division.
[20]
It is a perplexing fact also that
whereas every science treats of universals and types, substance is not
a universal thing, but rather a particular and separable thing; so
that if there is a science that deals with first principles, how can
we suppose that substance is a first principle?
19 Again, is there anything besides the concrete whole (I mean the
matter and the form in combination) or not?
20 If not, all things in the nature of matter are
perishable; but if there is something, it must be the form or shape.
It is hard to determine in what cases this is possible and in what it
is not; for in some cases, e.g. that of a house, the form clearly does
not exist in separation.
Again, are the
first principles formally or numerically the same?
21 If they are numerically one, all things will
be the same.
Since the science of the philosopher is
concerned with Being qua Being
universally,
22 and not with some part of
it, and since the term Being has several meanings and is not used only
in one sense, if it is merely equivocal and has no common significance
it cannot fall under one science (for there is no one class in things
of this kind); but if it has a common significance it must fall under
one science.
Now it would seem that it is used in the
sense which we have described, like "medical" and "healthy," for we
use each of these terms in several senses;
[
1061a]
[1]
and
each is used in this way because it has a reference, one to the
science of medicine, and another to health, and another to something
else; but each refers always to the same concept. A diagnosis and a
scalpel are both called medical, because the one proceeds from medical
science and the other is useful to it.The same is true of "healthy"; one thing is so
called because it is indicative, and another because it is productive,
of health; and the same applies to all other cases. Now it is in this
same way that everything which exists is said to
be ;
each thing is said to be because it is a modification or permanent or
temporary state or motion or some other such affection of Being qua Being.And since everything that is can be referred
to some one common concept, each of the contrarieties too can be
referred to the primary differentiae and contrarieties of
Being—whether the primary differentiae of Being are
plurality and unity, or similarity and dissimilarity, or something
else; for we may take them as already discussed.
23 It makes no difference whether that which
is is referred to Being or Unity; for even if they
are not the same but different, they are in any case convertible,
since that which is one also in a sense
is , and that
which
is is one.
Now since the study of
contraries pertains to one and the same science,
[20]
and each contrary is so called in
virtue of privation (although indeed one might wonder in what sense
they can be called contraries in virtue of privation when they admit
of a middle term—e.g. "unjust" and "just"), in all such
cases we must regard the privation as being not of the whole
definition but of the ultimate species. E.g., if the just man is "one
who is obedient to the laws in virtue of some volitional state," the
unjust man will not be entirely deprived of the whole definition, but
will be "one who is in some respect deficient in obedience to the
laws"; and it is in this respect that the privation of justice will
apply to him (and the same holds good in all other cases).And just as the mathematician
makes a study of abstractions (for in his investigations he first
abstracts everything that is sensible, such as weight and lightness,
hardness and its contrary, and also heat and cold and all other
sensible contrarieties, leaving only quantity and
continuity—sometimes in one, sometimes in two and sometimes
in three dimensions—and their affections qua quantitative and continuous, and does not study them
with respect to any other thing; and in some cases investigates the
relative positions of things and the properties of these,
[
1061b]
[1]
and in others their commensurability or
incommensurability, and in others their ratios; yet nevertheless we
hold that there is one and the same science of all these things, viz.
geometry), so it is the same with regard to Being.For the study of its attributes in so
far as it is Being, and of its contrarieties
24
qua Being, belongs to no other science than
Philosophy; for to physics one would assign the study of things not
qua Being but qua
participating in motion, while dialectics and sophistry deal with the
attributes of existing things, but not of things qua Being, nor do they treat of Being itself in so far as it is
Being.Therefore it
remains that the philosopher is the man who studies the things which
we have described, in so far as they are Being. And since everything
that
is , although the term has several meanings, is so
described in virtue of some one common concept, and the same is true
of the contraries (since they can be referred to the primary
contrarieties and differences of Being), and since things of this kind
can fall under one science, the difficulty which we stated at the
beginning
25 may be regarded as
solved
26—I mean the problem as to
how there can be one science of several things which are different in
genus.
Since even the mathematician uses the common
axioms only in a particular application, it will be the province of
Primary Philosophy to study the principles of these as well.
