[
1069a]
[18]
Our inquiry is concerned with
substance; for it is the principles and causes of substances that we
are investigating. Indeed if the universe is to be regarded as a
whole,
[20]
substance is
its first part; and if it is to be regarded as a succession,
1 even so substance is first, then quality, then
quantity. Moreover, the latter hardly exist at all in the full sense,
but are merely qualifications and affections of Being. Otherwise
"not-white" and "not-straight" would also exist; at any rate we say
that they too "are," e.g., "it is not white."Further, none of the other categories is
separately existent. Even the ancients in effect testify to this, for
it was of substance that they sought the principles and elements and
causes. Present-day thinkers
2 tend to regard universals as substance,
because genera are universal, and they hold that these are more truly
principles and substances because they approach the question
theoretically; but the ancients identified substance with particular
things, e.g. fire and earth, and not with body in general.
Now there are three kinds of substance. One is
sensible
(and may be either eternal
3 or perishable; the latter, e.g.
plants and animals, is universally recognized); of this we must
apprehend the elements, whether they are one or many.Another is
immutable , which certain thinkers hold to exist
separately; some dividing it into two classes, others combining the
Forms and the objects of mathematics into a single class, and others
recognizing only the objects of mathematics as of this nature.
4 The first
two kinds of substance come within the scope of physics, since they
involve motion;
[
1069b]
[1]
the last belongs to some other science,
if there is no principle common to all three.
Sensible substance is liable to change. Now if change proceeds from
opposites or intermediates—not however from all opposites
(for speech is not white), but only from the contrary
5—then there must be something underlying
which changes into the opposite contrary; for the contraries
6 do not
change.
Further, something persists, whereas the
contrary does not persist. Therefore besides the contraries there is
some third thing, the
matter . Now if change is of four
kinds, in respect either of substance or of quality or of quantity or
of place, and if change of substance is generation or destruction in
the simple sense, and change of quantity is increase or decrease, and
change of affection is alteration, and change of place is locomotion,
then changes must be in each case into the corresponding contrary
state.It must be the
matter, then, which admits of both contraries, that changes. And since
"that which is" is twofold, everything changes from that which is
potentially to that which is actually; e.g. from potentially white to
actually white. The same applies to increase and decrease. Hence not
only may there be generation accidentally from that which is not, but
also everything is generated from that which is,
[20]
but is potentially and is not
actually.And this is
the "one" of Anaxagoras; for his "all things were together,"
7 and the "mixture"
of Empedocles and Anaximander and the doctrine of Democritus would be
better expressed as "all things were together potentially, but not
actually."
8 Hence these thinkers must have had some
conception of matter. All things which change have matter, but
different things have different kinds; and of eternal things such as
are not generable but are movable by locomotion have matter; matter,
however, which admits not of generation, but of motion from one place
to another.
9One
might raise the question from what sort of "not-being" generation
takes place; for not-being has three senses.
10 If a thing exists through a potentiality,
nevertheless it is not through a potentiality for any chance thing;
different things are derived from different things.Nor is it satisfactory to say that "all
things were together," for they differ in their matter, since
otherwise why did they become an infinity and not one? For Mind is
one; so that if matter is also one, only that could have come to be in
actuality whose matter existed potentially. The causes and principles,
then, are three; two being the pair of contraries, of which one is the
formula or form and the other the privation, and the third being the
matter.
11 We must next observe
12 that
neither matter nor form (I mean in the proximate sense) is generated.
All change is of some subject by some agent into some object.
[
1070a]
[1]
The agent is the immediate mover; the
subject is the matter; and the object is the form. Thus the process
will go on to infinity if not only the bronze comes to be round, but
also roundness or bronze comes to be; there must, then, be some
stopping-point.
We must next observe that every
substance is generated from something which has the same name
("substances" including not only natural but all other products).
Things are generated either by art or by nature or by chance or
spontaneously. Art is a generative principle in something else; nature
is a generative principle in the subject itself
13(for man begets man); the other causes are privations of
these.
