Aristotle, Politics

[1300a] [1] and this usually happens when there is a plentiful supply of pay for those who attend the assembly, for being at leisure they meet frequently and decide all things themselves. But a Superintendent of Children and a Superintendent of Women, and any other magistrates that exercise a similar sort of supervision, are an aristocratic feature, and not democratic （for how is it possible to prevent the wives of the poor from going out of doors¹?） nor yet oligarchic （for the wives of oligarchic rulers are luxurious）. But let the discussion of these matters go no further at present, and let us attempt to go through from the beginning the question of the ways of appointing the magistrates. The varieties here depend on three determinants, the combinations of which must give all the possible modes. One of these three determining points is, who are the persons who appoint the magistrates? the second is, from whom? and last, in what manner? And of each of these three determinants there are three variations: either all the citizens appoint or some, and either from all or from a certain class （defined for instance by property-assessment or birth or virtue or some other such qualification, as at Megara only those were eligible who returned in a body from exile and fought together against the common people）,² and the mode of appointment may be either by vote or by lot; again, these systems may be coupled together— [20] I mean that some citizens may appoint to some offices but all to others, and to some offices all citizens may be eligible but to others only a certain class, and to some appointment may be by vote but to others by lot. And of each variation of these determinants there will be four modes: either all citizens may appoint from all by vote, or all from all by lot—and from all either section by section, for instance by tribes or demes or brotherhoods until the procedure has gone through all the citizens, or from the whole number every time,—or else partly in one way and partly in the other. Again, if the electors are some of the citizens, they must either appoint from all by vote, or from all by lot, or from some by vote, or from some by lot, or partly in one way and partly in the other—I mean partly by vote and partly by lot. Hence the modes prove to be twelve, apart from the two combinations. And among these, two ways of appointment are democratic—for all to appoint from all by vote, or by lot, or by both—some offices by lot and others by vote; but for not all to be the electors and for them to appoint simultaneously, and either from all or from some either by lot or by vote or by both, or some offices from all and others from some by both （by which I mean some by lot and others by vote） is constitutional. And for some to appoint from all, to some offices by vote and to others by lot or by both³ （to some by lot and to others by vote） is oligarchical; and it is even more oligarchical to appoint from both classes. But to appoint some offices from all and the others from a certain class is constitutional with an aristocratic bias;