27
[20]
That when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal is
an axiom common to all quantities; but mathematics isolates a
particular part of its proper subject matter and studies it
separately; e.g. lines or angles or numbers or some other kind of
quantity, but not qua Being, but only in so far
as each of them is continuous in one, two or three dimensions. But
philosophy does not investigate particular things in so far as each of
them has some definite attribute, but studies that which
is , in so far as each particular thing
is
.The same applies to
the science of physics as to mathematics, for physics studies the
attributes and first principles of things qua
in motion, and not qua Being; but Primary
Science, as we have said, deals with these things only in so far as
the subjects which underlie them are existent, and not in respect of
anything else. Hence we should regard both physics and mathematics as
subdivisions of Wisdom.
There is a principle in
existing things about which we cannot make a mistake
28; of
which, on the contrary, we must always realize the
truth—viz. that the same thing cannot at one and the same
time be and not be,
[
1062a]
[1]
nor admit of any other similar
pair of opposites. Of such axioms although there is a proof ad
hominem, there is no absolute proof;because there is no principle more convincing
than the axiom itself on which to base an argument, whereas there must
be such a principle if there is to be absolute proof. But he who wants to convince
an opponent who makes opposite statements that he is wrong must obtain
from him an admission which shall be identical with the proposition
that the same thing cannot at one and the same time be and not be, but
shall seem not to be identical with it. This is the only method of
proof which can be used against one who maintains that opposite
statements can be truly made about the same subject.Now those who intend to join in
discussion must understand one another to some extent; for without
this how can there be any common discussion between them? Therefore
each of the terms which they use must be intelligible and signify
something; not several things, but one only; or if it signifies more
than one thing, it must be made clear to which of these the term is
applied.Now he who
says that A is and is not denies what he asserts, and therefore denies
that the term signifies what it does signify. But this is impossible.
Therefore if "to be so-and-so" has a definite meaning, the opposite
statement about the same subject cannot be true.
[20]
Again, if the
term has a definite significance and this is truly stated, it must of
necessity be so.
29 But that
which of necessity is can never not be. Hence opposite statements
about the same subject cannot be true.
Again, if the assertion is no more true than the negation, it will
be no more true to say "A is man" than to say "A is not man."
30 But it
would also be admitted that it is more or at least not less true to
say that a man is not a horse than to say that he is not a man; and
therefore, since it was assumed that opposite statements are equally
true, it will be true to say that the same person is also a horse. It
follows therefore, that the same person is a man and a horse, or any
other animal.
Thus, although there is no absolute proof of
these axioms, there is an ad hominem proof where one's opponent makes
these assumptions.
31 Perhaps even
Heraclitus himself, if he had been questioned on these lines, would
have been compelled to admit that opposite statements can never be
true of the same subjects; as it is, he adopted this theory through
ignorance of what his doctrine implied.In general,
32 if what he says is true, not even this
statement itself
[
1062b]
[1]
(I mean "that the same thing can at one
and the same time be and not be") will be true;because just as, when they are
separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, so in
the same way, if the complex statement is taken as a single
affirmation, the negation will be just as true as the whole statement
regarded as an affirmation.And further, if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very
statement—that there is no such thing as a true
affirmation—will be false. But if there is such a thing, the
contentions of those who raise objections of this kind and utterly
destroy rational discourse may be considered to be refuted.
33 Very similar to
the views which we have just mentioned is the dictum of
Protagoras
34; for he said that man is the measure of
all things, by which he meant simply that each individual's
impressions are positively true.But if this is so, it follows that the same
thing is and is not, and is bad and good, and that all the other
implications of opposite statements are true; because often a given
thing seems beautiful to one set of people and ugly to another, and
that which seems to each individual is the measure.
[20]
This difficulty will be solved if we consider
the origin of the assumption. It seems probable that it arose in some
cases from the doctrine of the natural philosophers, and in others
from the fact that everyone does not form the same opinion about the
same things, but to some a given thing seems sweet and to others the
contrary.For that
nothing comes from what is not, but everything from what is, is a
doctrine common to nearly all natural philosophers.
35 Since, then, a thing
does not become white which was before completely white and in no
respect not-white, that which becomes white must come from what was
not-white. Hence according to this theory there would be generation
from what is not, unless the same thing were originally white
and not-white.However, it is not hard to solve this
difficulty. We have explained in the
Physics36 in what sense
things which are generated are generated from what is not, and in what
sense from what is.
But to attach equal
importance to the opinions and impressions of opposing parties is
foolish, because clearly one side or the other must be wrong.
