Under each of these forms of government we find friendship existing between ruler and
ruled, to the same extent as justice. The friendship of a king for his subjects is one of
superiority in beneficence; for a king does good to his subjects, inasmuch as being good
he studies to promote their welfare, as a shepherd studies the welfare of his sheep; hence
Homer called Agamemnon ‘shepherd of the people.’
The friendship of a father for his child is of the same kind
（only here the benefits bestowed are greater, for the father is the source of the
child's existence, which seems to be the greatest of all boons, and of its nurture and
education; and we also ascribe the same benefits to our forefathers）. For it is
as natural for a father to rule his children, and forefathers those descended from them,
as for a king to rule his subjects.
These friendships then involve a superiority of benefits
on one side, which is why parents receive honor as well as service.1
The claims of justice also, therefore, in these relations are not the same on
both sides, but proportionate to desert, as is the affection bestowed.
The friendship between husband and wife again is the same as that which prevails between
rulers and subjects in an aristocracy; for it is in proportion to excellence, and the
better party receives the larger share [of good],2
whilst each party
receives what is appropriate to each; and the same is true of the claims of justice on
Friendship between brothers is like that between members of a comradeship: the two
parties are equal in station and age, and this usually implies identity of feelings and of
character. The counterpart of fraternal friendship is that which exists under the
timocratic form of constitution; since the ideal of Timocracy is that all citizens shall
be equal and shall be good, so that they all rule in turn, and all have an equal share of
power; and therefore the friendship between them is also one of equality.
Under the perverted forms of constitution friendship like justice can have but little
scope, and least of all in the worst: there is little or no friendship between ruler and
subjects in a tyranny
. For where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, there
can be no friendship between them either, any more than there can be justice. It is like
the relation between a craftsman and his tool, or between the soul and the body
[or between master and slave3
]: all these instruments
it is true are benefited by the persons who use them, but there can be no friendship, nor
justice, towards inanimate things; indeed not even towards a horse or an ox, nor yet
towards a slave as slave. For master and slave have nothing in common: a slave is a living
tool, just as a tool is an inanimate slave.
there can be no friendship with a slave as slave, though there can be as human being: for
there seems to be some room for justice in the relations of every human being with every
other that is capable of participating in law and contract, and hence friendship also is
possible with everyone so far as he is a human being.
Hence even in tyrannies there is but little scope for friendship and justice between
ruler and subjects; but there is most room for them in democracies, where the citizens
being equal have many things in common.