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” Nor do men do wrong for the sake of the bare necessities only, the sort of wrongdoing for which Phaleas thinks that equality of substance is a cure—preventing highway robbery by removing the motive of cold or hunger; men also do wrong to gain pleasure and to satisfy desire. For if they have a desire above the bare necessities of existence, they will transgress to cure this desire; and moreover not because of desire only, but in order that they may enjoy the pleasures that are not associated with pains. What remedy then is there for these three classes of offenders? For the first class, a modest competence and work; for the second, temperance; and as for the third sort, any people who desire pleasures that depend on themselves would require no cure for their desires save that which is derived from philosophy, for the other pleasures require the aid of fellow-creatures. Since clearly the greatest transgressions spring from a desire for superfluities, not for bare necessaries （for example, men do not become tyrants in order to avoid shivering with cold, and accordingly high honors are awarded to one who kills a tyrant, but not to one who kills a thief）; so that the method of the constitution of Phaleas is efficacious only against the minor social disorders. Again, Phaleas desires to frame institutions for the most part which will lead to a right state of affairs in the internal relations of the citizens, but the legislator should also have regard to relations with the neighboring peoples and with all foreign nations.  It is essential therefore for the constitution to be framed with a view to military strength, about which Phaleas has said nothing. And the same is true also about property; for the citizens should not only possess enough to meet their requirements in civic life, but also to encounter the perils that face them from outside; hence they should possess neither so large an amount of wealth that it will be coveted by their neighbors and by stronger states while its possessors will be unable to repel their assailants, nor yet so small an amount as not to be capable of sustaining a war even against equal and similar states. Phaleas, it is true, has laid down no rule at all, but the question must not be overlooked, what amount of wealth is advantageous. Perhaps therefore the best limit to prescribe is that it must not profit a stronger people to make war upon the state because of its excessive wealth, but only just as it might do even if the citizens had not got so much property. For example, when Autophradates was about to lay siege to Atarneus,29 Eubulus bade him consider how long it would take him to capture the place, and then calculate what his expenditure would be for that period, for he himself was willing for the payment of a smaller sum than that to evacuate Atarneus at once; these words caused Autophradates to ponder and led him to abandon the siege. Now equality of property among the citizens is certainly one of the factors that contribute to the avoidance of party faction; it is not however a particularly important one. For the upper classes may resent it on the ground that their merits are not equal, owing to which we actually see them often attacking the government and rebelling; [1267b]  and also the baseness of human beings is a thing insatiable, and though at the first a dole of only two obols30 is enough, yet when this has now become an established custom, they always want more, until they get to an unlimited amount; for appetite is in its nature unlimited, and the majority of mankind live for the satisfaction of appetite. The starting-point in such matters therefore, rather than levelling estates, is to train those that are respectable by nature so that they may not wish for excessive wealth, and to contrive that the base may not be able to do so, and this is secured if they are inferior in number and not unjustly treated. And also we cannot approve what Phaleas has said about equality of property, for he makes the citizens equal in respect of landed estate only, but wealth also consists in slaves and cattle and money, and there is an abundance of property in the shape of what is called furniture; we must therefore either seek to secure equality or some moderate regulation as regards all these things, or we must permit all forms of wealth. And it is clear from Phaleas's legislation that he makes the citizen-population a small one, inasmuch as all the artisans are to be publicly owned slaves and are not to furnish any complement of the citizen-body. But if it is proper to have public slaves, the laborers employed upon the public works ought to be of that status （as is the case at Epidamnus and as Diophantus once tried to institute at Athens）.These remarks may serve fairly well to indicate such merits  and defects as may be contained in the constitution of Phaleas.Hippodamus31 son of Euryphon, a Milesian （who invented the division of cities into blocks and cut up Piraeus, and who also became somewhat eccentric in his general mode of life owing to a desire for distinction, so that some people thought that he lived too fussily, with a quantity of hair32 and expensive ornaments, and also a quantity of cheap yet warm clothes not only in winter but also in the summer periods, and who wished to be a man of learning in natural science generally）, was the first man not engaged in politics who attempted to speak on the subject of the best form of constitution. His system was for a city with a population of ten thousand, divided into three classes; for he made one class of artisans, one of farmers, and the third the class that fought for the state in war and was the armed class. He divided the land into three parts, one sacred, one public and one private: sacred land to supply the customary offerings to the gods, common land to provide the warrior class with food, and private land to be owned by the farmers. He thought that there are only three divisions of the law, since the matters about which lawsuits take place are three in number—outrage, damage, homicide. He also proposed to establish one supreme court of justice, to which were to be carried up all the cases at law thought to have been decided wrongly, and this court he made to consist of certain selected elders. [1268a]  He held that the verdicts in the courts ought not to be given by ballot, but that each juryman should bring a tablet on which if he found a simple verdict of guilty he should write the penalty, and if simply not guilty leave a blank, but if he found the prisoner guilty on some counts but not on others he should state this; for the present state of the law he thought unsatisfactory, since it forces jurors to commit perjury by giving either the one verdict or the other. He