37 This is evident from what happens in the
sphere of sensation;
[
1063a]
[1]
for the same thing never seems to
some people sweet and to others to the contrary unless one of the
parties has the organ of sense which distinguishes the said flavors
injured or impaired. Such being the case, the one party should be
taken as the "measure," and the other not.And I hold the same in the case of good and
bad, and of beautiful and ugly, and of all other such qualities. For
to maintain this view
38 is just the same
as to maintain that what appears to us when we press the finger below
the eye and make a thing seem two instead of one must be two because
it appears to be so, and then afterwards that it must be one; because
if we do not interfere with our sight that which is one appears to be
one.And in general
it is absurd to form our opinion of the truth from the appearances of
things in this world of ours which are subject to change and never
remain in the same state
39; for it is by reference to those things which are
always the same state and undergo no change that we should prosecute
our search for truth.Of
this kind are the heavenly bodies; for these do not appear to be now
of one nature and subsequently of another, but are manifestly always
the same and have no change of any kind.
Again, if there is motion there is also something which is moved;
and everything is moved from something and into something. Therefore
that which is moved must be in that from which it is to be
moved,
[20]
and must also
not be in it; and must be moved into so-and-so and must also come to
be in it; but the contradictory statements cannot be true at the same
time, as our opponents allege.And if the things of our world are in a state
of continuous flux and motion in respect of quantity, and we assume
this although it is not true, why should they not be constant in
respect of quality?
40 It appears
that not the least reason why our opponents predicate opposite
statements of the same thing is that they start with the assumption
that quantity is not constant in the case of bodies; hence they say
that the same thing is and is not six feet long.But essence depends upon quality, and
this is of a determinate, whereas quantity is of an indeterminate
nature.
Again, when the doctor
orders them to adopt some article of diet, why do they adopt it?
41 For on their view it is no more
true that a thing is bread than that it is not; and therefore it would
make no difference whether they ate it or not. But as it is, they
adopt a particular food as though they knew the truth about it and it
were the food prescribed;yet they ought not to do so if there were no fixed and permanent
nature in sensible things and everything were always in a state of
motion and flux.
Again, if we are always
changing and never remain the same, is it any wonder that to us, as to
the diseased, things never appear the same?
42
[
1063b]
[1]
For
to the diseased, since they are not in the same physical condition as
when they were well, sensible qualities do not appear to be the same;
although this does not mean that the sensible things themselves
partake of any change, but that they cause different, and not the
same, sensations in the diseased. Doubtless the same must be true if
the change which we have referred to takes place in us.If, however, we do not change
but remain always the same, there must be something
permanent.
As for those who raise
the aforesaid difficulties on dialectical grounds,
43 it is not easy to find a
solution which will convince them unless they grant some assumption
for which they no longer require an explanation; for every argument
and proof is possible only in this way. If they grant no assumption,
they destroy discussion and reasoning in general.Thus there is no arguing with people of
this kind; but in the case of those who are perplexed by the
traditional difficulties it is easy to meet and refute the causes of
their perplexity. This is evident from what has been already
said.
Thus from these considerations it is obvious
that opposite statements cannot be true of the same thing at one time;
nor can contrary statements, since every contrariety involves
privation. This is clear if we reduce the formulae of contraries to
their first principles.
44Similarly no
middle term can be predicated of one and the same thing
[20]
of which one of the contraries
is predicated.
45 If, when the subject is white, we say
that it is neither white nor black, we shall be in error; for it
follows that it is and is not white, because the first of the two
terms in the complex statement will be true of the subject, and this
is the contradictory of white.
Thus we
cannot be right in holding the views either of Heraclitus
46 or of Anaxagoras.
47 If we could, it would follow that contraries
are predicable of the same subject; for when he
48 says that in everything there is a
part of everything, he means that nothing is sweet any more than it is
bitter, and similarly with any of the other pairs of contraries; that
is, if everything is present in everything not merely potentially but
actually and in differentiation.
Similarly
all statements cannot be false, nor all true. Among
many other difficulties which might be adduced as involved by this
supposition there is the objection that if all statements were false,
not even this proposition itself would be true; while if they were all
true it would not be false to say that they are all false.
Every science inquires for certain principles and causes with respect
to every knowable thing which comes within its scope
49;
[
1064a]
[1]
e.g., the sciences of medicine and
physical culture do this, and so does each of the other productive and
mathematical sciences. Each one of these marks out for itself some
class of objects, and concerns itself with this as with something
existent and real, but not qua real; it is
another science distinct from these which does this.Each of the said sciences arrives in
some way at the essence in a particular class of things, and then
tries to prove the rest more or less exactly. Some arrive at the
essence through sense-perception, and some by hypothesis; hence it is
obvious from such a process of induction that there is no
demonstration of the reality or essence.
