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That our magistrates should suffer a reconsideration of our decision concerning Mytilene is surprising, and attempts to persuade you to a different conclusion can proceed only from dishonest motives. But it is no wonder that attempts are made to mislead you by fine-sounding words, since you are wont to devote yourselves to the enjoyment of brilliant speeches rather than to forming a judgment from actual cireumstances. ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτός εἰμι: the very words of Pericles, ii. 61. 5. Cf. Soph. O. R. 557 καὶ νῦν ἔθ: αὑτός εἰμι τῷ βονλεύματι. Dio C. imitates the passage, xxxviii. 44 ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην ἔχω καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλομαι. Cf. also Soph. Phil. 521; Eur. Phoen. 920.—2. θαυμάζω τῶν προθέντων . . . λέγειν: τῶν προθέντων is short for τῶν προθέντων ὅτι προύθεσαν. Cf. ὑμῶν θαυμάζω, εἰ μὴ βοηθήσετε, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 53; also Lys. xii. 86; Lyeurg. in Leocr. 135. For the gen., see G. 1126; H. 744; Kr. Spr. 47, 10, 9; Kühn. 417, N. 9. προθεῖναι λέγειν for the more usual προθεῖναι λόγον, or προθεῖναι γνώμας (c. 36. 21; cf. c. 42. 1)—ἀποδοῦναι βουλεύσασθαι (c. 36. 23). Cf. Hdt. viii. 49. 2 προθεῖναι γνώμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι. See Schoemann, de Comit. Athen., p. 104.—3. ἐμποιησάντων: causing, as in i. 2. 17; ii. 51. 16.— πρὸς τῶν ἠδικηκότων: in the interest of those who have done wrong. For πρός with gen., see G. 1216 a; H. 805, 1 b; Kr. Spr. 68, 37, 1; Matth. 590, 6. Cf. c. 59. 1; ii. 86. 19; iv. 10. 8; 29. 11; 92. 36; vii. 36. 18; 81. 27; viii. 36. 9.—4. ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ: with duller anger, i.e. anger that has already cooled off. The thought must be completed by supplying the words χρόνου διατριβῆς ἐμποιηθείσης. Cf. ii. 40. 21.—5. ἐπεξέρχεται: with the dat. (τῷ δράσαντι), in the sense of revenge (v. 89. 3; vi. 38. 10), as in that of attack (c. 27. 6; ii. 23. 1; v. 9. 8), of pursuit (iv. 14. 20).— ἀμύνασθαι: without art. as subject. Kr. Spr. 50, 6, 3. Cf. ii. 35. 7; 39. 22; 54. 8; 63. 14; Xen. Resp. Laced. 9. 2 ἕπεται τῇ ἀρετῇ σῴζεσθαι εἰς τὸν πλείω χρόνον μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ κακίᾳ. —τῷ παθεῖν: the dat. depends not upon ἐγγυτάτω alone, which always takes the gen. in Thuc., but upon ἐγγυτάτω κείμενον, the partic. being pf. pass. of τιθέναι. Schol. εἰ τὸ ἀμύνεσθαι τῷ παθεῖν ἐγγὺς τεθείη. Cf. ἐγγυτέρω καταστῆσαι Ἀθηναίοις, ii. 89. 47. Kr. Di. 48, 9, 2; Matth. 542, N. 1. In Plut. de Sera 2, this passage is cited, and the sentiment approved by the speaker,—not by Plutarch. —6. ἀντίπαλον μάλιστα τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει: takes the punishment that is most adequate. On the omission of ὄν, see App. ἀναλαμβάνει τιμωρίαν is not found elsewhere, but is to be compared with such expressions as ἔχθραν, ἀπέχθειαν, κίνδυνον ἀναλαμβάνειν. Reiske and Cl. conjecture λαμβάνει, considering the ἀνα- simply a repetition of the preceding -αν, and so St. writes. Kr. suggests ἀντιλαμβάνει.