[1281a]
[1]
which in our view constitutes a happy and noble
life; the political fellowship must therefore be deemed to exist for the sake of
noble actions, not merely for living in common. Hence those who contribute most to such fellowship have a
larger part in the state than those who are their equals or superiors in freedom
and birth but not their equals in civic virtue, or than those who surpass them
in wealth but are surpassed by them in virtue.It
is therefore clear from what has been said that all those who dispute about the
forms of constitution assert a part of the just principle.But it is a matter
of question what ought to be the sovereign power in the state. Clearly it must
be either the multitude, or the rich, or the good, or the one man who is best of
all, or a tyrant. But all of these arrangements appear to involve disagreeable
consequences. For instance, if the poor take advantage of their greater numbers
to divide up the property of the rich, is not this unjust? No, it may be said,
for it was a resolution made by the supreme authority in just form. Then what
must be pronounced to be the extreme of injustice? And again, when everybody is
taken into account, suppose the majority share out among themselves the property
of the minority, it is manifest that they are destroying the state; but
assuredly virtue does not destroy
[20]
its
possessor, and justice is not destructive of the state, so that it is clear that
this principle also cannot be just. Also it follows from it that all the actions done by a tyrant are just, for
his use of force is based upon superior strength, as is the compulsion exerted
by the multitude against the rich. But is it just that the minority and the rich
should rule? Suppose therefore they also act in the same way and plunder and
take away the property of the multitude, is this just? If it is, so also is the
plunder of the rich by the multitude. It is clear therefore that all these
things are bad and not just. But
ought the good to rule, and be in control of all classes? If so, then it follows
that all the other classes will be dishonored,1 if they are not honored by holding the offices of
government; for we speak of offices as honors, and if the same persons are
always in office the rest must necessarily be excluded from honor. But is it
better for the most virtuous individual to be the ruler? But that is still more
oligarchical, for the people excluded from honor will be more numerous. But
perhaps some one would say that in any case it is a bad thing for a human being,
having in his soul the passions that are the attributes of humanity, to be
sovereign, and not the law. Suppose therefore that law is sovereign, but law of
an oligarchic or democratic nature, what difference will it make as regards the
difficulties that have been raised? for the results described before will come
about just the same.Most of these points therefore must be discussed on
another occasion; but the view that it is more proper for the multitude to be
sovereign than the few of greatest virtue might be thought to be explicable and
to have some justification, and even to be the true view. For it is possible
that the many, though not individually good men,
1 The term is technical and means disfranchisement and loss of civic rights.
Aristotle. Aristotle in 23 Volumes, Vol. 21, translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1944.
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