Now since there
is a science of nature, clearly it must be different from both
practical and productive science. In a productive science the source
of motion is in the producer and not in the thing produced, and is
either an art or some other kind of potency; and similarly in a
practical science the motion is not in the thing acted upon but rather
in the agent.But the
science of the natural philosopher is concerned with things which
contain in themselves a source of motion. From this it is clear that
natural science must be neither practical nor productive, but
speculative; since it must fall under one of these classes.And since every science must
have some knowledge of the essence
[20]
and must use it as a starting-point, we must be
careful to observe how the natural philosopher should define, and how
he should regard the formula of essence—whether in the same
way as the term "snub," or rather as the term "concave."For of these the formula of
"snub" is stated in conjunction with the matter of the object, whereas
that of "concave" is stated apart from the matter; since snubness is
only found in the nose, which is therefore included in the formula,
for "the snub" is a concave
nose . Thus it is obvious
that the formula of "flesh" and "eye" and the other parts of the body
must always be stated in conjunction with their matter.
Since there is a science of Being qua Being and
separately existent, we must inquire whether this should be regarded
as identical with natural science or rather as a distinct branch of
knowledge. Physics deals with things which contain a source of motion
in themselves, and mathematics is speculative and is a science which
deals with permanent things, but not with things which can exist
separately.Hence
there is a science distinct from both of these, which deals with that
which exists separately and is immovable; that is, if there really is
a substance of this kind—I mean separately existent and
immovable—as we shall endeavor to prove.
50 And if there is an entity of this kind in
the world of reality, here surely must be the Divine, and this must be
the first and most fundamental principle.
[
1064b]
[1]
Evidently, then,
there are three kinds of speculative science: physics, mathematics,
and theology. The highest class of science is the speculative, and of
the speculative sciences themselves the highest is the last named,
because it deals with the most important side of reality; and each
science is reckoned higher or lower in accordance with the object of
its study.
The question might be raised
as to whether the science of Being qua Being
should be regarded as universal or not.Each of the mathematical sciences deals with
some one class of things which is determinate, but universal
mathematics is common to all alike. If, then, natural substances are
the first of existing things, physics will be the first of the
sciences; but if there is some other nature and substance which exists
separately and is immovable, then the science which treats of it must
be different from and prior to physics, and universal because of its
priority.
Since the term Being in its
unqualified sense is used with several meanings, of which one is
accidental Being, we must first consider Being in this sense.
51
Clearly none of the traditional sciences concerns itself with the
accidental; the science of building does not consider what will happen
to the occupants of the house,
[20]
e.g. whether they will find it unpleasant or the
contrary to live in; nor does the science of weaving or of shoemaking
or of confectionery.Each
of these sciences considers only what is proper to it, i.e. its
particular end. As for the question whether "the cultured" is also
"the lettered," or the quibble
52 that "the man who is cultured, when he has become
lettered, will be both at once although he was not before; but that
which is but was not always so must have come to be; therefore he must
have become at the same time cultured and lettered"—none of the recognized
sciences considers this, except sophistry. This is the only science
which concerns itself with the accidental, and hence Plato was not far
wrong in saying
53 that the sophist spends
his time in the study of unreality. But that it is not even possible
for there to be a science of the accidental will be apparent if we try
to see what the accidental really is.
Of some things we
say that they are so always and of necessity (necessity having the
sense not of compulsion, but that which we use in logical
demonstration
54), and of others
that they are so usually, but of others that they are so neither
usually nor always and of necessity, but fortuitously. E.g., there
might be a frost at midsummer, although this comes about neither
always and of necessity nor usually;
[
1065a]
[1]
but it
might happen sometimes.
The accidental, then, is that which comes about, but not always nor of
necessity nor usually. Thus we have now stated what the accidental is;
and it is obvious why there can be no science of such a thing, because
every science has as its object that which is so always or usually,
and the accidental falls under neither of these
descriptions.
Clearly there can be no causes and
principles of the accidental such as there are of that which is per
se; otherwise everything would be of necessity. For if A is when B is,
and B is when C is, and C is not fortuitously but of necessity, then
that of which C was the cause will also be of necessity, and so on
down to the last
causatum , as it is called.(But this was assumed to be
accidental.) Therefore everything will be of necessity, and the
element of chance, i.e. the possibility of a thing's either happening
or not, is entirely banished from the world of events. Even if we
suppose the cause not to exist already but to be coming to be, the
result will be the same; for everything will come to be of
necessity.The
eclipse tomorrow will come about if A does, and A will if B does, and
B if C does; and in this way if we keep on subtracting time from the
finite time between now and to-morrow, we shall at some point arrive
at the present existing condition.
