and also we think that the irrational feelings
are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger
or desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore strange to class
these actions as involuntary.2.
Having defined voluntary and involuntary action, we next have to examine the nature of
For this appears to be intimately connected
with virtue, and to afford a surer test of character than do our actions.2.
Choice is manifestly a voluntary act. But the two terms are not synonymous, the latter
being the wider. Children and the lower animals as well as men are capable of voluntary
action, but not of choice. Also sudden acts may be termed voluntary, but they cannot be
said to be done by choice.2.
Some identify Choice with （1） Desire, or （2） Passion,
or （3） Wish, or （4） some form of Opinion. These views
however appear to be mistaken.
（1） The irrational animals do not exercise choice, but they do feel
desire, and also passion. 2.
Also a man of defective self-restraint acts from desire but not from choice; and on the
contrary a self-restrained man acts from choice and not from desire. 2.
Again, desire can run counter to
choice, but not desire to desire.2
desire has regard to an object as pleasant or painful, choice has not.3
（2） Still less is choice the same as passion. Acts done from passion
seem very far from being done of deliberate choice. 2.
（3） Again, choice is certainly not a wish, though they appear closely akin. Choice cannot have for its object
impossibilities: if a man were to say he chose something impossible he would be thought a
fool; but we can wish for things that are impossible, for instance immortality. 2.
Also we may wish for what cannot
be secured by our own agency, for instance, that a particular actor4
or athlete may win; but no one
chooses what does not rest with himself, but only what he thinks can be attained by his
own act. 2.
Again, we wish
rather for ends than for means, but choose the means to our end; for example we wish to be
healthy, but choose things to make us healthy; we wish to be happy, and that is the word
we use in this connection, but it would not be proper to say that we choose to be happy;
since, speaking generally, choice seems to be concerned with things within our own
（4） Nor yet again can it be opinion. It seems that anything may be
matter of opinion—we form opinions about what is eternal,5
or impossible, just as much as about what is
within our power. Also we distinguish opinion by its truth or falsehood, not by its being
good or bad, but choice is distinguished rather as being good or bad.