14 There
are three kinds of substance: (1.) matter, which exists individually
in virtue of being apparent
15(for everything which is characterized
by contact and so not by coalescence is matter and substrate; e.g.
fire, flesh and head;
[20]
these
are all matter, and the last is the matter of a substance in the
strictest sense); (2.) the "nature"
16(existing
individually)—i.e. a kind of positive state which is the
terminus of motion; and (3.) the particular combination of these, e.g.
Socrates or Callias. In
some cases the individuality does not exist apart from the composite
substance (e.g., the form of a house does not exist separately, except
as the art of building;nor
are these forms liable to generation and destruction; there is a
distinct sense in which "house" and "health" and every artificial
product, considered in the abstract, do or do not exist
17); if it does so at all, it does so
in the case of natural objects. Hence Plato was not far wrong in
saying
18 that there are as many Forms as there are kinds
of natural objects; that is if there are Forms distinct from the
things of our world.
Moving causes are causes in the sense
of pre-existent things, but formal causes coexist with their effects.
For it is when the man becomes healthy that health exists, and the
shape of the bronze sphere comes into being simultaneously with the
bronze sphere.Whether any
form remains also afterwards is another question. In some cases there
is nothing to prevent this, e.g. the soul may be of this nature (not
all of it, but the intelligent part; for presumably all of it cannot
be). Clearly then there is no need on these grounds for the Ideas to
exist; for man begets man, the individual begetting the particular
person. And the same is true of the arts, for the art of medicine is
the formula of health.
In one sense the causes and
principles are different for different things; but in another, if one
speaks generally and analogically, they are the same for all. For the
question might be raised whether the principles and elements of
substances and of relations are the same or different; and similarly
with respect to each of the other categories. But it is absurd that
they should be the same for all; for then relations and substance
would have the same constituents.
[
1070b]
[1]
What then can their common constituent
be? For there is nothing common to and yet distinct from substance and
the other predicable categories, yet the element is prior to that of
which it is an element. Moreover substance is not an element of
relations, nor is any of the latter an element of substance. Further,
how can all the categories have the same elements?For no element can be the same as that
which is composed of elements; e.g., neither B nor A can be the same
as BA (nor indeed can any of the "intelligibles,"
19 e.g.
Unity or Being, be an element; for these apply in every case, even to
composite things); hence no element can be either substance or
relation. But it must be one or the other. Therefore the categories
have not all the same elements.
The truth is
that, as we say, in one sense all things have the same elements and in
another they have not. E.g., the elements of sensible bodies are, let
us say, (1) as form, the hot, and in another sense the cold, which is
the corresponding privation; as matter, that which directly and of its
own nature is potentially hot or cold. And not only these are
substances, but so are (2) the compounds
20 of which
they are principles, and (3) any unity which is generated from hot and
cold, e.g. flesh or bone; for the product of hot and cold must be
distinct from them.These
things, then, have the same elements and principles, although
specifically different things have specifically different elements; we
cannot, however, say that all things have the same elements in this
sense, but only by analogy: i.e., one might say that there are three
principles, form, privation and matter.But each of these is different in respect of
each class of things,
[20]
e.g.,
in the case of color they are white, black, surface; or again there is
light, darkness and air, of which day and night are composed. And
since not only things which are inherent in an object are its causes,
but also certain external things, e.g. the moving cause, clearly
"principle" and "element" are not the same; but both are causes.
Principles are divided into these two kinds, and that which moves a
thing or brings it to rest is a kind of principle and
substance.Thus
analogically there are three elements and four causes or principles;
but they are different in different cases, and the proximate moving
cause is different in different cases. Health, disease, body; and the
moving cause is the art of medicine. Form, a particular kind of
disorder, bricks; and the moving cause is the art of
building.And since
in the sphere of natural objects the moving cause of man is man, while
in the sphere of objects of thought the moving cause is the form or
its contrary, in one sense there are three causes and in another four.
For in a sense the art of medicine is health, and the art of building
is the form of a house, and man begets man; but besides these there is
that which as first of all things moves all things.
21 Now
since some things can exist in separation and others cannot, it is the
former that are substances.