[20]
Therefore since this exists, everything subsequent
to it will happen of necessity, and so everything happens of
necessity.
As for "what is" in the sense of what
is
true or what is
accidental , the former
depends upon a combination in thought, and is an affection of thought
(hence we do not look for the principles of Being in this sense, but
only for those of objective and separable Being) the latter is not
necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a
thing the causes are indefinite and cannot be reduced to a
system.
Teleology is found in events which come about
in the course of nature or as a result of thought.
55 It is
"chance" <or "luck"> when one of these comes about by
accident; for a thing may be a cause, just as it may exist, either per
se or accidentally. Chance is an accidental cause of normally
purposive teleological events.Hence chance and thought have the same sphere
of action, for there is no purpose without thought. Causes from which
chance results may come about are indeterminate; hence chance is
inscrutable to human calculation, and is a cause only accidentally,
but in the strictest sense is a cause of nothing.It is "good" or "bad luck" when the
result is good or bad,
[
1065b]
[1]
and "good" or "bad fortune" when
the result is on a large scale.
Since
nothing accidental is prior to that which is per se, neither are
accidental causes prior. Therefore if chance or spontaneity is the
cause of the universe, mind and nature are prior causes.
56 A thing may exist
only actually or potentially, or actually and potentially; it may be a
substance or a quantity or one of the other categories. There is no
motion
57
apart from things, for change is always in accordance with the
categories of Being
58; and there is nothing which is common to these and in
no one category. Each category belongs to all its members in two
ways—e.g. substance, for this is sometimes the form of the
thing and sometimes its privation;and as regards quality there is white and
black; and as regards quantity, complete and incomplete; and as
regards spatial motion there is up and down or light and
heavy—so that there are as many forms of motion and change
as there are of Being.
59Now since every kind of thing is divided into the
potential and the real, I call the actualization of the potential as
such,
60
motion.That this is
a true statement will be clear from what follows. When the "buildable"
in the sense in which we call it such exists actually, it is being
built; and this is the process of building. The same is true of the
processes of learning, healing, walking,
[20]
jumping, ageing, maturing. Motion results when the
complete reality itself exists, and neither sooner nor
later.The complete
reality, then, of that which exists potentially, when it is completely
real and actual, not qua itself but qua movable, is motion. By qua I mean this. The bronze is potentially a statue; but
nevertheless the complete reality of the bronze qua bronze is not motion. To be bronze is not the same as to be
a particular potentiality; since if it were absolutely the same by
definition the complete reality of the bronze would be a kind of
motion; but it is not the same.(This is obvious in the case of contraries;
for the potentiality for health and the potentiality for illness are
not the same—for if they were, health and illness would be
the same too—but the substrate which becomes healthy or ill,
whether it is moisture or blood, is one and the same.) And since it is
not the same, just as "color" and "visible" are not the same, it is
the complete reality of the potential qua
potential that is motion.It is evident that it is this, and that motion results when the
complete reality itself exists, and neither sooner nor later.
[
1066a]
[1]
For everything may sometimes be actual,
and sometimes not; e.g. the "buildable" qua
"buildable"; and the actualization of the "buildable" qua "buildable" is the act of
building.For the
actualization is either this—the act of
building—or a house. But when the house exists, it will no
longer be buildable; the buildable is that which is
being
built. Hence the actualization must be the act of building, and the
act of building is a kind of motion. The same argument applies to the
other kinds of motion.
That this account is correct
is clear from what the other authorities say about motion, and from
the fact that it is not easy to define it otherwise. For one thing, it
could not be placed in any other class; this is clear from the fact
that some people
61 identify it
with otherness and inequality and not-being, none of which is
necessarily moved;moreover
change is no more into these or out of them than into or out of their
opposites.
62 The reason for placing motion in this class
is that it is considered to be indeterminate, and the principles in
one of the columns of contraries are indeterminate, being privative;
for none of them is a determinate thing or quality or any of the other
categories.The
reason for considering motion to be indeterminate is that it cannot be
associated either with the potentiality or with the actuality of
things; for neither that which is potentially
[20]
nor that which is actually of a certain
size is necessarily moved.And motion is considered to be a kind of actualization, but
incomplete
63; the reason of this is that the
potential, of which it is the actualization, is incomplete.