—7. θαυμάζω δὲ καὶ ὅστις ἔσται ὁ ἀντερῶν κτἑ.: as the first clause contains a defiant threat, so by ἀξιώσων ἀποφαίνειν τὰς μὲν Μυτιληναίων κτἑ. the presumptive opponent is, with intentional perversion, forced into a false alternative. “Whoever does not vote for the severest punishment of the Mytileneans must show (I wonder who will presume to show) that the revolt of the Mytileneans is helpful to us, while our misfortunes are hurtful to our allies,” i.e. that they, by their revolt, which was certainly detrimental to Athens (ἡμετέρας ξυμφοράς), did us good, but themselves harm. From the impossibility of proving this is to be dedueed the necessity of extreme severity. That the guilt of revolting and the necessity of its punishment do not, however, neces sarily imply the destruction of the guilty, Cleon purposely does not say. A correct conception of the connexion shows that every change proposed is unnecessary. See Junge, ibid. p. 9 f. καὶ δῆλον ὅτι . . . ἀγωνίσαιτ̓ ἄν: and it is plain that either he has such confidence in his powers of speech as to contend that what is universally acknowledged is not established (clearly known), or, to use St.'s words, id quod omnibus probatum est non constat. τὸ δοκοῦν is here used in the philosophical sense found in Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 15 διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους. For the force of ἔγνωσται, cf. Dem. xxi. 41 ἂν γὰρ ταῦθ: οὕτως ἐγνωσμένα ὑπάρχῃ παῤ ὑμῖν. For the inf., ἀνταποφῆναι, dependent on ἀγωνίσαἰ ἄν, cf. c. 82. 59; iv. 87. 23; viii. 89. 30, and see Kr. Spr. 55, 3, 16. The term ἀγωνίζεσθαι is chosen as if the reference were to the delivery of a show-piece (ἀγώνισμα, i. 22. 19), and the figure of an oratorical competition is kept up in what follows (ἀγώνων l. 14, ἀγωνοθετοῦντες and θεαταί l. 16, ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι l. 25). The interpretation above is essentially that also of Heilmann, Arn., Kr., and Bm. Others (Portus, Duker, Kistemacher, Bredow, Haacke, Goell., and Bl.), understanding τὸ δοκοῦν to refer to the decree passed the day before, explain, “What was most certainly your resolution has really not been adopted.” But this, it is objected, would require τὸ δόξαν.—12. ἢ κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος . . . πειράσεται: or incited by gain (i.e. bribed), elaborating what is plausible in words he will try to mislead you. Thus an insinuation of bribery is made in advance against any reply. It is the course which is aptly characterized in c. 42. 12 ἐκπλῆξαι ἂν τούς τε ἀντεροῦντας καὶ τοὺς ἀκουσομένους. For κέρδει ἐπαιρόμενος, see on ἀγῶνι ἐπαιρομένους, c. 37. 27. In c. 40. § 1 also, Cleon makes a distinction between those of his opponents who would display their oratorical skill and those who are bribed. παράγειν as in i. 34. 9; 91. 6; ii. 64. 1. For τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τοῦ λόγου, cf. c. 11. 10. For the neut. adj. in place of abstract noun, see on c. 30. 4; i. 36. 3. ἑτέροις: Schol. τοῖς ῥήτορσι.— 15. ἀναφέρει: Schol. ἀναφέρει, ἀναδέχεται. It seems not to occur else where with κίνδυνον, but cf. ἀναφέρειν φθόνους καὶ διαβολάς, Polyb. i. 36. 3; ἀναφέρειν φθόνους καὶ τὸν πόλεμον, Polyb. iv. 59. 