Death of Hasdrubal
MY reason for prefixing a table of contents to each book,
rather than a preface, is not because I do not recognise the
usefulness of a preface in arresting attention and rousing
interest, and also giving facilities for finding any passage that is
wanted, but because I find prefaces viewed, though from many
inadequate reasons, with contempt and neglect. I therefore
had recourse to a table of contents throughout my history,
except the first six books, arranged according to Olympiads,
as being as effective, or even more so, than a preface, and at
the same time as less subject to the objection of being out
of place, for it is closely connected with the subject-matter.
In the first six books I wrote prefaces, because I thought a
mere table of contents less suitable. . . .
After the battle at Baecula, Hasdrubal made good his passage
over the Western Pyrenees, and thence through the Cevennes, B.C.
208. In the spring of B.C. 207 he crossed the Alps and descended
into Italy, crossed the Po, and besieged Placentia. Thence he
sent a letter to his brother Hannibal announcing that he would
march southward by Ariminum and meet him in Umbria. The
letter fell into the hands of the Consul Nero, who was at Venusia,
and who immediately made a forced march northward, joined his
colleague at Sena, and the next day attacked Hasdrubal. See
above, 10, 39; Livy, 27, 39-49.
Much easier and shorter was Hasdrubal's journey into
Italy. . . .
1
Never at any other time had
Rome been in a greater state
of excitement and terrified expectation of the result. . . .
2
None of these arrangements satisfied Hasdrubal. But
Battle of the Metaurus. B. C. 207. Coss, C. Claudius Nero, M. Livius Salinator II. |
circumstances no longer admitted of delay. He
saw the enemy drawn out in battle array and
advancing; and he was obliged to get the
Iberians and the Gauls who were serving with
him into line. He therefore stationed his ten
elephants on the front, increased the depth of
his lines, and so had his whole army covering a somewhat
small ground. He took up a position himself in the centre of
the line, immediately behind the elephants, and commenced
an advance upon the Roman left, with a full resolution that in
this battle he must either conquer or die. Livius advanced to
meet the enemy with proud confidence, and having come to
close quarters with him was fighting with great gallantry, Meanwhile Claudius, who was stationed on the right wing,
found himself unable to advance and outflank the enemy, owing to the
rough ground in front of him, relying on which Hasdrubal
had directed his advance upon the Roman left: and being
embarrassed by his inability to strike a blow, he promptly
decided what the circumstances pointed out as the tactics to
pursue. He withdrew his men from the right wing, and
marched them on the rear of the field of battle; and, after
passing the left of the Roman line, fell upon the flank of the
Carthaginians who were fighting near the elephants. Up to
this point the victory had been doubtful; for both sides fought
with desperation, the Romans believing that all would be over
with them if they failed, and the Iberians and Carthaginians
holding exactly the same conviction for themselves. Moreover
the elephants were being of disservice to both sides alike; for
finding themselves between two forces, and exposed to a crossfire of javelins, they kept throwing both the Carthaginian and
Roman lines into confusion. But as soon as Claudius fell
upon the rear of the enemy the battle ceased to be equal: for
the Iberians found themselves attacked on front and rear at
once, which resulted in the greater part of them being cut
down on the ground. Six of the elephants were killed with
the men on them, four forced their way through the lines and
were afterwards captured, having been abandoned by their
Indian drivers.