Thus it is difficult to comprehend what
motion is; for we must associate it either with privation or with
potentiality or with absolute actuality; and apparently none of these
is possible.There
remains, then, the account which we have given; that it is an
actuality, and an actuality of the kind which we have described, which
is hard to visualize but capable of existing.
That motion is in the movable is evident; for it is
the complete realization of the movable by that which is capable of
causing motion, and the actualization of that which is capable of
causing motion is identical with that of the movable.For it must be a complete
realization of them both; since a thing is capable of moving because
it has the potentiality, but it moves only when it is active; but it
is upon the movable that it is capable of acting. Thus the actuality
of both alike is one; just as there is the same interval from one to
two as from two to one, and the hill up and the hill down are one,
although their
being is not one; the case of the mover
and the thing moved is similar.
64The infinite is either (a) that which
cannot be traversed because it is not its nature to be traversed (just
as sound is by nature invisible); or (b) that which admits of an
endless traverse; or (c) scarcely admits of traverse; or (d) which,
though it would naturally admit of traverse or limit, does not do so.
[
1066b]
[1]
Further, it may be infinite in respect
of addition or of subtraction or of both.
That the infinite should be a separate independent entity,
65 and yet imperceptible, is impossible.For if it is neither magnitude
nor plurality, but infinity itself is the essence of it, and not
merely an accident, it must be indivisible; because that which is
divisible is either magnitude or plurality. And if it is indivisible
it cannot be infinite, except in the same way as sound is invisible.
But this is not what people mean by infinite; and it is not the
infinite in this sense that we are investigating, but the infinite in
the sense of the untraversable.
Again, how can
the infinite exist independently unless number and magnitude, of which
infinity is an attribute, also exist independently?
66 And
further, if the infinite is accidental, it cannot, qua infinite, be an element of things; just as the
invisible is not an element of speech, although sound is invisible. It
is clear also that the infinite cannot exist actually.Otherwise any part of it which
we might take would be infinite; for infinity and the infinite are the
same, if the infinite is substance and is not predicated of a subject.
Therefore it is either indivisible, or if it is partible, the parts
into which it is divisible are infinite. But the same thing cannot be
many infinites; for just as a part of air is air, so a part of the
infinite will be infinite, if the infinite is a substance and
principle.Therefore
it is impartible and indivisible. But this is impossible of the
actually infinite, because it must be some quantity. Therefore
infinity is an accidental attribute. But if so,
[20]
as we have said, it cannot be it that
is a principle, but that of which it is an accident: air
67 or "the even."
68The foregoing inquiry is general; but what
follows will show that the infinite does not exist in sensible
things.If the
definition of a body is "that which is bounded by surfaces," then no
body, whether sensible or intelligible, can be infinite nor can there
be any separate and infinite number, since number or that which
involves number is numerable. This is clearly shown by the following
concrete argument. The infinite can neither be composite nor simple.
For (a) it cannot be a composite body if the elements are limited in
number
69;for the contraries must be equal, and no one of them must be
infinite; for if the potency of one of the two corporeal elements is
in any way inferior, the finite element will be destroyed by the
infinite. And every element cannot be infinite, because body is that
which has extension in all directions, and the infinite is that which
is extended without limit; so that if the infinite is corporeal it
will be infinite in all directions.
70 Nor (b)
can the infinite be any simple body; neither, as some
71 hold, something which
is apart from the elements and from which they suppose the elements to
be generated (for there is no such body apart from the elements;
everything can be resolved into that of which it consists, but we do
not see things resolved into anything apart from the simple bodies),
[
1067a]
[1]
nor fire nor any other
element.Apart from
the question of how any of them could be infinite, the All, even if it
is finite, cannot be or become any one of the elements, as Heraclitus
says
72 all things
at certain times become fire. The same argument applies as to the One
which the physicists posit besides the elements; for all change
proceeds from the contrary, e.g. from hot to cold.
73 Again, a sensible body is in
some region, and the region of the whole and of the part (e.g. of the
earth) is the same.
74 Therefore if the infinite body is homogeneous, it
will be immovable or will always be in motion
75; but this is impossible,
for why should there be rest or motion below rather than above or in
any other region? E.g., if there were a clod, in what region would it
move or be at rest?The
region proper to the body which is homogeneous with the clod is
infinite. Then will the clod occupy the whole of that region? How can
it? Then what of its rest or motion? It will either rest
everywhere—in which case it cannot move—or move
everywhere; in which case it cannot rest.