10; ἀναφέρειν τὸν πόνον, Dion. H. x. 24. αἴτιοι δ᾽ ὑμεῖς: just as unworthy motives are imputed by Cleon to his presumptive opponent, so the hearer who would show himself favourable to the former is charged with perverse conduct throughout, and this is expressed in a series of partics. and pred. adjs., continuing to the end of the chapter. The charges made are threefold: 1) that in the deliberation more value is placed upon words than facts (κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες . . . ἀπὸ τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων); 2) that in speeches what is new and unusual is more applanded than what is tried and in the long run wholesome (καὶ μετὰ καινότητος . . . ἀποβησόμενα); 3) that in the hankering after an ideal state actual conditions are neglected (ζητοῦντές τε . . . ἱκανῶς); and finally all these errors are traced to the mania for rhetorical and sophistical performances (ἁπλῶς τε . . . βουλευομένοις).—16. ἀγωνοθετοῦντες: cf. Aeschin. c. Ctes. 180 ὑπολάβετε τοίνυν ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀγωνοθέτας πολιτικῆς ἀρετῆς, Xen. Anab. iii. 1. 21 ἀγωνοθέται οἱ θεοί εἰσιν.—θεαταὶ μὲν . . . τῶν ἔργων: “instead of seeing facts as they are and listening to speeches with judgment, you are on the contrary hearers of facts and seers of speeches, in that you view facts past and future in the light of what the orators say (ἀπὸ τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων) and attend upon the speeches as spectators of a contest of sophists, in which the prize is awarded for technical adroitness, not for the truth.” Bm.—17. τὰ μὲν . . . ἐπιτιμησάντων: not in the facts, but in the discussion of them (τῶν εὖ εἰπόντων, τῶν λόγῳ καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων), is found the rule or measure by which is determined (ἀπὸ . . . σκοποῦντες) both the practicability of the μέλλοντα ἔργα, and the truth about the πεπραγμένα (though these ought to be experienced, not heard about). σκοπεῖν ἀπό as in i. 21. 11; ii. 48. 14.— 19. τὰ δὲ πεπραγμένα ἤδη: sc. σκοποῦντες.—οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον ὄψει λαβόντες ἢ τὸ ἀκουσθέν: not taking what is done as more to be trusted, because you have seen it, than what is heard. λαβεῖν = ὑπολαβεῖν, as in ii. 42. 17; iv. 106. 6. With the sentiment of the whole passage, cf. vii. 48. 20 ff. τὸ δρασθέν as in vi. 53. 8. καὶ μετὰ καινότητος μὲν λόγου . . . ἐθέλειν: the best to be deceived with novelty of words and to be un- willing to follow with the rest in case of approved advice, i.e. where a proposition (λόγου) has been tested and approved. With μετὰ καινότητος λόγου, cf. Isoc. x. 2 ἐπὶ τῇ καινότητι τῶν εὑρημένων. ἄριστοι, sc. ὄντες, ironieal, adepts. It is equiv. to ἐπιτήδειοι, as the Schol. says, just as in Hdt. i. 193. 13 ἀρίστη . . . Δήμητρος κάρπον ἐκφέρειν, iii. 80. 21 διαβολὰς ἄριστος ἐνδέκεσθαι. Cf. also Hdt. i. 136. 2 μάχεσθαι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, and Hes. Op. 763, 779, 813; Soph. O. T. 440; Ar. Nub. 430; Xen. Cyrop. v. 4. 44. G. 1526; H. 952.—23. δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων: slaves of every new extravagance. δοῦλοι ὄντες, i.e. χαίροντες καὶ πιστεύοντές, Schol. ἀτόπων as in ii. 49. 8; Schol. παραδόξων. Cf. Greg. Naz. i. p. 53 δοῦλοι ὄντες τῶν ἀεὶ παρόντων, Aristid. ii. 150 a τῆς χρείας ἀεὶ δούλους εἶναι.