proposed a law that those who discovered something of advantage to the state should receive honor, and that the children of those who died in war should have their maintenance from the state, in the belief that this had never yet been provided by law among other people—but as a matter of fact this law exists at present both at Athens and in others of the cities. The governing officials were all to be chosen by the assembly of the people, and this he made to consist of the three classes of the city; and the officials elected were to superintend the business of the community and the affairs of foreign residents and of orphans. These then are the greatest number and the most noteworthy of the provisions in the system of Hippodamus. But doubt might be raised first of all about the division of the general mass of the citizens. The artisans, the farmers and the military class all participate in the government, though the farmers have not got arms and the artisans neither arms nor land,  which makes them almost the slaves of those who possess the arms. Therefore for them to share in all the offices is impossible （for it is inevitable that both military commanders and civic guards and in general the most important offices should be appointed from those that have the arms）; but if they do not share in the government of the state, how is it possible for them to be friendly towards the constitution? But it may be said that the ruling class as possessing the arms is bound to be stronger than both classes. But this is not easy if they are not numerous and if this be the case, why should the other classes participate in the government and control the appointment of the rulers?33 Again, what use are the farmers to the state? artisans there must necessarily be （for every state requires artisans）, and they can make a living as in the other states from the practice of their craft; but as for the farmers, although it would have been reasonable for them to be a portion of the state if they provided the class possessing the arms with its food, as it is they have private land of their own and farm it for themselves. And again, if the common land from which those who fight for the state are to have their food is to be farmed by themselves, the military class would not be different from the agricultural, but the legislator intends it to be; while if the cultivators of the common land are to be a different set of people from both those who cultivate the private farms and the soldiers, this will be yet a forth section of the state, holding no part in it but quite estranged from the government. But yet if one is to make those who cultivate the private and the common land the same people, the amount of the produce from the farms which each man will cultivate will be scanty for two households, [1268b]  and moreover why are they not both to take food for themselves and to supply it to the soldiers direct from the land and from the same allotments? All these points therefore involve much confusion. Also the law about trials is unsatisfactory—the requirement that the verdict shall be given on separate counts when the charge in the indictment is single, and the conversion of the juror into an arbitrator. A qualified verdict is practicable in an arbitration even when there are several arbitrators （for they confer with one another about their verdict）, but it is not practicable in the law-courts, but the contrary to this is actually provided for by most lawgivers, who prohibit consultation between the jurymen. Then the verdict will inevitably be a confused one when the juror thinks that the defendant is liable for damages but not in so large an amount as the plaintiff claims; for the plaintiff will sue for twenty minae34 and the juror will adjudge ten minae （or the former some larger and the latter some smaller sum）, and another juror five minae, and yet another four （and so they will obviously go on making fractions）, while others will award the whole sum, and others nothing; what then will be the method of counting the votes? Again, nobody compels the juror to commit perjury who, if the indictment has been drawn in simple form, gives a simple verdict of acquittal or condemnation, and gives it justly; for the juror  who gives a verdict of acquittal does not give judgement that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae for which he is sued; it is only the juror who gives a verdict condemning the defendant when he does not think that he owes twenty minae who commits perjury. As for the view that an honor ought to be awarded to those who invent something advantageous to the state, legislation to this effect is not safe, but only specious to the ear; for it involves malicious prosecutions and, it may even happen, constitutional upheavals. And the matter leads to another problem and a different inquiry: some persons raise the question whether to alter the ancestral laws, supposing another law is better, is harmful or advantageous to states. Hence it is not easy to give a speedy agreement to the above proposal to honor reformers, if really it is disadvantageous to alter the laws; yet it is possible that persons may bring forward the repeal of laws or of the constitution as a benefit to the community. And since we have made mention of this question, it will be better if we set out a few further observations about it, for, as we said, it involves difficulty. And it might be thought that it would be better for alteration to take place; at all events in the other fields of knowledge this has proved beneficial—for example, medicine has been improved by being altered from the ancestral system, and gymnastic training, and in general all the arts and faculties so that since statesmanship also is to be counted as one of these, it is clear that the same thing necessarily holds good in regard to it as well. And it might be said that a sign of this has occurred in the actual events of history, for （one might argue） the laws of ancient times were too simple and uncivilized: the Hellenes, for instance, used both to carry arms and to purchase their wives from one another, and all the survivals of the customs of antiquity existing anywhere are utterly foolish, [1269a]  as for example at Cyme there is a law relating to trials for murder, that if the prosecutor on the charge of murder produces a certain number of his own relatives as witnesses, the defendant is guilty of the murder. And in general all men really seek what is good, not what was customary with their forefathers; and it is probable that primitive mankind, whether sprung from the earth35 or the survivors of some destructive cataclysm,36 were just like ordinary foolish people, as indeed is actually said of the earth-born race, so that it is odd that we should abide by their notions. Moreover even