[
1071a]
[1]
And therefore all
things have the same causes, because without substance there can be no
affections and motions. Next we shall see
22 that these causes are
probably soul and body, or mind, appetite and body.
23 Again, there is another sense in which by analogy
the principles are the same viz. actuality and potentiality; but these
are different for different things, and apply to them in different
ways.For in some
cases the same thing exists now actually and now potentially; e.g.
wine or flesh or man (actuality and potentiality also fall under the
causes as already described; for the form exists actually if it is
separable, and so does the compound of form and matter, and the
privation, e.g. darkness or disease; and the matter exists
potentially, for it is this which has the potentiality of becoming
both
24;but the distinction in virtue of actuality and potentiality applies
in a different sense to cases where the matter of cause and effect is
not the same, in some of which the form is not the same but different.
E.g., the cause of a man is (i) his elements: fire and earth as
matter, and the particular form; (2) some external formal cause, viz.
his father; and besides these (3) the sun and the ecliptic,
25 which are neither matter nor form nor privation nor
identical in form with him, but cause motion.
Further, we must observe that some causes can be
stated universally, but others cannot.The proximate principles of all things are the
proximate actual individual and another individual which exists
potentially.
26
[20]
Therefore the proximate
principles are not universal. For it is the particular that is the
principle of particulars; "man" in general is the principle of "man"
in general, but there is no such person as "man," whereas Peleus is
the principle of Achilles and your father of you, and this particular
B of this particular BA; but B in general is the principle of BA
regarded absolutely.Again,
even if the causes of substances are universal, still, as has been
said,
27 different things, i.e.
things which are not in the same genus, as colors, sounds, substances
and quantity, have different causes and elements, except in an
analogical sense; and the causes of things which are in the same
species are different, not in species, but because the causes of
individuals are different: your matter and form and moving cause being
different from mine, although in their universal formula they are the
same.
As for the question what are the principles
or elements of substances and relations and qualities, whether they
are the same or different, it is evident that when the terms
"principle" and "element" are used with several meanings they are the
same for everything; but when the meanings are distinguished, they are
not the same but different; except that in a certain sense they are
the same for all. In a certain sense they are the same or analogous,
because (a) everything has matter, form, privation and a moving cause;
(b) the causes of substances may be regarded as the causes of all
things, since if substances are destroyed everything is destroyed; and
further (c) that which is first in complete reality
28
is the cause of all things.In another sense, however, proximate causes are different; there are
as many proximate causes as there are contraries which are predicated
neither as genera nor with a variety of meanings
29; and further the
particular material causes are different.
[
1071b]
[1]
Thus
we have stated what the principles of sensible things are, and how
many they are, and in what sense they are the same and in what sense
different.
Since we have seen
30 that there are three kinds of
substance, two of which are natural and one immutable, we must now
discuss the last named and show that there must be some substance
which is eternal and immutable. Substances are the primary reality,
and if they are all perishable, everything is perishable. But motion
cannot be either generated or destroyed, for it always existed
31; nor can time, because there
can be no priority or posteriority if there is no time.
32 Hence as time is continuous,
so too is motion; for time is either identical with motion or an
affection of it.
33 But there is no
continuous motion except that which is spatial, of spatial motion only
that which is circular.
34But even if we
are to suppose that there is something which is kinetic and productive
although it does not actually move or produce, there will not
necessarily be motion; for that which has a potentiality may not
actualize it.Thus it will
not help matters if we posit eternal substances, as do the exponents
of the Forms, unless there is in them some principle which can cause
change.
35 And even this is not enough, nor is it
enough if there is another substance besides the Forms; for unless it
actually functions there will not be motion.And it will still not be enough even if it
does function, if its essence is potentiality; for there will not be
eternal motion, since that which exists potentially may not
exist.
[20]
Therefore there
must be a principle of this kind whose essence is actuality.
Furthermore these substances
36 must be
immaterial; for they must be eternal if anything is. Therefore they
are actuality.