76 And if the whole is not alike
throughout, the regions proper to its parts are unlike also; and (a)
the body of the whole is not one, except in virtue of contact; (b) the
parts will be either finite or infinite in kind.Finite they cannot be, for then those
of one kind would be infinite
77 and those of
another would not (if the whole is infinite); e.g., fire or water
would be infinite.
[20]
But such
a condition would involve the destruction of the contraries. But if
the parts are infinite
78 and simple, the regions proper to them
are infinite and the elements will be infinite. And since this is
impossible,
79 the regions are finite
80 and the whole must be finite.
In general, there cannot be an infinite body
and a
place for bodies if every body which is sensible has either weight or
lightness; for it will have to move either towards the center or
upwards, and the infinite—either the whole or the
half—cannot do either; for how can you divide it? How can
the infinite be part up and part down, or part extreme and part
center?Further,
every sensible body is in some place, and of place there are six
kinds,
81 but these cannot exist in an infinite body. In
general, if an infinite place is impossible, so is an infinite body;
because that which is in a place is somewhere, and this means either
up or down or one of the other kinds of place, and each of these is a
limit.
The infinite is not the same in the sense
that it is one nature whether it applies to magnitude or to motion or
to time; the posterior is derived from the prior sense, e.g. motion is
called infinite in virtue of the magnitude involved when a thing is
moved or changed or increased, and time is so called on account of
motion.
82
[
1067b]
[1]
That which changes either changes
accidentally, as when "the cultured" walks; or is said to change in
general because something in it changes, as in the case of things
which change in their parts; the body becomes healthy because the eye
does.But there is
something which is moved directly per se, i.e. the essentially
movable. The same applies to that which moves, for it moves sometimes
accidentally, sometimes partially, and sometimes per se. There is
something that moves directly, and something that is moved; and also a
time in which, and something from which, and something into which it
is moved. But the forms and modifications and place into which moving
things are moved are immovable; e.g. knowledge and warmth. It is not
warmth that is motion, but the process of warming.
Non-accidental change is not found in all things, but only between
contraries and intermediates and contradictories. We can convince
ourselves of this by means of induction. That which changes changes
either from positive into positive, or from negative into negative, or
from positive into negative, or from negative into positive.By "positive" I mean that
which is denoted by an affirmation. Thus there must be three forms of
change;
[20]
for that which
is from negative into negative is not change, because they are neither
contraries nor contradictories, since they entail no opposition. The
change from the negative into its contradictory positive is
generation—absolute change absolute generation, and
qualified change qualified generation; and the change from the
positive to the negative is destruction—absolute change
absolute destruction, and qualified change qualified destruction.
83 Now
if "what is not" has several meanings, and neither that which implies
a combination or separation of terms,
84 nor that which relates to
potentiality and is opposed to unqualified Being, admits of motion
("not-white" or "not-good," however, admits of motion accidentally,
because "not-white" may be a man; but that which is "not so-and-so" in
an absolute sense does not admit of it at all), then "what is not"
cannot be moved. If this is so, generation cannot be motion; for it is
"what is not" that is generated.For even if the generation is in the highest
degree accidental, still it is true to say that not-being is
predicable of that which is generated absolutely. And the argument
applies similarly to rest. Thus not only do these difficult
conclusions follow, but also that everything which is moved is in a
place, whereas "what is not" is not in a place; for then it would
be somewhere. Nor is destruction motion; for the
contrary of motion is motion or rest, but the contrary of destruction
is generation.
[
1068a]
[1]
And since every motion is a kind of change,
and the three kinds of change are those which we have described,
85 and of these
those which relate to generation and destruction are not motions, and
these are the changes between contradictories, the change from
positive to positive must alone be motion. The subjects are either
contraries or intermediates (for privative terms may also be regarded
as contraries) and are denoted by a positive term—e.g.
"naked" or "toothless" or "black."
Now since the
categories are distinguished as substance, quality, place, activity or
passivity, relation and quantity,
86 there must be three kinds of motion, in respect of
quality, quantity and place. There is no motion
87 in respect of substance, because substance has no
contrary; nor of the relative, because it is possible that when one of
two related things changes the relation to it of the other thing, even
though the thing itself does not change, may become untrue; therefore
the motion of these related things is accidental.Nor is there motion of the agent or
patient, or of the mover and the thing moved, because there is no
motion of motion nor no generation of generation, nor in general is
there change of change. There are two ways in which there might be
motion of motion: (1) Motion might be the subject of motion, as, e.g.,
a man is moved because he changes from white to black; in this way
motion might be heated or cooled or might change its place or
increase.