written codes of law may with advantage not be left unaltered. For just as in the other arts as well, so with the structure of the state it is impossible that it should have been framed aright in all its details; for it must of necessity be couched in general terms, but our actions deal with particular things. These considerations therefore make it clear that it is proper for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we consider the matter in another way, it would seem to be a thing that needs much caution. For when it is the case that the improvement would be small, but it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal the laws lightly, it is clear that some mistakes both of the legislator and of the magistrate should be passed over; for the people will not be as much benefited by making an alteration as they will be harmed by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers. Also, the example from the case of the arts is a mistake,  as to change the practice of an art is a different thing from altering a law; for the law has no power to compel obedience beside the force of custom, and custom only grows up in long lapse of time, so that lightly to change from the existing laws to other new laws is to weaken the power of the law. Again, even if alteration of the laws is proper, are all the laws to be open to alteration, and in every form of constitution, or not? and is any chance person to be competent to introduce alterations or only certain people? for there is a great difference between these alternatives. Therefore let us abandon this inquiry for the present, since it belongs to other occasions.On the subject of the constitution of Sparta and that of Crete, and virtually in regard to the other forms of constitution also, the questions that arise for consideration are two, one whether their legal structure has any feature that is admirable or the reverse in comparison with the best system, another whether it contains any provision that is really opposed to the fundamental principle and character of the constitution that the founders had in view.Now it is a thing admitted that a state that is to be well governed must be provided with leisure from menial occupations; but how this is to be provided it is not easy to ascertain. The serf class in Thessaly repeatedly rose against its masters, and so did the Helots at Sparta, where they are like an enemy constantly sitting in wait for the disasters of the Spartiates. Nothing of the kind has hitherto occurred in Crete, the reason perhaps being that the neighboring cities, [1269b]  even when at war with one another, in no instance ally themselves with the rebels, because as they themselves also possess a serf class this would not be for their interest; whereas the Laconians were entirely surrounded by hostile neighbors, Argives, Messenians and Arcadians. For with the Thessalians too the serf risings originally began because they were still at war with their neighbors, the Achaeans, Perraebi and Magnesians. Also, apart from other drawbacks, the mere necessity of policing a serf class is an irksome burden—the problem of how intercourse with them is to be carried on: if allowed freedom they grow insolent and claim equal rights with their masters, and if made to live a hard life they plot against them and hate them. It is clear therefore that those whose helot-system works out in this way do not discover the best mode of treating the problem. Again, the freedom in regard to women is detrimental both in regard to the purpose of the constitution and in regard to the happiness of the state. For just as man and wife are part of a household, it is clear that the state also is divided nearly in half into its male and female population, so that in all constitutions in which the position of the women is badly regulated one half of the state must be deemed to have been neglected in framing the law. And this has taken place in the state under consideration,  for the lawgiver wishing the whole city to be of strong character displays his intention clearly in relation to the men, but in the case of the women has entirely neglected the matter; for they live dissolutely37 in respect of every sort of dissoluteness, and luxuriously. So that the inevitable result is that in a state thus constituted wealth is held in honor, especially if it is the case that the people are under the sway of their women, as most of the military and warlike races are, except the Celts and such other races as have openly held in honor passionate friendship between males. For it appears that the original teller of the legend had good reason for uniting Ares with Aphrodite, for all men of martial spirit appear to be attracted to the companionship either of male associates or of women. Hence this characteristic existed among the Spartans, and in the time of their empire many things were controlled by the women; yet what difference does it make whether the women rule or the rulers are ruled by the women? The result is the same. And although bravery is of service for none of the regular duties of life, but if at all, in war, even in this respect the Spartans' women were most harmful; and they showed this at the time of the Theban invasion,38 for they rendered no useful service, as the women do in other states, while they caused more confusion than the enemy. It is true therefore that at the outset the freedom allowed to women at Sparta seems to have come about with good reason, [1270a]  for the Spartans used to be away in exile abroad for long periods on account of their military expeditions, both when fighting the war against the Argives and again during the war against the Arcadians and Messenians; but when they had turned to peaceful pursuits, although they handed over themselves to the lawgiver already prepared for obedience by military life （for this has many elements of virtue）, as for the women it is said that Lycurgus did attempt to bring them under the laws, but since they resisted he gave it up. So the Spartan women are, it is true, responsible for what took place, and therefore manifestly for this mistake among the rest; although for our own part we are not considering the question who deserves excuse or does not, but what is the right or wrong mode of action. But, as was also said before, errors as regards the status of women seem not only to cause a certain unseemliness in the actual conduct of the state but to contribute in some degree to undue love of money. For next to the things just spoken of one might censure the Spartan institutions with respect to the unequal distribution of wealth. It has come about that some of the Spartans own too much property and some extremely little; owing to which the land has fallen into few hands, and this has also been badly regulated by the