There is a difficulty, however; for it seems
that everything which actually functions has a potentiality, whereas
not everything which has a potentiality actually functions; so that
potentiality is prior. But if this is so, there need be no reality;
for everything may be capable of existing, but not yet
existent.Yet if we
accept the statements of the cosmologists who generate everything from
Night,
37 or the doctrine of the physicists that "all
things were together,"
38 we have the same
impossibility; for how can there be motion if there is no actual
cause? Wood will not move itself—carpentry must act upon it;
nor will the menses or the earth move themselves—the seeds
must act upon the earth, and the semen on the menses.Hence some, e.g. Leucippus
39
and Plato,
40 posit an
eternal actuality, for they say that there is always motion; but why
there is, and what it is, they do not say; nor, if it moves in this or
that particular way, what the cause is. For nothing is moved at
haphazard, but in every case there must be some reason present; as in
point of fact things are moved in one way by nature, and in another by
force or mind or some other agent. And further, what kind of motion is
primary? For this is an extremely important point.
[
1072a]
[1]
Again,
Plato at least cannot even explain what it is that he sometimes thinks
to be the source of motion, i.e., that which moves itself; for
according to him the soul is posterior to motion and coeval with the
sensible universe.
41 Now to suppose that
potentiality is prior to actuality is in one sense right and in
another wrong; we have explained
42 the
distinction.But that
actuality is prior is testified by Anaxagoras (since mind is
actuality), and by Empedocles with his theory of Love and Strife, and
by those who hold that motion is eternal, e.g. Leucippus.
Therefore Chaos or Night did not endure for
an unlimited time, but the same things have always existed, either
passing through a cycle or in accordance with some other
principle—that is, if actuality is prior to
potentiality.Now if
there is a regular cycle, there must be something
43 which remains always active in the
same way; but if there is to be generation and destruction, there must
be something else
44 which is always active in two
different ways. Therefore this must be active in one way
independently, and in the other in virtue of something else, i.e.
either of some third active principle or of the first.It must, then, be in virtue of
the first; for this is in turn the cause both of the third and of the
second. Therefore the first is preferable, since it was the cause of
perpetual regular motion, and something else was the cause of variety;
and obviously both together make up the cause of perpetual variety.
Now this is just what actually characterizes motions; therefore why
need we seek any further principles?
Since (a) this is
a possible explanation, and (b) if it is not true, we shall have to
regard everything as coming from "Night"
45 and "all things together" and "not-being,"
46
[20]
these difficulties may be considered to be solved.
There is something which is eternally moved with an unceasing motion,
and that circular motion. This is evident not merely in theory, but in
fact. Therefore the "ultimate heaven" must be eternal. Then there is
also something which moves it.And since that which is moved while it moves
is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved;
something eternal which is both substance and actuality.
Now it moves in the following manner. The
object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved.
The primary objects of desire and thought are the same. For it is the
apparent good that is the object of appetite, and the real good that
is the object of the rational will.
47 Desire is the result of opinion
rather than opinion that of desire; it is the act of thinking that is
the starting-point.Now
thought is moved by the intelligible, and one of the series of
contraries
48 is essentially
intelligible. In this series substance stands first, and of substance
that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are
not the same; for one signifies a measure,
49 whereas "simple" means that the subject itself
is in a certain state.)But
the Good, and that which is in itself desirable, are also in the same
series;
[
1072b]
[1]
and that which is first in a class is
always best or analogous to the best.
That the final cause may apply to immovable things is shown by the
distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is not only "the good
for something," but also "the good which is
the end of some action." In the latter sense it
applies to immovable things, although in the former it does not; and
it causes motion as being an object of love, whereas all other things
cause motion because they are themselves in motion.Now if a thing is moved, it can be
otherwise than it is. Therefore if the actuality of "the heaven" is
primary locomotion, then in so far as "the heaven" is moved, in this
respect at least it is possible for it to be otherwise; i.e. in
respect of place, even if not of substantiality. But since there is
something—X—which moves while being itself
unmoved, existing actually, X cannot be otherwise in any
respect.For the
primary kind of change is locomotion,
50 and of locomotion circular
locomotion
51; and this is the motion which X induces. Thus X is necessarily
existent; and qua necessary it is good, and is
in this sense a first principle.