[20]
But this is impossible,
because the change is not a subject. Or (2) some other subject might
change from change to some other form of existence, as, e.g., a man
changes from sickness to health. But this is also impossible except
accidentally.Every
motion is a change from one thing into something else; and the same is
true of generation and destruction, except that these are changes into
opposites in one sense,
88 while the other, i.e. motion, is a
change into opposites in another sense.
89 Hence a thing changes at
the same time from health to sickness, and from this change itself
into another.Now clearly
if it has fallen ill it will be already changed (for it cannot remain
at rest) into that other change, whatever it may be; and further this
cannot be, in any given case, any chance change; and it also must be
from something into something else. Therefore it will be the opposite
change, viz. becoming healthy. But this is so accidentally; just as
there is change from recollecting to forgetting because the
subject changes, now in the direction of knowledge
and now in that of ignorance.
Further, we shall have an
infinite series if there is to be change of change and becoming of
becoming, because if the latter of two becomings comes to be from the
former, the former must come to be too.
[
1068b]
[1]
E.g.,
if simple becoming was once coming to be, that which comes to be
something was also once coming to be. Therefore that which simply
comes to be was not yet, but there was already something coming to be
coming to be something.But this too was at one time coming to be, and therefore it was not
at that time coming to be something. But in infinite series there is
no first term, and therefore in this series the first term cannot
exist, nor can any subsequent term. Therefore nothing can be either
generated or moved or changed.
Further,
the same thing which admits of motion admits also of the contrary
motion and of rest, and that which admits of generation admits also of
destruction.Therefore that which comes to be, when it has come to be coming to
be, is then in course of perishing
90; for it does not
perish as soon as it is coming to be coming to be, nor afterwards,
because that which is perishing must
exist .
91Further, there must be some matter underlying that which is coming
to be or changing. What then will it be? What is it that becomes
motion or generation in the same way as it is body or soul that
undergoes change? And moreover what is that which is the terminus of
the motion? For that which we are considering must be a motion or
generation
of A
from B
into
C.How then can
these conditions be fulfilled? There can be no learning of learning,
and therefore there can be no generation of generation.
Since there is no motion of substance or of
the relative or of activity and passivity, it remains that there is
motion in respect of quality, quantity and place; for each of these
admits of contrariety. By "quality" I mean not that which is in the
substance (for indeed even the differentia is a quality),
[20]
but the passive quality in
virtue of which a thing is said to be acted upon or to be immune from
being acted upon.
92 The immovable is either that which is wholly incapable of being
moved, or that which is scarcely moved in the course of a long time or
is slow in starting, or that which would naturally be moved but cannot
be moved at the time when and from the place whence and in the way in
which it would naturally be moved. This last is the only kind of
immovable thing which I recognize as being at rest; for rest is
contrary to motion, and so must be a privation of that which admits of
motion.
Things are "together in place" which
are in the primary sense
93 in one place, and "separate" which are in
different places. "Contrary in place" is that which is at a maximum
distance in a straight line.
94 Things are said to be "in contact" whose extremes are
together in place. An "intermediate" is that at which a changing thing
which changes continuously in accordance with its nature naturally
arrives before it arrives at the extreme into which it is changing.
Since all change takes place between opposites, and these are either
contraries or contradictories, and contradictories have no middle
term, clearly it is to the sphere of contraries that the intermediate
belongs.
95 "Successive" is that which comes after the beginning (the order
being determined by position or form or in some other way) and has
nothing of the same class between itself and that which it succeeds;
e.g. lines in the case of a line, and units in that of a unit, and a
house in the case of a house (but there is nothing to prevent
something else from coming between). For that which is successive is a
thing which is successive and posterior to some other thing.
[
1069a]
[1]
1 is not successive to 2, nor is the
new moon
96 to the second day of the month."Contiguous" is that which is
successive and in contact. The "continuous" is a species of the
contiguous.I call
two things continuous when their respective boundaries, by which they
are kept together in contact, become one and the same; hence clearly
the continuous belongs to the sphere of things whose nature it is to
become one by contiguity.
Clearly
"successive" is the most ultimate term; for the successive need not be
in contact, but contact implies succession; and if there is continuity
there is contact, but if there is contact there is not necessarily
continuity;and
where there is no contact there is no coalescence. Therefore a point
is not the same as a unit; for points admit of contact, whereas units
do not, but only of succession; and between points there is something
intermediate, but between units there is not.