laws;  for the lawgiver made it dishonorable to sell a family's existing estate, and did so rightly, but he granted liberty to alienate land at will by gift or bequest; yet the result that has happened was bound to follow in the one case as well as in the other. And also nearly two-fifths of the whole area of the country is owned by women, because of the number of women who inherit estates and the practice of giving large dowries; yet it would have been better if dowries had been prohibited by law or limited to a small or moderate amount . . .39 But as it is he is allowed to give an heiress in marriage to whomever he likes; and if he dies without having made directions as to this by will, whoever he leaves as his executor bestows her upon whom he chooses. As a result of this40 although the country is capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand heavy-armed troopers, they numbered not even a thousand. And the defective nature of their system of land-tenure has been proved by the actual facts of history: the state did not succeed in enduring a single blow,41 but perished owing to the smallness of its population. They have a tradition that in the earlier reigns they used to admit foreigners to their citizenship, with the result that dearth of population did not occur in those days, although they were at war for a long period; and it is stated that at one time the Spartiates numbered as many as ten thousand. However, whether this is true or not, it is better for a state's male population to be kept up by measures to equalize property. The law in relation to parentage is also somewhat adverse to the correction of this evil. [1270b]  For the lawgiver desiring to make the Spartiates as numerous as possible holds out inducements to the citizens to have as many children as possible: for they have a law releasing the man who has been father of three sons from military service, and exempting the father of four from all taxes. Yet it is clear that if a number of sons are born and the land is correspondingly divided there will inevitably come to be many poor men.Moreover the regulations for the Ephorate42 are also bad. For this office has absolute control over their most important affairs, but the Ephors are appointed from the entire people, so that quite poor men often happen to get into the office, who owing to their poverty used to be43 easily bought. This was often manifested in earlier times, and also lately in the affair44 at Andros; for certain Ephors were corrupted with money and so far as lay in their power ruined the whole state. And because the office was too powerful, and equal to a tyranny, the kings also were compelled to cultivate popular favor, so that in this way too the constitution was jointly injured, for out of an aristocracy came to be evolved a democracy. Thus this office does, it is true, hold together the constitution—for the common people keep quiet because they have a share in the highest office of state, so that whether this is due to the lawgiver or  has come about by chance, the Ephorate is advantageous for the conduct of affairs; for if a constitution is to be preserved, all the sections of the state must wish it to exist and to continue on the same lines; so the kings are in this frame of mind owing to their own honorable rank, the nobility owing to the office of the Elders, which is a prize of virtue, and the common people because of the Ephorate, which is appointed from the whole population—but yet the Ephorate, though rightly open to all the citizens, ought not to be elected as it is now, for the method is too childish.45 And further the Ephors have jurisdiction in lawsuits of high importance, although they are any chance people, so that it would be better if they did not decide cases on their own judgement but by written rules and according to the laws. Also the mode of life of the Ephors is not in conformity with the aim of the state, for it is itself too luxurious, whereas in the case of the other citizens the prescribed life goes too far in the direction of harshness, so that they are unable to endure it, and secretly desert the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body. Also their regulations for the office of the Elders are not good; it is true that if these were persons of a high class who had been adequately trained in manly valor, one might perhaps say that the institution was advantageous to the state, although their life-tenure of the judgeship in important trials is indeed a questionable feature （for there is old age of mind as well as of body）; [1271a]  but as their education has been on such lines that even the lawgiver himself cannot trust in them as men of virtue, it is a dangerous institution. And it is known that those who have been admitted to this office take bribes and betray many of the public interests by favoritism; so that it would be better if they were not exempt from having to render an account of their office, but at present they are. And it might be held that the magistracy of the Ephors serves to hold all the offices to account; but this gives altogether too much to the Ephorate, and it is not the way in which, as we maintain, officials ought to be called to account. Again, the procedure in the election of the Elders as a mode of selection is not only childish, but it is wrong that one who is to be the holder of this honorable office should canvass for it, for the man worthy of the office ought to hold it whether he wants to or not. But as it is the lawgiver clearly does the same here as in the rest of the constitution: he makes the citizens ambitious and has used this for the election of the Elders, for nobody would ask for office if he were not ambitious; yet surely ambition and love of money are the motives that bring about almost the greatest part of the voluntary wrongdoing that takes place among mankind. As to monarchy, the question whether it is not or is an advantageous institution for states to possess  may be left to another discussion; but at all events it would be advantageous that kings should not be appointed as they are now, but chosen in each case with regard to their own life and conduct. But it is clear that even the lawgiver himself does not suppose that he can make the kings men of high character: at all events he distrusts them as not being persons of sufficient worth owing to which the Spartans used to send kings who were enemies as colleagues on embassies, and thought that the safety of the state depended on division between the kings. Also the regulations for the the public mess-tables called Phiditia have been badly laid down by their originator. The revenue for these ought to come rather from public funds, as in Crete; but among the Spartans everybody has to contribute, although some of them are very poor