52 For the necessary has all
these meanings: that which is by constraint because it is contrary to
impulse; and that without which excellence is impossible; and that
which cannot be otherwise, but is absolutely necessary.
53Such, then, is the first principle upon which
depend the sensible universe and the world of nature.And its life is like the best
which we temporarily enjoy. It must be in that state always (which for
us is impossible), since its actuality is also pleasure.
54(And for this reason waking, sensation and
thinking are most pleasant, and hopes and memories are pleasant
because of them.) Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which
is in itself best, and thinking in the highest sense with that which
is in the highest sense best.
55
[20]
And thought thinks itself through
participation in the object of thought; for it becomes an object of
thought by the act of apprehension and thinking, so that thought and
the object of thought are the same, because that which is receptive of
the object of thought, i.e. essence, is thought. And it actually
functions when it possesses this object.
56 Hence it is actuality
rather than potentiality that is held to be the divine possession of
rational thought, and its active contemplation is that which is most
pleasant and best.If,
then, the happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which
we enjoy sometimes, it is marvellous; and if it is greater, this is
still more marvellous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs
to God. For the actuality of thought is life, and God is that
actuality; and the essential actuality of God is life most good and
eternal. We hold, then, that God is a living being, eternal, most
good; and therefore life and a continuous eternal existence belong to
God; for that is what God is.
Those who suppose, as do the
Pythagoreans and Speusippus,
57 that
perfect beauty and goodness do
not exist
in the beginning (on the ground that whereas the first beginnings of
plants and animals are causes, it is in the products of these that
beauty and perfection are found) are mistaken in their
views.For seed
comes from prior creatures which are perfect, and that which is first
is not the seed but the perfect creature.
[
1073a]
[1]
E.g.,
one might say that prior to the seed is the man—not he who
is produced from the seed, but another man from whom the seed
comes.
58 Thus
it is evident from the foregoing account that there is some substance
which is eternal and immovable and separate from sensible things; and
it has also been shown that this substance can have no magnitude, but
is impartible and indivisible (for it causes motion for infinite time,
and nothing finite has an infinite potentiality
59; and therefore since
every magnitude is either finite or infinite, it cannot have finite
magnitude,and it
cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no such thing at all);
and moreover that it is impassive and unalterable; for all the other
kinds of motion are posterior to spatial motion. Thus it is clear why
this substance has these attributes.
We must not
disregard the question whether we should hold that there is one
substance of this kind or more than one, and if more than one, how
many; we must review the pronouncements of other thinkers and show
that with regard to the number of the substances they have said
nothing that can be clearly stated.The theory of the Ideas contains no peculiar
treatment of the question; for the exponents of the theory call the
Ideas numbers, and speak of the numbers
[20]
now as though they were unlimited and now as though
they were limited by the number 10
60; but as for why there should be just so many numbers,
there is no explanation given with demonstrative accuracy.We, however, must discuss the
question on the basis of the assumptions and distinctions which we
have already made.
The first principle
and primary reality is immovable, both essentially and accidentally,
but it excites the primary form of motion, which is one and
eternal.Now since
that which is moved must be moved by something, and the prime mover
must be essentially immovable, and eternal motion must be excited by
something eternal, and one motion by some one thing; and since we can
see that besides the simple spatial motion of the universe
61(which we hold to be excited by
the primary immovable substance) there are other spatial
motions—those of the planets—which are eternal
(because a body which moves in a circle is eternal and is never at
rest—this has been proved in our physical treatises
62); then each of these spatial motions must
also be excited by a substance which is essentially immovable and
eternal.For the
nature of the heavenly bodies is eternal, being a kind of substance;
and that which moves is eternal and prior to the moved; and that which
is prior to a substance must be a substance. It is therefore clear
that there must be an equal number of substances, in nature eternal,
essentially immovable, and without magnitude; for the reason already
stated.
