PROSCRI´PTIO
PROSCRI´PTIO The word
proscriptio, signifying primarily the “writing
up” of anything, was generally used to denote a written public notice
of sale;
proscriptio bonorum was thus applied
to the notice of property sold by auction: and amongst goods disposed of in
this way would be the confiscated goods of persons who were declared public
enemies by the state. It was this last meaning, that of the sale of goods
forfeited by the outlawry of their possessors, that became specially
attached to the word after the occupation of Rome by Sulla in 82 B.C. Since,
however, a decree of outlawry by the state included not only the forfeit of
property, but the forfeit of life ( “de capite civis et de bonis
proscriptio,” Cic.
pro Sest. 30,
65), the word involved both significations; and the special connotation that
attached to it was that of the absence of all protection to the lives of
persons so outlawed, who were themselves called
proscripti. Sulla was the first to “proscribe”
in this new sense, and to make a declaration of outlawry against political
enemies a definite political measure (Veil. 2.28, 3;
App. BC 1.95). The form which the measure
took was the posting up of a list setting forth the names of the victims,
with certain decrees necessary for its execution attached. Thus this notice
did not merely give the passive permission to take the lives of the persons
so outlawed, which was recognised by the Roman law (Festus, s. v.
sacer), but offered rewards, both for information
which might lead to their death, and for their execution at the hands of
either citizens or slaves; while it imposed penalties on those who should
seek to protect them (
App. BC 1.95). This
proscription of large numbers of Roman citizens by Sulla, although an act of
individual policy, and in part perhaps an act of vengeance, was yet
supported by a political pretext. This was a declaration that they were
hostes, or enemies to the state, through
their complicity with its foreign foes; and enemies besides that had
forfeited all claims to protection, through the breach of the covenant that
Sulla had made with the consul Scipio, and which, he maintained, bound all
the Marian party. All connivance with his enemies subsequent to the date of
this treaty was sufficient to place a man's name on the list (App. ib.), and
the confiscation of property was applied not only
[p. 2.504]to those proscribed at Rome, but to all who had fallen in the ranks of his
opponents (
Cic. pro Rosc. Amer.
43, 126). The fact that those proscribed were regarded as
hostes naturally affected the status of their
children and descendants who suffered a
capitis
deminutio. This loss of status was not rigorously carried out,
however, and they were only disfranchised for certain purposes which were
specified (
Plut. Sull. 31). They were
debarred from all public offices in the state, but yet not entirely degraded
from their social position, for one of the ordinances declared that the sons
of senators, while excluded from the privileges of their order, should yet
undertake its burdens (Vell. 2.28, 3). They seem also to have been forbidden
certain private rights, such as the acceptance of legacies; and the spirit,
if not the letter, of the law that sanctioned Sulla's arrangements seems
even to have cut them off from all active assistance at the hands of their
fellow-citizens (
Cic. in Verr.
1.47, 123). The effect was to debar them as far as possible from all
chances of a public career ( “a republica summoveri,” Cic. ap.
Quinct. 2.1, 85), which, considering the hereditary policy of Roman houses,
was no doubt the deliberate design of Sulla, to further the permanence of
his constitution. The authorities on the Sullan proscriptions agree
generally that the proscription list was published before the dictatorial
power was conferred on Sulla (
Plut. Sull.
32;
App. BC 1.97). When it was
conferred, a retrospective sanction was given to his acts, and a special
clause granted him the power to adjudicate on the lives and property of the
citizens (Plut.
ib.;
Cic. de Leg. Agr. 3.2, 7). The
law which conferred these powers on Sulla was the Lex Valeria, passed by the
interrex L. Valerius Flaccus (
App. BC
1.98): a law, however, which was so entirely the work of Sulla, and
so intimately bound up with his own subsequent legislation, that Cicero
calls it indifferently the Lex Valeria or Cornelia (
Cic. in Verr. 1.47, 123). These acts may,
however, have received a further legal sanction from Sulla himself, and
Cicero's language rather implies that they did (Cic. ap. Quinct. 2.1, 85).
The legality of these regulations was never questioned; Cicero, while
affirming their injustice, never doubts their legality (
de
Leg. 1.15): and the disabilities imposed on the children of the
proscribed still remained in force after many of Sulla's laws had been
repealed, and was the one point in his legislation which neither the
democratic nor the moderate aristocratic party ventured to assail. The
number actually put to death in the Sullan proscriptions is variously given:
subsequent additions were continually being made until the list was complete
(App. 1.95;
Plut. Sull. 31), but the total
of 4,700, that is given by Valerius Maximus (9.2, 1), of which 2,000 were
senators and equites, is probably not above the mark. This proscription of
Sulla was merely the legalised form of the massacre and confiscation which
his opponents, the Marians, had conducted in a hardly less destructive,
though more informal, manner. It was no doubt regarded by its author as
necessary to his work of re-organisation; and was almost an inevitable
result of the first use of the military power for this purpose. So far as it
was a necessity of the times, it was rendered so by the absence of the
punishment of death in Roman law, and by the growing extent of the Roman
Empire, which rendered the exiling of opponents useless and even dangerous.
In Sulla's case it was rendered more desirable by the necessity he was under
of raising revenues to recompense his soldiers-After Sulla it was regarded
as the natural, and almost necessary consequence, of any violent
restoration. Had Pompey been victorious in the civil war, his victory would
almost certainly have been followed by a proscription (
Cic. Att. 9.1. 0,
6;
11.6,
2); while the same fears were entertained,
by the moderate party at Rome, of the probable conduct of Caesar, if he
became master of the city (
Cic. Att. 9.7,
5;
10.8,
2). The assassination of Caesar by those
whom he had spared gave an impetus to the next proscription, and a plausible
excuse for its advisability (
App. BC 4.8).
The precedent set by Sulla was taken up with still more vigour by the
triumvirs Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus, in 43 B.C. (Suet.
Oct. 27; App.
Civ. Bell. 4.5). The number of
the upper classes now proscribed exceeded that of Sulla. For the party
chiefly aimed at by the triumvirs was that of the
optimates (
οἱ δυνατοί, App.
4.5), the strict constitutional party, whose power it was necessary to break
down; and accordingly 2,000 equites and 300 senators were in the list. The
proscription was carried out from motives of personal hatred, except perhaps
on the part of Octavian, quite as much as from such considerations of
political necessity as were recognised by Sulla. The motive of raising money
by confiscation was still more present in this proscription, while private
enmity and private greed played a large part in it (
App. BC 4.5). But in other respects this second proscription was
directed by stricter adherence to the forms of law. It did not definitely
commence until the triumvirs had been invested with their extraordinary
powers
reipublicae constituendae (Liv.
Ep. 20, 24;
App. BC 4.7),
although a preliminary proscription of sixteen persons, amongst whom was
Cicero, had been carried out by the consul Pedius, on a mandate from the
triumvirs. In, other respects the proscription resembled that of Sulla, and
was directed by the same supposed necessities, but, in that it aimed more
definitely at the dissolution of a specific party in the state, its effects
were more permanently felt; it assisted in destroying a section of the
community that had united interests opposed to those of the rising monarchy
(
Tac. Ann. 1.2,
1).
[
A.H.G]