and unable to find money for this charge, so that the result is the opposite of what the lawgiver purposed. For he intends the organization of the common tables to be democratic, but when regulated by the law in this manner it works out as by no means democratic; for it is not easy for the very poor to participate, yet their ancestral regulation of the citizenship is that it is not to belong to one who is unable to pay this tax. The law about the Admirals has been criticized by some other writers also, and rightly criticized; for it acts as a cause of sedition, since in addition to the kings who are military commanders the office of Admiral stands almost as another kingship. Another criticism that may be made against the fundamental principle of the lawgiver [1271b]  is one that Plato has made in the Laws. The entire system of the laws is directed towards one part of virtue only, military valor, because this is serviceable for conquest. Owing to this they remained secure while at war, but began to decline when they had won an empire, because they did not know how to live a life of leisure, and had been trained in no other form of training more important than the art of war. And another error no less serious than that one is this: they think that the coveted prizes of life are won by valor more than by cowardice, and in this they are right, yet they imagine wrongly that these prizes are worth more than the valor that wins them. The public finance of Sparta is also badly regulated: when compelled to carry on wars on a large scale she has nothing in the state treasury, and the Spartiates pay war taxes badly because, as most of the land is owned by them, they do not scrutinize each other's contributions. And the lawgiver has achieved the opposite result to what is advantageous—he has made the state poor and the individual citizen covetous.So much for a discussion of the constitution of Sparta: for these are the main points in it for criticism.  The Cretan constitution approximates to that of Sparta, but though in a few points it is not worse framed, for the larger part it has a less perfect finish. For the Spartan constitution appears and indeed is actually stated46 to have been copied in most of its provisions from the Cretan; and as a rule old things have been less fully elaborated than newer ones. For it is said that when Lycurgus relinquished his post as guardian of King Charilaus47 and went abroad, he subsequently passed most of his time in Crete because of the relationship between the Cretans and the Spartans; for the Lyctians48 were colonists from Sparta, and the settlers that went out to the colony found the system of laws already existing among the previous inhabitants of the place; owing to which the neighboring villagers even now use these laws in the same manner, in the belief that Minos49 first instituted this code of laws. And also the island appears to have been designed by nature and to be well situated to be under Greek rule, as it lies across the whole of the sea, round which almost all the Greeks are settled; for Crete is only a short distance from the Peloponnese in one direction, and from the part of Asia around Triopium and from Rhodes in the other. Owing to this Minos won the empire of the sea,50 and made some of the islands subject to him and settled colonies in others, but finally when making an attack on Sicily he ended his life there near Camicus.The Cretan organization is on the same lines as that of Sparta. In Sparta the land is tilled by the Helots and in Crete by the serfs; [1272a]  and also both have public mess-tables, and in old days the Spartans called them not ‘phiditia’ but ‘men's messes,’ as the Cretans do, which is a proof that they came from Crete. And so also did the system of government; for the Ephors have the same power as the magistrates called Cosmi in Crete, except that the Ephors are five in number and the Cosmi ten; and the Elders at Sparta are equal in number to the Elders whom the Cretans call the Council; and monarchy existed in former times, but then the Cretans abolished it, and the Cosmi hold the leadership in war; and all are members of the Assembly, though it has no powers except the function of confirming by vote the resolutions already formed by the Elders and the Cosmi.Now the Cretan arrangements for the public mess-tables are better than the Spartan; for at Sparta each citizen pays a fixed poll-tax, failing which he is prevented by law from taking part in the government, as has been said before; but in Crete the system is more communal, for out of all the crops and cattle produced from the public lands, and the tributes paid by the serfs, one part is assigned for the worship of the gods and the maintenance of the public services,  and the other for the public mess-tables, so that all the citizens are maintained from the common funds, women and children as well as men; and the lawgiver has devised many wise measures to secure the benefit of moderation at table, and the segregation of the women in order that they may not bear many children, for which purpose he instituted association with the male sex, as to which there will be another occasion51 to consider whether it was a bad thing or a good one. That the regulations for the common mess-tables therefore are better in Crete than at Sparta is manifest; but the regulations for the Cosmi are even worse than those regarding the Ephors. For the evil attaching to the office of the Ephors belongs to the Cosmi also, as the post is filled by any chance persons, while the benefit conferred on the government by this office at Sparta is lacking in Crete. At Sparta, as the election is made from all the citizens, the common people sharing in the highest office desire the maintenance of the constitution, but in Crete they do not elect the Cosmi from all the citizens but from certain clans, and the Elders from those who have held the office of Cosmos, about which regulations the same comments might be made as about what takes place at Sparta: their freedom from being called to account and their tenure for life gives them greater rank than their merit deserves, and their administration of their office at their own discretion and not under the guidance of a written code is dangerous. And the fact that the common people quietly tolerate their exclusion is no proof that the arrangement is a sound one; for the Cosmi unlike the Ephors make no sort of profit, [1272b]  as they live in an island remote from any people to corrupt them. Also the remedy which they employ for this defect52 is a curious one, and less characteristic of a republic than of a dynasty53: often the Cosmi are expelled by a conspiracy formed among some of their actual colleagues or the private citizens. Also the Cosmi are allowed to resign during their term of