63
[
1073b]
[1]
Thus it is clear that the movers are
substances, and that one of them is first and another second and so on
in the same order as the spatial motions of the heavenly
bodies.As regards
the number of these motions, we have now reached a question which must
be investigated by the aid of that branch of mathematical science
which is most akin to philosophy, i.e. astronomy; for this has as its
object a substance which is sensible but eternal, whereas the other
mathematical sciences, e.g. arithmetic and geometry, do not deal with
any substance. That there are more spatial motions than there are
bodies which move in space is obvious to those who have even a
moderate grasp of the subject, since each of the non-fixed stars has
more than one spatial motion.As to how many these spatial motions actually
are we shall now, to give some idea of the subject, quote what some of
the mathematicians say, in order that there may be some definite
number for the mind to grasp; but for the rest we must partly
investigate for ourselves and partly learn from other investigators,
and if those who apply themselves to these matters come to some
conclusion which clashes with what we have just stated, we must
appreciate both views, but follow the more accurate.
Eudoxus
64 held
that the motion of the sun and moon involves in either case three
spheres,
65 of which
the outermost is that of the fixed stars,
66 the second revolves in the circle
which bisects the zodiac,
67
[20]
and the third revolves in a
circle which is inclined across the breadth of the zodiac
68; but the circle in which the moon moves is inclined at
a greater angle than that in which the sun moves.And he held that the motion of the
planets involved in each case four spheres; and that of these the
first and second are the same
69 as before (for
the sphere of the fixed stars is that which carries round all the
other spheres, and the sphere next in order, which has its motion in
the circle which bisects the zodiac, is common to all the planets);
the third sphere of all the planets has its poles in the circle which
bisects the zodiac; and the fourth sphere moves in the circle inclined
to the equator of the third. In the case of the third sphere, while
the other planets have their own peculiar poles, those of Venus and
Mercury are the same.
Callippus
70 assumed the same arrangement of the
spheres as did Eudoxus (that is, with respect to the order of their
intervals), but as regards their number, whereas he assigned to
Jupiter and Saturn the
same number of spheres as Eudoxus, he considered that two further
spheres should be added both for the sun and for the moon, if the
phenomena are to be accounted for, and one for each of the other
planets.
But if all the spheres in combination
are to account for the phenomena,
[
1074a]
[1]
there must be for
each of the other planets other spheres, one less in number than those
already mentioned, which counteract these and restore to the same
position the first sphere of the star which in each case is next in
order below.
71 In this way
only can the combination of forces produce the motion of the
planets.Therefore
since the forces by which the planets themselves are moved are 8 for
Jupiter and Saturn, and 25 for the others, and since of these the only
ones which do not need to be counteracted are those by which the
lowest planet
72
is moved, the counteracting spheres for the first two planets will be
6, and those of the remaining four will be 16; and the total number of
spheres, both those which move the planets and those which counteract
these, will be 55.If we
do not invest the moon and the sun with the additional motions which
we have mentioned,
73 there will be 47 (?)
74 spheres
in all.
This, then, may be taken to be
the number of the spheres; and thus it is reasonable to suppose that
there are as many immovable substances and principles,
75—the statement of logical necessity may
be left to more competent thinkers.
If there can be
no spatial motion which is not conducive to the motion of a
star,
[20]
and if moreover
every entity and every substance which is impassive and has in itself
attained to the highest good should be regarded as an end, then there
can be no other entity besides these,
76 and the number of the
substances must be as we have said. For if there are other substances,
they must move something, since they are the end of spatial
motion.But there
can be no other spatial motions besides those already mentioned. This
is a reasonable inference from a general consideration of spatial
motion. For if everything which moves exists for the sake of that
which is moved, and every motion for the sake of something which is
moved, no motion can exist for the sake of itself or of some other
motion, but all motions must exist for the sake of the
stars.For if we are
to suppose that one motion is for the sake of another, the latter too
must be for the sake of something else; and since the series cannot be
infinite, the end of every motion must be one of the divine bodies
which are moved through the heavens.
It
is evident that there is only one heaven.