—ὑπερόπται δὲ τῶν εἰωθότων: scorners of what is established. ὑπερόπται not found elsewhere in Attic; Schol. καταφρονοῦντες. Both δοῦλοι and ὑπερόπται are explanatory of ἄριστοι, while τῶν αἰεὶ ἀτόπων represents καινότητος λόγου, as τῶν εἰωθότων does δεδοκιμασμένου. In illustration of the whole passage, Bl. compares Ar. Eccles. 581-588. μάλιστα μέν, εἰ δὲ μή: as in i. 32. 4; ii. 72. 8; iv. 104. 20; v. 21. 15; viii. 91. 15.— αὐτὸς ἕκαστος βουλόμενος: the distrib. pron. after pl. subj. (ὑμεῖς), as in i. 141. 27; ii. 16. 11. —25. ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι kte(.: the pl. is resumed. On the partic. depends not only δοκεῖν, but also εἶναι with its preds. πρόθυμοι and βραδεῖς. On δοκεῖν depend both ἀκολουθῆσαι and προεπαινέσαι. Vying with those that say such things, in seeming not to follow after them in insight, but when any one says anything clerer to applaud it beforehand. Cf. Dio C. lii. 8 ἀνταγωνιζόμενοι μὴ δοκεῖν ὀργίζεσθαι.—τοιαῦτα: sc. καινά and ἄτοπα. So generally explained, but Steup brackets τοῖς τοιαῦτα λέγουσι. See App.— 27. προεπαινέσαι: found only here. Cf. ἐπαινέσαι, approve, iv. 65. 8; v. 37. 24.— καὶ προαισθέσθαι τε . . . ἀποβησόμενα: and (vying) in being both eager to perceive beforehand what is said and slow to anticipate what will come of it. The first καί connects εἶναι with δοκεῖν; while τε, καί connect προαισθέσθαι πρόθυμοι and προνοῆσαι βραδεῖς, the emphasis being on the former, as in ii. 39. 24. See App. ἄλλο τι . . . ζῶμεν: an entirely different world, so to speak, from that in which we live. ὡς εἰπεῖν, as always in Thuc., not ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, as in Plato and the orators. GMT. 777, 1; H. 956. Cf. i. 1. 9. For the pl. οἷς after ἄλλο, see Kr. Spr. 58, 4, 5.— 31. ἁπλῶς τε: and in a word, as in c. 45. 29; 82. 34. τε inferential, and so, as que in Lat. See on i. 4. 5.— ἀκοῆς ἡδονῇ: cf. c. 40. 7 ἡδονῇ λόγων. —ἡσσώμενοι: with dat. as vii. 25. 41 οὐ τῇ τῶν πολεμίων ἰσχύι . . . ἡσσηθεῖεν. Elsewhere in figurative sense with the gen., as iv. 37. 6; v. 111. 15. In connexion with Cleon's placing the source of all evil in the prevailing enjoyment of fine speeches, is to be remembered the fact that about the end of this summer (see on c. 86. 12) Gorgias came to Athens for the first time, as ambassador from Leontini, and though Cleon could not have had him in mind in his real speech, Thuc. doubtless did, as he wrote the speech. — σοφιστῶν: only here in Thuc., in Cleon's mouth, in the same unfavourable sense as often in Aristophanes (Nub. 331, 1111), Xenophon (Mem. i. 6. 13), and Plato (Phaedr. 257 d; Prot. 312 a, etc.).—32. θεαταῖς ἐοικότες καθημένοις: the perversity of the practice of the sophists, whose object was not instruction, but vainglorious display, is characterized by θεαταί (cf. θεαταὶ τῶν λόγων, l. 16). καθημένοις is usually taken as explanatory of θεαταῖς, sitting idly, as in Dem. ii. 23, 24; iv. 9, 44; viii. 77—similarly iv. 124. 24. But Kr. objects that no activity is required of spectators, and Steup seems clearly right in considering (with Hude, p. 98) θεαταῖς as pred. Like men sitting as spectators of sophists rather than like men deliberating about the welfare of the state.
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