office. Now it would be preferable for all these expedients to be put in force by law rather than at the discretion of individuals, for that is a dangerous principle. And the worst expedient of all is that of the suspension of the office of Cosmi, which is often brought about by members of the powerful class who wish to escape being punished; this proves that the constitution has a republican element, although it is not actually a republic but rather a dynasty.54 And the nobles frequently form parties among the common people and among their friends and so bring about a suspension of government,55 and form factions and engage in war with one another. Yet such a state of things is virtually the same as if for a period of time the state underwent an entire revolution, and the bonds of civil society were loosened.And it is a precarious position for a state to be in, when those who wish to attack it also have the power to do so. But, as has been said, it is saved by its locality; for distance has had the same effect as alien-acts.56 A result of this is that with the Cretans the serf population stands firm, whereas the Helots often revolt; for the Cretans  take no part in foreign empire, and also the island has only lately been invaded by warfare from abroad, rendering manifest the weakness of the legal system there.Let this suffice for our discussion of this form of constitution.Carthage also appears to have a good constitution, with many outstanding features as compared with those of other nations, but most nearly resembling the Spartan in some points. For these three constitutions are in a way near to one another and are widely different from the others—the Cretan, the Spartan and, thirdly, that of Carthage. Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof of a well-regulated constitution is that the populace willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system, and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree worth mentioning, nor yet a tyrant.Points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables of its Comradeships corresponding to the Phiditia, and the magistracy of the Hundred and Four corresponding to the Ephors （except one point of superiority—the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Carthaginians elect this magistracy by merit）; the kings and the council of Elders correspond to the kings and Elders at Sparta, and it is another superior feature that the Carthaginian kings are not confined to the same family and that one of no particular distinction, and also that if any family distinguishes itself . . .57 the Elders are to be chosen from these rather than by age; for as they are put in control of important matters, if they are men of no value they do great harm, [1273a]  and they have already injured the Spartan State.Most of the points therefore in the Carthaginian system that would be criticized on the ground of their divergences happen to be common to all the constitutions of which we have spoken; but the features open to criticism as judged by the principle of an aristocracy or republic are some of them departures in the direction of democracy and others in the direction of oligarchy. The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree58 unanimously, but failing that, these matters also lie with the people59; and when the kings introduce business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their rulers, but the people have the sovereign decision, and anybody who wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a right that does not exist under the other constitutions. The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of Five which control many important matters, and the election by these boards of the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of authority than that of any other officers （for they are in power after they have gone out of office and before they have actually entered upon it） are oligarchical features; their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and other similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact that the members of the Boards are the judges in all lawsuits,  instead of different suits being tried by different courts as at Sparta. But the Carthaginian system diverges from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy most signally in respect of a certain idea that is shared by the mass of mankind; they think that the rulers should be chosen not only for their merit but also for their wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man to govern well or to have leisure for his duties. If therefore election by wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratic, this will be a third system exhibited in the organization of the constitution of Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye to these two qualifications, and especially elections to the most important offices, those of the kings and of the generals. But it must be held that this divergence from aristocracy is an error on the part of a lawgiver; for one of the most important points to keep in view from the outset is that the best citizens may be able to have leisure and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only when in office but also when living in private life. And if it is necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the greatest offices of state, the kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the whole state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem honorable, the opinion of the other citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in which virtue is not held in the highest honor [1273b]  cannot be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it is probable that those who purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it, when they hold office for money spent; for it would be odd if a man of small means but respectable should want to make a profit but an inferior person when he has spent money to get elected should not want to. Hence the persons who should be in office are those most capable of holding office. And even if the lawgiver neglected to secure comfortable means for respectable people, it would at all events be better that he should provide for their leisure while in office.And it might also be thought a bad thing for the same person to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction at Carthage. One man one job is the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought to see that this may be secured, and not appoint the same man to play the flute and make shoes. Hence except in a small city it is more statesmanlike for a larger number to share in the offices and more democratic, for it is fairer to all, as we said, and also functions are performed better and more quickly when