77 For if there is to be a
plurality of heavens (as there is of men), the principle of each must
be one in kind but many in number.But all things which are many in number have
matter (for one and the same definition applies to many individuals,
e.g. that of "man"; but
Socrates is one
78), but the primary
essence has no matter, because it is complete reality. Therefore the
prime mover, which is immovable, is one both in formula and in number;
and therefore so also is that which is eternally and continuously in
motion. Therefore there is only one heaven.
[
1074b]
[1]
A tradition has been handed down by the
ancient thinkers of very early times, and bequeathed to posterity in
the form of a myth, to the effect that these heavenly bodies are
gods,
79 and that the Divine pervades the whole of
nature.The rest of
their tradition has been added later in a mythological form to
influence the vulgar and as a constitutional and utilitarian
expedient
80; they say that these
gods are human in shape or are like certain other animals,
81 and
make other statements consequent upon and similar to those which we
have mentioned.Now if we
separate these statements and accept only the first, that they
supposed the primary substances to be gods, we must regard it as an
inspired saying and reflect that whereas every art and philosophy has
probably been repeatedly developed to the utmost and has perished
again, these beliefs of theirs have been preserved as a relic of
former knowledge. To this extent only, then, are the views of our
forefathers and of the earliest thinkers intelligible to us.
The subject of Mind involves certain difficulties. Mind is held to be
of all phenomena the most supernatural; but the question of how we
must regard it if it is to be of this nature involves certain
difficulties. If Mind thinks nothing, where is its dignity? It is in
just the same state as a man who is asleep. If it thinks, but
something else determines its thinking, then since that which is its
essence is not thinking but potentiality,
82
[20]
it
cannot be the best reality; because it derives its excellence from the
act of thinking.Again,
whether its essence is thought or thinking, what does it think? It
must think either itself or something else; and if something else,
then it must think either the same thing always, or different things
at different times. Then does it make any difference, or not, whether
it thinks that which is good or thinks at random?Surely it would be absurd for it to
think about some subjects. Clearly, then, it thinks that which is most
divine and estimable, and does not change; for the change would be for
the worse, and anything of this kind would immediately imply some sort
of motion. Therefore if Mind is not thinking but a potentiality, (a)
it is reasonable to suppose that the continuity of its thinking is
laborious
83; (b) clearly there
must be something else which is more excellent than Mind; i.e. the
object of thought;for both
thought and the act of thinking will belong even to the thinker of the
worst thoughts.
84 Therefore if this is to be
avoided (as it is, since it is better not to see some things than to
see them), thinking cannot be the supreme good. Therefore Mind thinks
itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of
thinking.
Yet it seems that
knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding are always of
something else, and only incidentally of themselves.And further, if to think is not the
same as to be thought, in respect of which does goodness belong to
thought? for the act of thinking and the object of thought have not
the same essence.
[
1075a]
[1]
The answer is that in some cases
the knowledge is the object. In the productive sciences, if we
disregard the matter, the substance, i.e. the essence, is the object;
but in the speculative sciences the formula or the act of thinking is
the object. Therefore since thought and the object of thought are not
different in the case of things which contain no matter, they will be
the same, and the act of thinking will be one with the object of
thought.
There still remains the question whether the
object of thought is composite; for if so, thought would change in
passing from one part of the whole to another. The answer is that
everything which contains no matter is indivisible. Just as the human
mind, or rather the mind of composite beings,
85 is in a certain space of time
86(for
it does not possess the good at this or at that moment, but in the
course of a certain whole period it attains to the supreme good, which
is other than itself), so is absolute self-thought throughout all
eternity.
We must also consider in which sense
the nature of the universe contains the good or the supreme good;
whether as something separate and independent, or as the orderly
arrangement of its parts.Probably in both senses, as an army does; for the efficiency of an
army consists partly in the order and partly in the general; but
chiefly in the latter, because he does not depend upon the order, but
the order depends upon him. All things, both fishes and birds and
plants, are ordered together in some way, but not in the same way; and
the system is not such that there is no relation between one thing and
another; there is a definite connection.Everything is ordered together to one end; but
the arrangement is like that in a household, where the free persons
have the least liberty to act at random,
[20]
and have all or most of their actions preordained
for them, whereas the slaves and animals have little common
responsibility and act for the most part at random; for the nature of
each class is a principle such as we have described.
