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1 Ruskin, Time and Tide 52 (Brantwood ed. p. 68): “Every faculty of man's soul, and every instinct of it by which he is meant to live, is exposed to its own special form of corruption”; Boethius, Cons. iii. 11 (L.C.L. trans. p. 283), things are destroyed by what is hostile; Aristot.Top. 124 a 28εἰ γὰρ τὸ φθαρτικὸν διαλυτικόν.
3 See What Plato Said, p. 490, on Lysis 216 D.
4 Cf. Vol. I. p. 529, note a, on 478 D.
6 The argument that follows is strictly speaking a fallacy in that it confounds the soul with the physical principle of life. Cf. on 35 C and on 352 E, Gorg. 477 B-C, and supra,Introd. p. lxvii. But Dean Inge, “Platonism and Human Immortality” (Aristot. Soc., 1919, p. 288) says: “Plato's argument, in the tenth book of the Republic, for the immortality of the soul, has found a place in scholastic theology, but is supposed to have been discredited by Kant. I venture to think that his argument, that the soul can only be destroyed by an enemy (so to speak)in pari materia, is sound. Physical evils, including death, cannot touch the soul. And wickedness does not, in our experience, dissolve the soul, nor is wickedness specially apparent when the soul (if it perishes at death) would be approaching dissolution.” Cf. 610 C. Someone might object that wickedness does destroy the soul, conceived as a spiritual principle.
7 Plato generally disregards minor distinctions when they do not affect his point.
8 Cf. 610 D.
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