separate than by the same people. This is clear in military and naval matters; for in both of these departments command and subordination penetrate throughout almost the whole body.60 But the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the dangers by being wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion of the common people to  appointments in the cities; by this means they heal the social sore and make the constitution stable. However, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the lawgiver; but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude of the subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore tranquillity.This then is the character of the Spartan, Cretan and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly famous.Of those that have put forward views about politics, some have taken no part in any political activities whatever but have passed their whole life as private citizens; and something has been said about almost all the writers of this class about whom there is anything noteworthy. Some on the other hand have been lawgivers, either for their native cities or even for certain foreign peoples, after having themselves been actively engaged in government; and of these some have been framers of laws only, and others of a constitution also, for instance Solon and Lycurgus, who instituted both laws and constitutions. The Spartan constitution has been discussed. As for Solon, he is considered by some people to have been a good lawgiver, as having put an end to oligarchy when it was too unqualified and having liberated the people from slavery and restored the ancestral democracy with a skilful blending of the constitution: the Council on the Areopagus being an oligarchic element, the elective magistracies aristocratic and the law-courts democratic. And although really in regard to certain of these features, the Council and the election of magistrates, [1274a]  Solon seems merely to have abstained from destroying institutions that existed already, he does appear to have founded the democracy by constituting the jury-courts from all the citizens. For this he is actually blamed by some persons, as having dissolved the power of the other parts of the community by making the law-court, which was elected by lot, all-powerful. For as the law-court grew strong, men courted favor with the people as with a tyrant, and so brought the constitution to the present democracy; and Ephialtes and Pericles docked the power of the Council on the Areopagus, while Pericles instituted payment for serving in the law-courts, and in this manner finally the successive leaders of the people led them on by growing stages to the present democracy. But this does not seem to have come about in accordance with the intention of Solon, but rather as a result of accident （for the common people having been the cause of the naval victories at the time of the Persian invasion became proud and adopted bad men as popular leaders when the respectable classes opposed their policy）; inasmuch as Solon for his part appears to bestow only the minimum of power upon the people, the function of electing the magistrates and of calling them to account （for if even this were not under the control of the populace it would be a mere slave and a foreign enemy）, whereas he appointed all the offices from the notable and the wealthy, the Five-hundred-bushel class  and the Teamsters and a third property-class called the Knighthood; while the fourth class, the Thetes, were admitted to no office.61 Laws were given62 by Zaleucus to the Epizephyrian63 Locrians and by Charondas64 of Catana to his fellow-citizens and to the other Chalcidic cities65 on the coasts of Italy and Sicily. Some persons try to connect Zaleucus and Charondas together: they say that Onomacritus first arose as an able lawgiver, and that he was trained in Crete, being a Locrian and travelling there to practise the art of soothsaying, and Thales became his companion, and Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thales, and Charondas of Zaleucus; but these stories give too little attention to the dates. Philolaus of Corinth also arose as lawgiver at Thebes. Philolaus belonged by birth to the Bacchiad family; he became the lover of Diocles the winner66 at Olympia, but when Diocles quitted the city because of his loathing for the passion of his mother Alcyone, he went away to Thebes, and there they both ended their life. Even now people still show their tombs, in full view of each other and one of them fully open to view in the direction of the Corinthian country but the other one not; for the story goes that they arranged to be buried in this manner, Diocles owing to his hatred for his misfortune securing that the land of Corinth might not be visible from his tomb, and Philolaus that it might be from his. [1274b]  It was due then to a reason of this nature that they went to live at Thebes; but Philolaus became the Thebans' lawgiver in regard to various matters, among others the size of families,—the laws called by the Thebans laws of adoption; about this Philolaus enacted special legislation, in order that the number of the estates in land might be preserved. There is nothing special in the code of Charondas except the trials for false witness （for he was the first to introduce the procedure of denunciation）, but in the accuracy of his laws he is a more finished workman even than the legislators of today. （Peculiar to Phaleas67 is the measure for equalizing properties; to Plato,68 community of wives and children and of property, and the common meals for the women, and also the law about drunkenness, enacting that sober persons are to be masters of the drinking-bouts, and the regulation for military training to make men ambidextrous during drill, on the ground that it is a mistake to have one of the two hands useful but the other useless.）There are laws of Draco,69 but he legislated for an existing constitution, and there is nothing peculiar in his laws that is worthy of mention, except their severity in imposing heavy punishment. Pittacus70 also was a framer of laws, but not of a constitution; a special law of his is that if men commit any offence when drunk,  they are to pay a larger fine than those who offend when sober; because since more men are insolent when drunk than when sober he had regard not to the view that drunken offenders are to be shown more mercy, but to expediency. Androdamas71 of Rhegium also became lawgiver to the Chalcidians in the direction of Thrace,72 and to him belong the laws dealing with cases of murder and with heiresses; however one cannot mention any provision that is peculiar to him.Let such be our examination of the constitutional schemes actually in force and of those that have been proposed by certain persons.