87 I mean, for example, that
everything must at least come to dissolution; and similarly there are
other respects in which everything contributes to the good of the
whole.
We must not fail to observe
how many impossibilities and absurdities are involved by other
theories, and what views the more enlightened thinkers hold, and what
views entail the fewest difficulties.All thinkers maintain that all things come
from contraries; but they are wrong both in saying "all things"
88 and in saying that
they come from contraries,
89 nor do they
explain how things in which the contraries really are present come
from the contraries; for the contraries cannot act upon each other.
For us, however, this problem is satisfactorily solved by the fact
that there is a third factor. Other thinkers make one of the two
contraries matter; e.g., this is done by those
90 who make the Unequal matter for the Equal, or
the Many matter for the One.But this also is disposed of in the same way;
for the one matter of two contraries is contrary to nothing. Further,
on their view everything except Unity itself will partake of evil; for
"the Bad"
91 is itself one of the elements. The
other school
92 does not even regard
the Good and the Bad as principles; yet the Good is in the truest
sense a principle in all things. The former school is right in holding
that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a
principle—
[
1075b]
[1]
whether as an end or as a moving
cause or as form.
Empedocles theory is also absurd, for
he identifies the Good with Love.
93 This is a principle both as causing motion (since
it combines) and as matter (since it is part of the mixture).
94 Now even
if it so happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and
as causing motion, still the essence of the two principles is not the
same. In which respect, then, is Love a principle? And it is also
absurd that Strife should be imperishable; strife is the very essence
of evil.
95
Anaxagoras makes the Good a principle as causing motion; for Mind
moves things, but moves them for some end, and therefore there must be
some other Good
96—unless it is as we say; for on our view
the art of medicine is in a sense health.
97 It is absurd also not to provide a contrary
for the Good, i.e. for Mind.
98
But all those who recognize the contraries fail to make use of the
contraries, unless we systematize their theories.And none of them explains why some
things are perishable and others imperishable; for they make all
existing things come from the same first principles.
99 Again, some
100 make existing things come from
not-being, while others,
101
to avoid this necessity, make all things one. Again, no one explains
why there must always be generation, and what the cause of generation
is.
Moreover, those who posit two principles must
admit another superior principle,
102 and so must the
exponents of the Forms; for what made or makes particulars participate
in the Forms?
[20]
And on all
other views it follows necessarily that there must be something which
is contrary to Wisdom or supreme knowledge, but on ours it does not.
For there is no contrary to that which is primary,since all contraries involve matter,
and that which has matter exists potentially; and the ignorance which
is contrary to Wisdom would tend towards the contrary of the object of
Wisdom; but that which is primary has no contrary.
Further, if there is to be nothing else besides
sensible things, there will be no first principle, no order, no
generation, and no celestial motions, but every principle will be
based upon another,
103 as in
the accounts of all the cosmologists and physicists.And if the Forms or numbers
are to exist, they will be causes of nothing; or if not of nothing, at
least not of motion.
Further, how can
extension, i.e. a continuum, be produced from that which is
unextended? Number cannot, either as a moving or as a formal cause,
produce a continuum. Moreover, no contrary can be essentially
productive and kinetic, for then it would be possible for it not to
exist;and further,
the act of production would in any case be posterior to the
potentiality. Therefore the world of reality is not eternal. But there
are real objects which are eternal. Therefore one of these premisses
must be rejected. We have described how this may be done.
104Further, in
virtue of what the numbers, or soul and body, or in general the form
and the object, are one, no one attempts to explain; nor is it
possible to do so except on our theory, that it is the moving cause
that makes them one.
105
As for those
106 who maintain
that mathematical number is the primary reality,
[
1076a]
[1]
and so
go on generating one substance after another and finding different
principles for each one, they make the substance of the universe
incoherent (for one substance in no way affects another by its
existence or non-existence) and give us a great many governing
principles. But the world must not be governed badly:
The rule of many is not good; let one be the
ruler.
107