1 On the following criticisms see Grote, Plato, 3, pp. 211-233.
2 （1） 1.3-7; （2） 1.8-2.11; （3） 2.11-13; also （4） other objections 2.15-16.
3 In the mss. of the Greek ‘whereas—kind’ comes below after ‘ Arcadian.’
4 As the best state consists of different classes, its unity is secured by each citizen giving services to society and receiving in return benefits proportionate to his service. Probably τὸ ἴσον is an interpolation （though Newman explains it as 'the reciprocal rendering of an equal amount of dissimilar things'）: omitting τὸ ἴσον, we render ‘reciprocity’ and not ‘reciprocal equality’; cf. Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1132b 33, ‘In the interchange of services Justice in the form of Reciprocity is the bond that maintains the association: reciprocity, that is, on the basis of proportion, not on the basis of equality.’
5 The best form of constitution is where there is a superior class that governs continuously—an aristocracy; so where there are no class-distinctions, the next best thing is for all the citizens to take turns in governing and being governed, those in office for the time being forming a sort of aristocracy. Richards's alteration of the text gives ‘to take turns to govern is an imitation of original inequality and class-distinction.‘
10 The three classes in Plato's Republic.
11 Something has clearly been lost here, signifying ‘or should there be some limited form of communism?’
13 The saying was ascribed to Pythgagoras.
15 A passage has been lost here.
16 The last clause, ‘and about—to have,’ has almost certainly been misplaced by a copyist, and should come near the beginning of the sentence, after ‘about property.’
17 i.e. a life of intercourse with other states, cf. 1327b 5. Some mss. add ‘not one of isolation’; this looks like an explanatory note interpolated.
18 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ‘when they are away from it.’
19 Otherwise unknown.
20 i.e. the estates are equal, and the number of households fixed, but not the number of citizens.
24 i.e. a better ellective body because representative of all classes.
25 i.e. from voting for the preliminary list from the third and fourth classes.
26 Otherwise unknown.
27 Probably the Greek should be altered to give ‘because’ instead of ‘moreover.’
31 A famous architect and town-planner （see 1330b 24） circa 475 B.C.
33 As military posts must be filled by the military class, the civilians will feel excluded and be disaffected; and the military class may not be strong enough to control them. Better, then, not to give full citizenship to civilians.
34 The mina, 100 drachmas, may be put at 4 pounds （gold）.
37 The textual emendation giving ‘live without restraint’ is probably correct.
38 Under Epaminondas, 369 B.C.
39 A clause seems to have been lost: ‘Also it would have been better to regulate by law the marriage of heiresses.’
40 i.e. the consequent fall in the number of men rich enough to keep a horse or even to provide themselves with heavy arms.
41 The battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.
42 The five Ephors, elected for a year by the people, were the real rulers of Sparta. The two kings were hereditary; the senate of twenty-eight nobles advised them, and the Ephors presided at the Assembly of citizens over thirty years old, who voted on the measures of the Kings and Ephors but could not discuss them. The small fleet was commanded by a single admiral appointed for a year by the Ephors and not allowed to hold office twice.
43 Perhaps the Greek should be altered to give ‘are.’
45 There is no clear evidence what the method was.
46 e.g. by Hdt 1.65.
47 Posthumous son of Lycurgus's elder brother King Polydectes; cf.1316a 34.
51 This promise is not fulfilled
52 i.e. the defect of the undue restriction of the office.
53 See 1292b 10 n.
54 See 1292b 10 n.
55 The MSS. give ‘bring about a monarchy.’
57 Clauses seem to have been lost concluding the account of the appointment of the Kings and turning to the Elders and their selection on grounds of wealth.
58 i.e. agree to refer or not to refer
59 i.e. even when the Kings only or the Elders only desire reference, it takes place
60 i.e. everyone in command （except the commander-in-chief） has someone of higher rank over him.
62 Perhaps 664 B.C.
64 See 1252b 14.
66 In 728 B.C.
67 Dealt with already in 4.
68 Above, 1-3
71 Otherwise unknown.
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